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INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that Richard B. Cheney was the most
powerful Vice President in American history. 1 His tenure marks
the apogee of vice presidential influence, reflecting the gradual
rise in importance of the office over the past several decades. 2

1
See, e.g., BRUCE P. MONTGOMERY, RICHARD B. CHENEY AND THE RISE OF THE
IMPERIAL VICE PRESIDENCY x (2009) (“Cheney . . . far surpassed any of his
predecessors in power and influence.”); SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW, THE COPRESIDENCY OF BUSH AND CHENEY 1 (2009) (“Cheney . . . exerted more influence
than any vice president in history . . . .”).
2
It is undeniable that the stature of the vice presidency has increased
dramatically since the nineteenth century. When exactly the turning point took
place is less clear. The leading scholar on the vice presidency sums up matters aptly:
The metamorphosis of the vice presidency occurred over time. Although
scholars differ on the length of the period, the key dates, and the weight to
attach to particular events, it seems clear that the evolution began during
the twentieth century and accelerated sometime after World War II. [In the
first quarter of the twentieth century,] Vice presidents began to find some
work in the executive branch. Wilson’s vice president Thomas Marshall, and
his successor, Calvin Coolidge, attended some cabinet meetings. . . . [With a
brief pause during the Charles Dawes vice presidency, this custom] has
continued since that time. [John Nance] Garner and Henry Wallace
assumed some executive duties as legislative liaison, foreign emissary, and
commission head. These involvements . . . symbolized a migration of the
office to the executive branch. . . . The vice presidency of Richard M. Nixon
first illustrated the modern American vice presidency [as he] . . . functioned
essentially as a member of the executive branch.
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One of the issues that arose at several junctures during Cheney’s
tenure was his determination to conduct his official activities
confidentially. This prompted a series of clashes with members
of Congress and outside groups as they tried to gain access to
Cheney’s internal deliberations. 3 These conflicts, several of
which were litigated, 4 led many commentators to assert that
Cheney was exercising what amounted to an illegitimate vice
presidential privilege. 5
While the President’s exercise of executive privilege has been
covered exhaustively in the academic literature, 6 the question of
whether the Vice President enjoys his own constitutional
privilege has never been fully explored by scholars. 7 This Article
Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Power
of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 165, 177–79 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000); see also
infra notes 309–15 and accompanying text.
3
See infra Part VI.L.
4
See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Walker v. Cheney,
230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002).
5
See infra note 7 (providing a number of examples of such commentary).
6
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH
(1974); ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (1974); LOUIS
FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2004); DANIEL N. HOFFMAN,
GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS (1981); PHILIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 34–74 (1978); MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA
OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1st ed. 1994) [hereinafter ROZELL
I]; Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974); Robert G.
Dixon, Jr., Congress, Shared Administration, and Executive Privilege, in CONGRESS
AGAINST THE PRESIDENT (Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr. ed., 1975); Randall K. Miller,
Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of Executive
Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631 (1997); Gary J. Schmitt, Executive Privilege:
Presidential Power To Withhold Information from Congress, in THE PRESIDENCY IN
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis eds., 1981); Peter
M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case
of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987);
Abraham D. Sofaer, Book Review of Raoul Berger’s EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH, 88 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1974); Constitutional Law—
Executive Privilege—The President Does Not Have an Absolute Privilege To Withhold
Evidence from a Grand Jury—Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 87
HARV. L. REV. 1557 (1974); Judicial Review of Claims of Executive Privilege, 88
HARV. L. REV. 50 (1974).
7
The question has been briefly alluded to by a number of commentators. See,
e.g., The Presidential Records Act Amendments of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4187 Before
the Subcomm. on Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform Concerning H.R. 4187, 107th Cong. (2002), in
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., H.R. 4187, THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT AMENDMENTS
2002, at 6 [hereinafter Rosenberg Statement] (statement of Morton Rosenberg)
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(“Section 11 of E.O. 13,233 appears to provide that a former Vice-President may
assert an independent claim of executive privilege to bar access to his materials
under the PRA, and that such a claim will be treated exactly the same as a privilege
by a former President . . . .”); The Implementation of the Presidential Records Act:
Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform Concerning, 107th Cong.
(2001), in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., H.R. 4187, THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT
AMENDMENTS 2002, at 105 [hereinafter PRA Hearing] (testimony of Peter M. Shane)
(“[The executive order states that] the Vice President shall be treated as the
President [for purposes of executive privilege]. And if I may ask rhetorically, why in
heaven’s name would that be?”); The Role of the Council on Competitiveness in
Regulatory Review: Hearing on S. 1942 Before the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 102d
Cong. 20, 24 (1991) [hereinafter Council Hearings] (testimony of Harold Bruff)
(“How does the executive privilege apply to the vice presidency? . . . We do not want
then to constrain executive privilege so much that the vice president is left attending
funerals and cannot do anything useful at the center of the Federal Government.”);
WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 199 (“Extending executive privilege to the vice
president . . . was a novel concept.”); Vikram David Amar, The Cheney Decision—A
Missed Chance To Straighten out Some Muddled Issues, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
185, 200 (stating that “the Cheney [v. U.S. District Court] ruling also missed a golden
chance to explain how, or even why, executive privilege applies to the peculiar office
of the vice presidency”); Hilary S. Cairnie & C. Ernest Edgar, IV, An Imperfect
Shield: How Private Parties Can Attack and Defeat the Executive Privilege for
Deliberative Process in Government Procurement Litigation, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 127,
144 (1999) (“Presidential deliberations are to be accorded the most (but not absolute)
deference in terms of privilege. Presumably, the vice president would also be
accorded this degree of deference. Because these are the only two constitutionally
created offices in the Executive Branch, they enjoy an explicit constitutional
recognition that does not apply to any other members of the Executive Branch.”);
Louis Klarevas, The Law: Can You Sue the White House? Opening the Door for
Separation of Powers Immunity in Cheney v. District Court, 34 PRES. STUD. Q. 849,
865 (2004) (“[T]he opinion implies that the vice president should enjoy the right to
invoke presidential privileges and immunities (at least in civil suits). . . . Should vice
presidents seize on this language in the future, it is likely that they will argue that
they are shielded from a variety of legal proceedings because of the unique rights
and responsibilities conferred to them by the Constitution. The fact that the
Supreme Court did not expressly distinguish the vice president from the president in
its ruling bodes well for vice presidents.”); Martha Joynt Kumar, Executive Order
13233 Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act, 32 PRES. STUD. Q.
194, 205 (2002) (“The executive order implies a vice president may exercise executive
privilege, an authority some question. . . . [I]t is unclear where his independent
claim to executive privilege lies.”); Bruce P. Montgomery, Nixon’s Ghost Haunts the
Presidential Records Act: The Reagan and George W. Bush Administrations, 32
PRES. STUD. Q. 789, 805 (2002) (“One of the extraordinary features of the Bush
[Executive Order No. 13,233] . . . was that it manufactured a nonexistent,
independent, constitutionally based privilege for vice presidents[,] . . . asserting a
vice presidential claim of privilege that has no basis in the Constitution . . . .”);
Thomas O. Sargentich, Normative Tensions in the Theory of Presidential Oversight
of Agency Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 325, 328 (1993) (“The concept of
executive privilege is based on Article II of the Constitution . . . . One should be
especially careful to associate it directly with the President or the Vice President.”);
Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Consequence of
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attempts to fill the void and answer the novel constitutional
question: Does the Vice President have a constitutional privilege
separate and distinct from that of the President? This work
concludes that indeed the Vice President should be recognized as
possessing a constitutional privilege when acting pursuant to the
narrow duties assigned him by the Constitution.
Vice presidential privilege (“VPP”) will be considered the
assertion, by the Vice President himself, of his own constitutional
right to withhold certain information from Congress, private
litigants, and the public—a right independent from the
President’s constitutional authority and a right separate from the
common-law deliberative process privilege that executive-branch

Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of
Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 676 n.153 (2003) (stating that in
executive order 13,233 “[t]here is also a suggestion that the vice president can
independently assert executive privilege, . . . [which is] an extremely controversial
position. . . . Such a ‘vice presidential privilege’ represents a significant departure
from existing case [law] and statutory authority. It would also dramatically expand
the concept of executive privilege that the Court has struggled to confine within the
constitutional framework. It is difficult to see any textual or original intent basis for
a ‘vice-presidential privilege.’ ”); Jeffrey P. Carlin, Note, Walker v. Cheney: Politics,
Posturing, and Executive Privilege, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 269 (2002) (“A more
complicated question is whether Vice President Cheney may assert the privilege on
his own behalf.”); Marcy Lynn Karin, Note, Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind: How
Executive Order 13,233 Expands Executive Privilege While Simultaneously
Preventing Access to Presidential Records, 55 STAN. L. REV. 529, 554 (2002) (“Bush’s
Order is unambiguous in granting a former Vice President the authority to claim a
vice-presidential privilege. While the President would have the authority to claim a
privilege over a record of the Vice President, no precedent prior to this Order exists
that expands to the Vice President a right to claim a privilege over a record of the
Vice President, no precedent prior to this Order exists that expands to the Vice
President a right to claim independently a privilege regardless of whether the
President exerted one.” (citations omitted)); Michael C. Dorf, A Brief History of
Executive Privilege, from George Washington Through Dick Cheney, FIND LAW’S
LEGAL COMMENTARY, Feb. 6, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020206.html
(“Nor is it clear . . . that the Vice President can assert executive privilege.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Polarization of Extremes, CHRONICLE REV., Dec. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/sunstein121407 [hereinafter Sunstein] (last
visited Oct. 8, 2010) (quoting an interview with Professor Sunstein discussing briefly
the issue of a Vice President invoking executive privilege); Cass R. Sunstein,
Defining Executive Privilege, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 2007, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/07/12/definin
g_executive_privilege [hereinafter Defining Executive Privilege] (“Is [executive
privilege] . . . restricted to communications involving the president (and vice
president) personally?”); see also MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 155 (2d ed. 2002) (1994)
[hereinafter ROZELL II].
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officials may invoke regarding certain predecisional matters. 8 As
with executive privilege 9 and judicial privilege, 10 VPP includes
within its ambit the authority to decline to appear in person
before congressional committees. 11
As with limitations on
executive privilege, VPP would prove more difficult to invoke
successfully in the context of a criminal investigation,
particularly outside the Vice President’s legislative role. On a
broader level, evaluation of VPP provides a useful vehicle for
analyzing the unique status of the vice presidency within
American constitutional law and government.
This Article will begin by providing proper context for
discussion of VPP, reviewing as a structural matter the
constitutional privileges enjoyed by other constitutional officers.
As such, this segment will first demonstrate the premium that
the Constitution places on encouraging effective decisionmaking.
This emphasis is reflected in the authority of Presidents,
members of Congress, and federal judges: (1) to collect the
necessary information they need to make decisions—gathering
information; (2) to reach decisions that will not leave them
exposed to civil liability for their official actions—civil immunity;
and (3) to deliberate over policy options in confidence—privilege.
The lens will then narrow to focus on the third of these items,
constitutional privileges writ large. This includes an overview of

8
In this Article, mention of a vice presidential privilege will refer to a
conception of the Vice President enjoying his own constitutional privilege but one
distinct from vice presidential privilege as outlined in this piece.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part IV.
11
See, e.g., infra Part VI; cf. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S.
425, 523 n.19 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I see no distinction in Congress’
seeking to compel the appearance and testimony of a former President and in,
alternatively, seeking to compel the production of Presidential papers over the
former President’s objection.”). The two-pronged rationale is that: (1) the very act of
appearing would place the Vice President, a constitutional officer, in a position
subservient to that of Congress; and (2) it would necessarily place him in the
position of having to answer privileged questions. Cf. HAROLD C. RELYEA & TODD B.
TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS’ TESTIMONY BEFORE
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: AN OVERVIEW 19 (2008).
It is quite likely that in the context of a House impeachment investigation the Vice
President would be required to turn over even privileged materials. Cf. FISHER,
supra note 6, at 49–50 (quoting authorities, such as Presidents Washington and
Polk, who implied the existence of enhanced investigatory power pursuant to an
impeachment investigation); infra note 262 (discussing the likely surrender of
judicial materials to an impeachment investigation).
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executive privilege, 12 legislative privilege, 13 and judicial privilege,
What these discussions reflect is that the
respectively. 14
For purposes of this Article, unless otherwise noted, “executive privilege” will
be defined as “the right of presidents to withhold information from those entities
that have compulsory power, particularly Congress and the judicial branch.” Mark J.
Rozell, Executive Privilege in an Era of Polarized Politics, in EXECUTING THE
CONSTITUTION: PUTTING THE PRESIDENT BACK INTO THE CONSTITUTION 91, 91
(Christopher S. Kelley ed., 2006). This definition is in keeping with others in the
field. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 554 (2002),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/012.pdf [hereinafter
CRS] (“The doctrine of executive privilege defines the authority of the President to
withhold documents or information in his possession or in the possession of the
executive branch from compulsory process of the legislative or judicial branch of the
government.”); DAVID E. KYVIG, THE AGE OF IMPEACHMENT: AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE SINCE 1960, at 163 (2008) (stating that “executive
privilege, [is] the right of the president to withhold information from Congress and
the courts”); DAVID SADOFSKY, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: POLITICAL AND LEGAL
CONTROL OF INFORMATION 74 (1990) (“Executive privilege is the presidential right to
maintain secrecy against otherwise binding discovery.”). As will be discussed below,
executive privilege includes both constitutional and common-law privileges. See
infra notes 123–31 and accompanying text. Unless otherwise stated, “executive
privilege” refers to the constitutional executive privilege, known as presidential
communications privilege and not the common-law privilege known as the
deliberative process privilege.
13
For purposes of this Article, “legislative privilege” will be defined as the
constitutional right of members of the legislative branch to withhold information
from those entities that have compulsory power. Cf. Rozell, supra note 12. In this
regard, the term legislative privilege is used in a more narrow sense than in other
contexts, which sometimes include freedom of speech during debate and privilege
from civil arrest. See, e.g., JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW:
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS 3 (2007) (defining the term as “those special rights that individual
Members or Houses of the legislature possess in order to facilitate their legislative
duties”); see also id. at 87–110, 134–43 (discussing other aspects of the broader
definition). Legislative privilege in this piece has two subcategories. The first is what
will be called “Speech or Debate privilege,” which is a legislative privilege that is
linked at least in part to the Speech or Debate Clause or other text. See infra Part
III.A. The second is what will be called the “generalized legislative privilege,” which
is a legislative privilege that is not tied specifically to the Speech or Debate Clause
or other text. See infra Part III.B. The latter can be justified instead on structural
comparisons to executive privilege and judicial privilege, as well as to past practice.
This definition does not include the authority of the Senate to enforce the
confidentiality of its secret sessions. This authority is exercised by the chamber as a
whole and not by individual members. Unlike an assertion of privilege based on the
Speech or Debate Clause or the generalized legislative privilege—both of which are
exercised at the discretion of the individual lawmaker, see infra note 180—the Vice
President and all Senators are obligated to withhold information revealed in closed
session until released from that obligation by the entire Senate. See MILDRED AMER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SECRET SESSIONS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE 2–3 (2008)
[hereinafter SECRET SESSIONS]. In this vein, the upper chamber may permit the
12
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President, members of Congress, and federal judges have the
benefit of a recognized privilege to protect the confidentiality of
their internal deliberations as they carry out their
constitutionally-assigned responsibilities.
As a matter of
15
it would seem
constitutional structure and symmetry,
release of information by passing a resolution. See id. at 3. This authority is drawn
from Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which permits Congress to keep its
journals secret. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. There is no judicial guidance on this
provision. See CHAFETZ, supra at 13. That same section also authorizes each house
of Congress to issue its own rules. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Based on these
authorities, the Senate, from time to time, meets in secret session. See SECRET
SESSIONS, supra, at 1–2. These sessions are authorized by Senate rules XX, XXI,
XXIV, XXIX, and XXXI, see id. at 1, and may be chaired by the Vice President in his
role as President of the Senate. The Vice President must ensure the confidentiality
of these closed sessions. See RICHARD S. BETH, DANIEL STRICKLAND & PAUL DWYER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 23 (1981). Thus, this confidentiality provision is not so much a
privilege as an obligation placed on the Vice President.
Thus, in light of Senate rules and the Vice President’s role as presiding officer, the
Vice President would appear to be obligated to claim privilege over materials related
to or communications engaged in during closed session. In this regard, Senate rules
would seem to prevent the House from compelling the Vice President to turn over
such Senate materials. See Letter from Kathryn L. Wheelbarger, Counsel to the Vice
President, to Perry Apelbaum, Chief of Staff and Counsel, Comm. on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives 2 (Apr. 18, 2008) [hereinafter April 18, 2008 Letter] (on file
with author); cf. Molly K. Hooper, Young Cries Foul After Senate Calls for
Investigation, CQ TODAY, Apr. 23, 2008 (criticizing the U.S. Senate for a vote
requesting an investigation into alleged wrongdoing in the House of
Representatives,
by
contending
that:
“What
the
Senate
did
was
unconstitutional . . . . No other body can request an investigation on another body.”
(quoting Representative Don Young)); infra notes 402–03 and accompanying text.
But cf. 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES § 2665 (1907) (the Senate acquiescing to a House subpoena that the Senate
turn over certain documents to the House).
Unlike arguments related to the Speech or Debate Clause or the generalized
legislative privilege, the authority to withhold such information in secret session has
been explicitly cited by the Vice President’s office. During correspondence with the
Senate Judiciary Committee over a subpoena it issued to the Vice President, Vice
President Cheney’s counsel noted that “the Vice President respects the legal
privileges afforded by the Constitution to the Senate, such as preservation of the
confidentiality of a session of the Senate with closed doors over which a Vice
President may preside.” Letter from Shannen W. Coffin, Counsel to the Vice
President to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary 1–2
(Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter August 20, 2007 Letter] (on file with author).
14
For purposes of this Article, “judicial privilege” will be defined as the
constitutional right of federal judges to withhold information from those entities
that have compulsory power. Cf. Rozell, supra note 12.
15
Structural exegesis has proved an important means of interpreting aspects of
separation of powers. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The actual art of governing under
our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of
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anomalous for the Vice President to be the only one of the nearly
1,400 constitutional officers not to hold such a privilege. 16 It
should therefore follow that the Vice President possesses a
comparable privilege to the extent he is carrying out his own
constitutional responsibilities, however modest they may be.
This is because the rationale for the Vice President requiring a
any of its branches based on isolated clauses, or even single Articles torn from
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government.” (emphasis added)). Absolute civil immunity for constitutional officers
when carrying out their official duties provides an example of structural analysis
when used in the context of separation of powers. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court
noted that its “analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional
heritage and structure.” 457 U.S. 731, 748 (1982) (emphasis added). The Court
reasoned that since
the Speech and [sic] Debate Clause provides a textual basis for
congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of executive immunity. This
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been
considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision
expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity . . . is well settled.
Id. at 750 n.31 (1982); see also id. at 747–48 (in considering questions of civil
immunity, the Supreme Court “necessarily . . . has weighed concerns of public policy,
especially as illuminated by our history and the structure of our government”
(emphasis added)); id. at 750 n.31 (“[T]he most compelling arguments [in favor of
presidential immunity] arise from . . . reliance on constitutional structure and
judicial precedent . . . .”); infra Part I.B.
Another example of the courts concluding that the Constitution grants each branch
similar authority involves constitutional interpretation by the political branches.
Although the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution, it is widely
acknowledged that the political branches have their own parallel, if subordinate,
authority to interpret the Constitution. This is particularly the case when the
political branches interpret their own constitutional authority. See, e.g., United
States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 681, 703 (1974) (“In the performance of assigned
constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the
Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect
from the others.” (emphasis added)).
In the academic realm, the Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III have been
analogized to one another. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1153 (1992). Regarding the merits of structural interpretation more broadly, see, for
example, CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 747 (1999).
16
This number includes 1 President, 100 Senators, 435 Representatives, 9
Supreme Court Justices, 179 court of appeals judges, 9 international trade judges,
and 678 district court judges. This total does not include bankruptcy judges or
magistrate judges. See United States Courts, Judges & Judgeships,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited
Oct. 8, 2010).
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constitutional privilege—to encourage maximum candor during
his internal deliberations in order to promote effective
decisionmaking—is the same as it is for other constitutional
officers. While focusing on the Vice President and whether he
holds his own privilege, it is hoped that this discussion of
confidentiality among the three branches will add to the broader
discourse on comparative constitutional privilege. 17
This Article will then turn to an analysis of the vice
presidency and its place in our constitutional system. The Vice
President has a unique status under the Constitution: part
legislative and part executive, with his exact location in the
constitutional order varying depending on the duties he is
performing at the time. The primary constitutional duties of the
Vice President are to preside over the Senate and break ties,
which are legislative duties; to prepare for and help make a
determination of presidential inability, 18 and to prepare for
succession, which are executive branch responsibilities. 19 In
none of these roles is the Vice President legally—as opposed to
politically—answerable to the President.
A historical analysis of investigations involving the vice
presidency will follow. This discussion—the first of its kind in
the academic literature—will review several case studies to
determine whether any Vice President has asserted his own
constitutional privilege.
The vice presidencies of Daniel
Tompkins, John C. Calhoun, Schuyler Colfax, Henry Wallace,
Hubert Humphrey, Spiro Agnew, Gerald Ford, Nelson
Rockefeller, George H.W. Bush, Dan Quayle, Al Gore, and
Cheney will all be explored. 20
17
Other earlier comparative discussions include: Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700,
730–51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080–84 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring);
Cox, supra note 6, at 1391–407.
18
The terms “disability” and “inability” often have been used interchangeably in
the context of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., JOHN D. FEERICK, THE
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 270 (1992).
For the sake of simplicity and consistency, the expression “inability” will be used
throughout this Article.
19
For purposes of this Article, the Vice President’s responsibilities under the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment will be termed “executive branch duties” or “executive
branch responsibilities” to distinguish them from “executive duties” or “executive
responsibilities,” which imply presidential responsibility under Article II.
20
A Senate committee investigation of Senate aide Bobby Baker at times drew
close to Lyndon Johnson late in his vice presidency and early in his presidency. See,
e.g., Cabell Phillips, Senators To Push Inquiry on Baker, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1963,
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Particular attention in this Part will be placed on Cheney’s
vice presidency, including an examination of Walker v. Cheney, 21
a federal district court decision involving the Vice President’s
dispute over information with the General Accounting Office
(“GAO”), 22 and Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 23 a suit stemming
from attempts by private litigants to secure similar information
from the Vice President. While not involving executive privilege
or VPP per se, both suits entailed closely related issues and
culminated in the judiciary deferring to vice presidential
concerns regarding confidentiality.
They also implicitly
recognized the Vice President’s constitutional status as being
roughly on par with that of the President. In addition, the
Cheney segment will discuss a 2001 executive order implying the
existence of a privilege for the Vice President and several other
conflicts over information involving Cheney and congressional
committees. It will also discuss Cheney’s interaction with the
9/11 Commission.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that, while Vice Presidents
have become embroiled in ever more frequent contests over
information, VPP has not been officially invoked. Nonetheless,
episodes involving Vice Presidents Humphrey, Agnew,
Rockefeller, and Cheney all to varying degrees seem to have
implicitly recognized that such a privilege exists; in this vein,
they would appear to have “reserved the right” for future Vice
Presidents to make such an assertion. At a broader level, the
growing frequency of these clashes over the past several decades
demonstrates the growing significance of the vice presidency over
time and the position’s greater involvement in the executive
branch.
Should this overall trend toward enhanced vice
presidential power continue, it is quite possible that Vice
Presidents could build on these proto-VPP precedents and
actually invoke the doctrine.
Next, the Article will turn to evaluating potential arguments
in favor of VPP and possible counterarguments against it. It will
analyze constitutional structure as well as case law and past
at 1. Ultimately, the investigation did not focus on potential links between Baker
and Johnson. See generally BOBBY BAKER WITH LARRY L. KING, WHEELING AND
DEALING: CONFESSIONS OF A CAPITOL HILL OPERATOR 175–96 (1978). The author
would like to thank Joel Goldstein for raising this episode.
21
230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002).
22
GAO is now called the Government Accountability Office.
23
542 U.S. 367 (2004).
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practice. While case law and past practice generally support
VPP, theoretical arguments based on structural considerations
are even more compelling, especially in light of other
constitutional officers 24 having comparable constitutional
privileges. After the pros and cons of VPP have been weighed,
this Article concludes that the arguments in favor of a privilege
of limited scope are more persuasive than those against
recognition of such a power. The doctrine, however, is likely to
exist only to the extent it involves the Vice President’s narrow
textual responsibilities: presiding over the Senate and breaking
tie votes; preparing for and helping to make determinations
about presidential inability; and preparing for succession. As
such, VPP is a composite privilege reflecting both the Vice
President’s Article I duties and his responsibilities under the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 25 For the Vice President to invoke a
constitutional privilege beyond these narrow confines runs the
risk of creating a vice presidential executive privilege, which
would undermine the President’s constitutional role as the head
of the executive branch and the prevailing view that only the
President may invoke executive privilege.

24
For purposes of this Article, “constitutional officer” refers to those holding
positions of high authority in the federal government as provided in constitutional
text. Accordingly, the term does not include positions such as presidential electors.
Nor should it be confused with “principal” or “inferior” officers of the executive
branch, which have been created by statute. See, e.g., Letter from Brian A.
Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep.
Henry A. Waxman (Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Benczkowksi Jan. 18, 2008 Letter] (on
file with author) (referring to the President and Vice President as “the two
constitutional officers of the executive branch”); Memorandum from Walter
Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, on Whether the Office of the
Vice President Is an “Agency” for Purposes of the Freedom of Information Act to
Todd J. Campbell, Counsel & Dir. of Admin., Office of the Vice President (Feb. 14,
1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/foiavp.htm [hereinafter FOIA Opinion]
(stating that “the Vice President is also a constitutional officer”).
25
A Vice President elect is also likely to enjoy a constitutional privilege under
the Twentieth Amendment. See infra note 743.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010)

2010]

VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY

437

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL NORM OF ENCOURAGING EFFECTIVE
DECISIONMAKING

On a broad structural level, the Constitution places a
premium on encouraging effective governmental decisionmaking.
There are three components to this constitutional norm. They
are: (1) ensuring that constitutional officers can collect reliable
and sufficient information with which to make their decisions—
the gathering of information; (2) ensuring that constitutional
officers can consider policy options without fear that they will be
held civilly liable for the decisions they make—immunity from
civil suit; and (3) ensuring that they may consider their
decisionmaking options confidentially—privilege. 26 While the
focus of this Article is on the latter aspect of this norm, a brief
discussion of the other two elements provides a useful backdrop,
explaining the rationale behind why the Vice President should
enjoy a constitutional privilege like those exercised by his fellow
constitutional officers.
A.

The Gathering of Information

The structural need for constitutional officers to secure
reliable information in their internal decisionmaking is
manifested in all three branches. Regarding the President’s
authority to collect the information necessary for him to
effectively perform his duties, under Article II he “may require
the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices.” 27 Moreover, Article I provides him
26
Cf. Randall K. Miller, Presidential Sanctuaries After the Clinton Sex
Scandals, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 728–29 (1999); Louis S. Raveson,
Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your
Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 879, 881–82 (1985).
27
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 29–30, Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (No. 03-475) [hereinafter Cheney Supreme
Court Brief] (“The Opinion Clause . . . explicitly confirms the President’s authority to
gather information and opinions from his subordinates . . . . The Recommendations
Clause (along with the State of the Union Clause) provides further textual evidence
of the President’s powers to gather information . . . .”).
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with ten days with which to familiarize himself with legislation
in order to decide whether to sign a bill or veto it. 28 More
generally, Justices of the Supreme Court have recognized the
importance of the President being able to gather information as
needed to render decisions. 29
Members of Congress are also empowered to secure
information with which to legislate. Two houses of Congress
were created by the Framers in part to ensure that matters of
public concern would be thoroughly considered before becoming
law. 30 As the Supreme Court has noted
[t]he division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures
that the legislative power would be exercised only after
opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings . . . .
Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers’ decision that the
legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure. 31

The expectation behind this “exhaustively considered” procedure
was that full information about the legislation in question could
28
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 448
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937) [hereafter 2 ELLIOT] (“The President, sir, will not
be a stranger to our country, to our laws, or to our wishes . . . . [When considering
whether to sign legislation] [h]e will have before him the fullest information of our
situation; he will avail himself not only of records and official communications,
foreign and domestic, but he will have also the advice of the executive officers in the
different departments of the general government.” (quoting James Wilson during the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Debate)); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion
Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 673 n.110 (1996) (“The Framers understood that, in
weighing and wielding his veto pen, the President would often seek the ‘information
and opinions’ of the executive underlings.”).
29
See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 488–89 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (concluding that a statute that “would regulate so as to
interfere with the manner in which the President obtains information necessary to
discharge his duty assigned under the Constitution to nominate federal judges is
enough to invalidate the Act”); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy
Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 50 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated on other grounds, Cheney,
542 U.S. 367 (“While no clause of Article II expressly grants the President the power
to acquire information or receive advice in confidence, the necessity of receiving
confidential advice appears to flow from Article II. Several clauses of Article II
reflect an understanding that the President will have access to information and the
power to acquire it . . . .” (citations omitted)).
30
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 754–55 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“ ‘The division of Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the
legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate
in separate settings.’ ” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983))).
31
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
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come to light and be carefully weighed during congressional
debate. This emphasis on encouraging good decisionmaking by
gathering appropriate information is further manifested through
Congress’s investigative power.
The Supreme Court has
concluded that
[w]e are of the opinion that the power of inquiry—with process
to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. . . . A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information—which not infrequently is true—recourse
must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught
that mere requests for such information often are unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential
to obtain what is needed. 32

Likewise, members of the judiciary possess authority to
ensure that courts have sufficient information before them to
make proper judgments. In United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), the
Supreme Court noted:
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal
justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a
partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very
integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the
system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the
framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is
done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory
process be available for the production of evidence needed either
by the prosecution or by the defense. 33

The Vice President is also granted authority to secure the
information he needs to carry out his constitutional duties under
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Under Section 4, which governs
situations involving presidential inability determinations, the
Vice President, in conjunction with the Cabinet or other body
created by Congress, has to make a “factual determination of
whether or not inability exists. . . . It is assumed that such
decision would be made only after adequate consultation with
32
33

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174–75 (1927).
418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (emphasis added).
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medical experts who were intricately familiar with the
President’s physical and mental condition.” 34
Thus, it seems clear that the Constitution envisions that its
officers must be able to properly gather the information they
need to effectively carry out their responsibilities.
B. Immunity Against Civil Suit for Official Actions
Constitutional protection of the decisionmaking function is
also reflected in the granting to constitutional officers of absolute
immunity from civil suit related to their official duties. In the
case of civil immunity, the risk to effective decisionmaking is
twofold: (1) the threat of litigation is thought to discourage
certain policy options from being seriously considered; 35 and
(2) discovery pursuant to a lawsuit may expose the internal
deliberations themselves. 36
For these reasons, the President benefits from absolute
immunity from civil suit in the execution of his official duties—at
least absent legislation to the contrary—so that he can make his
34
S. REP. No. 89-66, at 13 (1965); see also John D. Feerick et al., Minority
Opinion Regarding Recommendation IV, in JAMES F. TOOLE ET AL., DISABILITY IN
U.S. PRESIDENTS: REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTARIES BY THE
WORKING GROUP 26, 27 (1997) [hereinafter REPORT] (recommending that, under the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, “[c]onstitutional decision-makers will generally require
medical advice from appropriate medical experts . . . regarding the President’s
condition in making decisions . . . [and] as to whether the President is able to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. The legislative history surrounding the
adoption of the Twenty-[F]ifth Amendment makes clear that its framers intended
that constitutional decision-makers would solicit appropriate medical advice.”);
Senator Birch E. Bayh, Jr., The Twenty–Fifth Amendment: Its History and Meaning,
in 1 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 1,
14 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1991) (“In the real world . . . nothing [would be
done] . . . until the vice president has a chance to consult with a lot of folks as to
whether something needs to be done.”); Mortimer Caplin, Revisiting the TwentyFifth Amendment, in 2 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTYFIFTH AMENDMENT, supra, at 9, 22 (hypothesizing about a First Lady discussing the
President’s health with the Vice President and Cabinet during an inability inquiry
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment).
35
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752 n.32 (1982) (“Among the most
persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the prospect that damages
liability may render an official unduly cautious in the discharge of his official
duties.”).
36
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 826 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(“[E]xposure to civil liability [for presidential aides] for official acts will result in
constant judicial questioning, through judicial proceedings and pretrial discovery,
into the inner workings of the Presidential Office beyond that necessary to maintain
the traditional checks and balances of our constitutional structure.”).
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decisions undeterred by concerns about potential damage suits.
It has been recognized that the threat of litigation “is compelling
where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and farreaching decisions entrusted to any official under our
constitutional system.” 37 In Clinton v. Jones, the Supreme Court
similarly observed “we have repeatedly explained that the
immunity serves the public interest in enabling such officials to
perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a
particular decision may give rise to personal liability.” 38
Likewise, the Court concluded in Ferri v. Ackerman,
[t]he societal interest in providing such public officials with the
maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the
public at large has long been recognized as an acceptable
justification for official immunity. The point of immunity for
such officials is to forestall an atmosphere of intimidation that
would conflict with their resolve to perform their designated
functions in a principled fashion. 39

Federal lawmakers are also shielded by absolute immunity
from civil suit for their official actions. This is reflected in the
Speech or Debate Clause, which ensures that “for any Speech or
Debate in either House, [federal lawmakers] shall not be
questioned in any other Place.” 40 This has been reinforced in the
caselaw. 41 For example, in Doe v. McMillan, the Supreme Court
held that parents could not bring an action for civil damages

37
Nixon, 457 U.S. at 752; id. at 763 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that
failure to provide civil immunity to the President for official acts “would also
inevitably inhibit the processes of Executive Branch decisionmaking and impede the
functioning of the Office of the President”); id. at 784 (White, J., dissenting) (“The
Court’s response, until today, to this problem has been to apply the argument to
individual functions, not offices, and to evaluate the effect of liability on
governmental decisionmaking within that function in light of the substantive ends
that are to be encouraged or discouraged.”); cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 527
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating in the
context of immunity that “vexatious constitutional litigation will interfere with his
[Cabinet Secretary’s] decisionmaking process”); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 720
(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that the majority opinion centers around
the view that “a President’s fear of civil lawsuits based upon his official duties could
distort his official decisionmaking”).
38
520 U.S. at 693.
39
444 U.S. 193, 203–04 (1979); see also Nixon, 457 U.S. at 752 n.32.
40
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
41
See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311–12 (1973).
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against members of Congress and their employees for publishing
information about the scholastic performance of their children. 42
Judges are similarly protected by absolute immunity, albeit
at common law. In Randall v. Brigham, the Supreme Court
concluded that “it is a general principle applicable to all judicial
officers, that they are not liable to a civil action for any judicial
This rule has been
act done within their jurisdiction.” 43
reaffirmed on several occasions. 44
While there is no case law directly on point, 45 dicta indicate
that the Vice President would also be protected by a comparable
immunity for his official acts. In McCullough v. United States,46
a federal court upheld a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation “in its entirety.” 47 The magistrate judge’s
opinion involved dismissal of a pro se suit against former Vice
President Cheney, among others. The judge wrote that “[w]hile
case law does not appear to extend the protection of absolute
See id.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 535 (1868).
44
See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871) (noting that if a judge
carries out “a judicial act,” then “the defendant cannot be subjected to responsibility
for it in a civil action”); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (“[C]ourts of
superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial
acts . . . .”).
45
The question of vice presidential civil immunity for official acts was raised in
Wilson v. Libby, but the court declined to address the question. See 535 F.3d 697,
713 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Because our decision, based on the grounds considered by
the district court, results in the dismissal of all claims against the Vice President of
the United States, we need not, and do not, consider his alternate claim for absolute
Vice-Presidential immunity.”). For the limited literature on vice presidential
immunity, see James D. Myers, Note, Bringing the Vice President into the Fold:
Executive Immunity and the Vice Presidency, 50 B.C. L. REV. 897, 898 n.8 (2009); cf.
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The
Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995) (arguing that while “not
a ‘Senator or Representative,’ strictly speaking,” the Arrest Clause would still
protect the Vice President from civil incarceration). A comprehensive discussion of
vice presidential immunity is beyond the scope of this Article. However, in addition
to case law, persuasive structural considerations could also be marshalled in support
of immunity. As with privilege, were the Vice President to be denied immunity he
would stand alone in this regard among constitutional officers. It is, of course, highly
doubtful that the Vice President would enjoy civil immunity for unofficial acts. See
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 693 (1997); 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 7.3(f)(i)–(ii) (4th ed. 2007) (noting that both Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman
were defendants in civil lawsuits while they were Vice President, both for actions
that occurred before they took office); infra note 348.
46
C/A No. 8:08-4137-GRA-WMC, 2009 WL 367371, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2009).
47
Id. at *2.
42
43
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immunity to the Vice President, Plaintiff named [the Vice
President] . . . [in his] role as President of the Senate. Therefore,
it is possible that Defendant Cheney may be protected by
legislative immunity, or in the alternative, be entitled to
qualified immunity.” 48 The judge cautioned, “[h]owever, [that] as
the complaint is subject to dismissal on other grounds, a detailed
discussion regarding the possible scope of former Vice President
Cheney’s immunity is unnecessary.” 49
A few weeks later, the same federal court in Sykes v. Frank
dismissed a similar suit on largely the same grounds against
several officials, including the former Vice President. 50 Again,
the court upheld the magistrate’s report and recommendation “in
its entirety.” 51 The magistrate judge noted that the “present
action cannot proceed against Defendants Bush and Cheney
because of the complete immunity enjoyed by the President and
Vice-President of the United States in performing the duties of
Citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the
their respective offices.” 52
magistrate judge explained that “[a]lthough the Nixon court did
not specifically mention the office of Vice-President, it is clear
from the Court’s analysis that the rationale for absolute
immunity applies to that office as well.” 53 Because the former
Vice President was “protected by absolute immunity,” the suit
was dismissed. 54 Thus, what dicta exist indicate that the Vice
President would have the benefit of civil immunity.
This Article, of course, focuses on the third aspect of the
emphasis the Constitution places on decisionmaking by
constitutional officers: privilege. In particular, it considers
whether a Vice President has a constitutional privilege. That the
Vice President is granted the authority to gather the information
he needs to fulfill his constitutional duties and that he is likely
immune from civil suit for his official acts only serve to
underscore the structural reasoning upon which VPP in large
part rests: That, like any other constitutional officer, he must
have his decisionmaking process protected.

48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at *4 n.4.
Id.
C/A No. 8:08-4049-GRA-BBH, 2009 WL 614806, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2009).
See id. at *2.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *8 n.3 (emphasis added).
Id. at *8.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010)

444

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:423

C. Constitutional Privileges and Governmental Structure
1.

Separation of Powers and Constitutional Privileges

Constitutional officers in each of the three branches of the
federal government have the benefit of a constitutional privilege
against disclosure of their internal deliberations. 55 This is a
concept which dates to the 1790s. 56 During the first decade
under the Constitution, Representative Nathaniel Smith noted
“that each department of Government ought to be the sole judge
when to make any part of its proceedings public.” 57 This view
was echoed in the early nineteenth century by Supreme Court
Justice Thomas Johnson. He wrote to Thomas Jefferson that “I
do verily believe that there is no Body of Men, legislative, judicial
or executive, who could preserve the public Respect for a single
year, if the public Eye were permitted always to look behind the
Curtain.” 58 This view has prevailed up to the present day. 59
For instance, the Supreme Court adopted the same rationale
in Nixon I:
[T]he valid need for protection of communications between high
Government officials and those who advise and assist them in
55
See also infra Parts II–IV; see also, e.g., ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 51
(“[E]xecutive privilege can be defended on the basis of the accepted practices of
secrecy in the other branches of government.”); Dixon, supra note 6, at 133
(“Executive privilege is a particular aspect of . . . government information
policy . . . common to all three branches of the separation of powers system.”);
Vikram David Amar, Executive Privilege: Often Valuable To Protect the Presidency,
But Misunderstood by President Bush in the Condoleezza Rice Case, FINDLAW LEGAL
COMMENTARY, Apr. 16, 2004, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/
20040416.html (“[T]he idea [executive privilege] . . . embodies is quite well accepted:
the notion that each branch requires some internal privacy to deliberate free from
the prying eyes and ears of the other two branches and of the American public.”).
56
See HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 155.
57
Id.
58
ALEXANDRA K. WIGDOR, THE PERSONAL PAPERS OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE 10 (1986).
59
See, e.g., 9 CONG. REC. 680 (1879) (quoting a House Judiciary Committee
study that determined the political branches lacked authority to compel production
of documents from each other); see also Dixon, supra note 6, at 134; cf. United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (“We have explicitly held . . . that ‘it was not the
function of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary [of Agriculture in
arriving at his decision].’ Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny so
the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected. It will bear
repeating that although the administrative process has had a different development
and pursues somewhat different ways from those of the courts, they are to be
deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate independence
of each should be respected by the other.” (citations omitted)).
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the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this
confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion . . . .
Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of
enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of
Presidential communications has similar constitutional
underpinnings . . . . 60

Thus, the reason for such a privilege is that for the President to
perform his duties ably he must receive candid advice from his
aides. It is thought that this type of counsel might not be
forthcoming if internal deliberations are not protected from
public view. The concern is that embarrassing revelations might
limit a full airing of policy options or rationales, which could
therefore compromise the decisionmaking process. 61 The Court
in Nixon I explained that the privilege was not unique to the
President but “is fundamental to the operation of Government
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution.” 62 In this regard, the justification for the President
would be applicable to other constitutional officers who also need
candid advice from their peers and subordinates to sharpen the
decisionmaking processes of their respective institutions.
The years since Nixon I have witnessed the high court
reaffirming this stance, that constitutional privileges are integral
to constitutional officers optimally performing their duties. In
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Nixon II), the
Supreme Court noted that Nixon I “recognized that there is a
legitimate governmental interest in the confidentiality of

60
418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974) (emphasis added); cf. id. at 708 n.17
(“[G]overnment . . . needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk that
is essential to the quality of its functioning.” (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeis, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Nixon I decision will be discussed in greater detail below. See infra Part II.B.1.
61
See infra notes 79, 111, and 115 and accompanying text. In addition to the
importance of promoting effective decisionmaking among constitutional officers,
another justification provided in support of constitutional privilege is to preserve the
independence of the three branches from each other. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen.
Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 510–11 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“This
independence of the three branches of Government, including control over the
papers of each, lies at the heart of this Court’s broad holdings concerning the
immunity of congressional papers from outside scrutiny. . . . [T]o preserve the
constitutionally rooted independence of each branch of Government, each branch
must be able to control its own papers.”). This same rationale is applicable in the
case of VPP since it is important to preserve the independence of the vice presidency,
especially in the context of determining presidential inability.
62
418 U.S. at 708.
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communications between high Government officials.” 63 The
Court elaborated that “[g]overnment confidentiality has been a
concern from the time of the Constitutional Convention.” 64
The view that all constitutional officers may exercise a
privilege was made even more explicit by Chief Justice Warren
Burger in his dissent in Nixon II. In this vein, Burger wove
considerations of constitutional structure and symmetry into his
reasoning by pegging the legitimacy of executive privilege to
legislative privilege.
The Chief Justice noted that “the
President[’s] . . . power to control files, records, and papers of the
office . . . are comparable to the internal workpapers of Members
of the House and Senate.” 65 Burger reasoned further that
[t]he Constitution does not speak of Presidential papers, just as
it does not speak of workpapers of Members of Congress or of
judges. But there can be no room for doubt that, up to now, it
has been the implied prerogative of the President as of Members
of Congress and of judges to . . . provide unilaterally for
disposition of his work papers. Control of Presidential papers
is, obviously, a natural and necessary incident of the broad
discretion vested in the President in order for him to discharge
his duties. 66

He concluded broadly that “to preserve the constitutionally
rooted independence of each branch of Government, each branch
must be able to control its own papers.” 67 Then-Justice William
Rehnquist drew much the same conclusion. In his own dissent,
Rehnquist wrote that “[p]rivileges, such as the executive
privilege [are] embodied in the Constitution as a result of the
separation of powers.” 68
Three Supreme Court Justices followed the same reasoning
in Houchins v. KQED, which involved whether journalists under
the Constitution have a right to enter jails to report on prevailing
conditions. 69 There again, the Justices quoted from Nixon I and
acknowledged “ ‘the valid need for protection of communications
between high Government officials and those who advise and
63
433 U.S. 425, 447 n.10 (1977). For further structural reasoning in this
decision, see id. at 448. This decision is discussed in greater detail in Part II.B.2.a.
64
433 U.S. at 447 n.11.
65
Id. at 514 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
66
Id. at 515 (citations omitted).
67
Id. at 511.
68
Id. at 545 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69
438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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assist them in the performance of their manifold duties.’ ” 70 In
University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, a case involving a college’s assertion of a
constitutional and common-law privilege against revealing peerreview documents, the Court echoed on yet another occasion the
Writing for the Court, Justice
language from Nixon I. 71
Blackmun reasoned that “the privilege we recognized in Nixon
was grounded in the separation of powers between the branches
of the Federal Government.” 72
Other prominent judicial opinions have also noted that a
privilege is vital to the work performed by constitutional officers.
In 1971, the issue of privilege arose in Soucie v. David. 73 This
case involved whether an Office of Science and Technology report
could be made public pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act. 74 In this case, Judge Malcolm Wilkey of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit filed a concurring
opinion. 75 In it he emphasized that constitutional officers have a
constitutional privilege. He wrote:
To put this question in perspective, it must be understood that
the privilege against disclosure of the decision-making process
is a tripartite privilege, because precisely the same privilege in
conducting certain aspects of public business exists for the
legislative and judicial branches as well as for the executive. It
arises from two sources, one common law and other
constitutional. 76

Wilkey continued: “The constitutional part of the privilege [in
question] arises from the principle of the separation of powers
among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of our
Government.” 77
70
Id. at 35 n.27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Nixon (Nixon
I), 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)).
71
493 U.S. 182, 195 (1990) (“[T]he privilege can be said to derive from the
supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties.
Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the
protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar
constitutional underpinnings.” (quoting Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705–06) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
72
Id.
73
448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74
See id.
75
Id. at 1080 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1081. Wilkey relied on past practice to buttress his argument. See id. at
1082 (“These examples of [past] recognition by all three branches of a constitutional
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Two years later in Nixon v. Sirica, which involved President
Nixon’s attempt to quash a subpoena duces tecum directing him
to turn over audio recordings of White House conversations to the
special prosecutor’s office, Judge Wilkey filed a dissent. 78 Here,
he applied the same reasoning as in his earlier opinion. Basing
much of his argument on notions of constitutional structure and
symmetry, he wrote that
public officials are entitled to the private advice of their
subordinates and to confer among themselves freely and
frankly, without fear of disclosure, otherwise the advice received
and the exchange of views may not be as frank and honest as
the public good requires. . . . Government could not function if
it was permissible to go behind judicial, legislative or executive
action and to demand a full accounting from all subordinates
who may have been called upon to make a recommendation in
the matter. 79

Wilkey noted that “the tripartite privilege has been asserted
innumerable times in various alignments of conflict among the
three Branches.” 80 At still another juncture in his opinion,
Wilkey returned to the notion of the “tripartite privilege,” which
he concluded was “universally derived from that principle of
separation of powers.” 81
Thus, as the courts have noted repeatedly, and as the next
three Parts will further demonstrate, each of the constitutional
officers of each of the federal government’s three branches may
withhold certain materials from public view when exercising
powers delegated to them under the Constitution. In this regard,
the Constitution has been interpreted to encourage effective and
well-informed decisionmaking by promoting candor when
constitutional officers are discussing official matters with their
peers and aides. If constitutional officers and their subordinates
privilege to withhold certain documents under given circumstances . . . show the
tripartite nature of the constitutional privilege.”).
78
487 F.2d 700, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 764.
80
Id. at 770; see also id. at 773–74 (“Every President, beginning with
Washington and Jefferson, has asserted that the privilege and the scope and
applicability are for him alone to decide. That is precisely what Congress does when
it either grants or withholds documents in response to the request of a court for
evidence in a criminal case. This is what no doubt this court would do if confronted
with a demand by a Congressional committee for any of our internal documents. . . .
We would do so on the Constitutional ground of separation of powers.”).
81
Id. at 775.
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believe their exchanges over policy matters are likely to be
exposed, all concerned may sanitize their comments or decline to
broach sensitive or novel options or rationales out of fear they
will be revealed to the public. Were the confidentiality of
internal proceedings to be breached, authorities have concluded
that the quality of decisionmaking by constitutional officers
would suffer accordingly.
2.

Why the Vice President Should Be Treated Like Any Other
Constitutional Officer

Since the President exercises executive privilege, since
members of Congress exercise legislative privilege and since
federal judges exercise judicial privilege—all while acting
pursuant to their respective constitutional powers—then as a
structural matter, it should almost certainly follow that the Vice
President would be able to exercise his own privilege to the
extent he is carrying out his own enumerated powers. These are:
presiding over the Senate and breaking ties; preparing for and
helping make determinations about presidential inability; and
preparing for succession. Otherwise, the Vice President would be
the only constitutional officer in the entire federal government
who would exercise his constitutional duties without the benefit
of a privilege.
The Vice President should not enjoy such a privilege based
on abstract notions of constitutional tidiness, but because the
rationale for him holding such a privilege is the same as has been
applied by the courts to other constitutional officers. In carrying
out his constitutional duties, the Vice President—like any
constitutional officer—needs to be able to benefit from an
effective decisionmaking process. This includes gathering the
necessary data and opinions to make an informed decision; being
civilly immune for official decisions made; and conducting
internal deliberations in confidence in order to fully explore
possible policy options and rationales. Otherwise, the quality of
his decisionmaking would suffer and the public could be ill
served. Much as it is vital that a lawmaker receive candid advice
from his legislative aides on policy matters, so too the Vice
President must receive unvarnished opinions from his staff as to
his constitutional responsibilities, whether they involve:
(1) parliamentary or legislative issues related to his presiding
over, and voting in, the Senate; or (2) inability and succession
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matters related to his responsibilities under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. The rationale for the Vice President holding his
own privilege reflects this same overarching constitutional norm
of encouraging high-quality, candid internal dialogue on policy
options and rationales.
Moreover, there is dicta in both Cheney v. U.S. District
Court 82 and Walker v. Cheney 83 that point toward the Vice
President being treated in the same manner as the President.
Therefore, not only is the rationale underlying VPP the same as
the rationale underlying privilege for any other constitutional
officer, but the Vice President has been specifically compared to
the President in a structural fashion by the courts. The fact that
both of these judicial decisions treat the two offices the same in
the context of asserting confidentiality interests makes this
structural linkage all the more relevant. In this regard, the
courts have already treated the Vice President in a manner
similar to other constitutional officers when it comes to ensuring
the confidentiality of deliberations.
For these reasons, the fact that all other constitutional
officers have a constitutional privilege is highly relevant to the
question of whether the Vice President can wield a comparable
power.
II. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
The first of the constitutional privileges to be examined is
the best known, that of executive privilege. For purposes of this
Article, an examination into executive privilege is necessary for
two reasons. First, it is important to discuss the legitimacy of
executive privilege in order to demonstrate, by analogy, the
legitimacy of VPP. If the President can invoke a constitutional
privilege pursuant to his enumerated powers, then the Vice
President would seem to be able to do the same since the
underlying rationale is the same.

82
542 U.S. 367, 382 (2004) (“[S]eparation-of-powers considerations should
inform a court of appeals’ evaluation of a mandamus petition involving the President
or the Vice President.”); see also infra Part VI.L.2.
83
230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[F]undamental separation of powers
concerns relating to the restricted role of Article III courts . . . ordain the outcome
here . . . . The parties agree that no court has ever before granted [what is sought
here] . . . an order that the President (or Vice President) must produce information
to Congress . . . .”); see also infra Part VI.L.1.
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Second, a discussion of executive privilege is needed to
demonstrate what VPP is not: it is not vice presidential executive
privilege. As will be shown below, the President and executive
branch lawyers do not appear to have ever contended that the
Vice President may exercise executive privilege. Only the
President, or a former President, has such authority. That,
however, does not prevent the Vice President from exercising his
own privilege, which reflects his own unique constitutional
position.
A.

Constitutional Structure

The authority of the President to withhold materials from
the public and other branches is not to be found in the text of the
Constitution.
Nonetheless, there are several constitutional
clauses that serve as potential bases for executive privilege.
They include the Vesting Clause, the Opinion Clause, and the
clauses governing the President’s military and diplomatic
powers. At the end of the day, the Supreme Court has not
explicitly relied on any of them in justifying executive privilege.
At first blush, the Vesting Clause would appear to be the
most likely candidate for providing authority for the President to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and the public. 84
An argument could be put forward that the clause provides the
President with some degree of implied authority, 85 particularly in
foreign and military affairs. 86 Unlike Article I, which provides
Congress with “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted,” 87 Article
II begins by stating more generally and without apparent
limitation that the “executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.” 88 Thus, an argument
can be made that the powers in Article II are unenumerated,
See, e.g., ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 24–26; Viet D. Dinh, Book Review, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 346, 348 (1996) (reviewing MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1994));
cf. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
85
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 137–38 (1926). But see Humphrey’s
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935).
86
See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234, 355 (2001). The argument that the
Vesting Clause is a repository of foreign affairs powers is not airtight, however. See,
e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 546, 687–88 (2004).
87
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
88
See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
84
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much like those of Article III. 89 It would seem to follow that the
unstated but clearly recognized 90 authority of executive privilege
could well flow from this clause.
In addition to the Vesting Clause, those asserting executive
privilege can point to the President’s power to obtain opinions
from executive branch officials. 91 As noted above, Article II,
Section 2 states that the President “may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices.” 92 The argument could be made that, since
the President may request opinions from other executive officers,
it is implicit that such advice as a general matter may not be
provided to others and must remain confidential. However, it is
by no means clear that, simply because the President may ask for
information from his Cabinet officers, Congress or the public
therefore may not have access to the same data, particularly
since Congress exercises a long-recognized power to investigate
the executive branch. 93
Case law has also made particular reference to the
President’s authority to withhold information in defense and
foreign affairs. 94 Thus, other textual grounds for executive
privilege could be found in the President’s constitutional
responsibilities as Commander in Chief 95 and Chief Diplomat. 96
See generally Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15.
See infra Part II.B.
91
Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Cheney, Enron, and the Constitution, TIME, Feb. 2,
2002, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,198829,00.html.
92
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
93
See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of
the Congress to conduct investigations . . . is broad . . . . It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or
waste.”).
94
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 706, 707, 710, 715
(1974).
95
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”); see also Chi. & S. Air
Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“The President, both as
Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available
intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not be published to the world.
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held
secret.”). But cf. BERGER, supra note 6, at 115–16, 161–62 (discussing and ultimately
dismissing the view that the Commander in Chief Clause provides the President
with authority to protect information from disclosure).
89
90
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It is usually acknowledged that both of these roles require some
degree of secrecy, which justifies the President withholding
certain information in these areas. 97
While the Vesting Clause, the Opinion Clause, the
Commander in Chief Clause, and Article II’s diplomatic clauses
would each appear to provide some possible textual support for
executive privilege, the Supreme Court has never embraced any
of these propositions. In fact, the Court in Nixon I concluded that
“[n]owhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference
to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest [in
confidentiality] relates to the effective discharge of a President’s
powers, it is constitutionally based.” 98 Instead, it will be recalled
that the Court expressly tied the privilege to “the nature of
enumerated powers,” 99 reasoning that “the protection of the
confidentiality
of
Presidential
communications
has . . . constitutional underpinnings.” 100 Thus, according to the
Supreme Court, executive privilege is implied from the
President’s exercise of his constitutional powers, not explicit from
specific textual grants.
In binding executive privilege to the exercise of enumerated
powers, the Supreme Court clearly tied executive privilege to
broader structural features in the Constitution. If, in fact,
authority for executive privilege is drawn from structural
considerations rather than an individual clause or clauses as laid
out in Nixon I, then it would seem to bolster the case for VPP
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors . . . .”). The term “Chief
Diplomat” is Clinton Rossiter’s. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
25 (2d ed. 1960).
97
But see BERGER, supra note 6, at 115–16, 161–62. Exactly what the President
can withhold from Congress in the realm of foreign and defense affairs is uncertain
as Congress can make compelling claims to information in this context. See, e.g., id.
at 108–16, 124–33; FISHER, supra note 6, at 10–11, 13–14, 30–39.
98
Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 711 (emphasis added); see also In re Certain Complaints
Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council of the
Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The Court [in Nixon I]
discerned the constitutional foundation for the executive privilege—notwithstanding
the lack of any express provision—in the constitutional scheme of separation of
powers and in the very nature of a President’s duties . . . the same must be true of
the judiciary.”).
99
See Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705.
100
Id. at 705–06.
96
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since VPP has no express textual basis and instead relies on the
same type of structural reasoning. 101
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Doctrine
Until the Nixon administration, the doctrine of executive
privilege had yet to be fully recognized by the Supreme Court,
even though the need for executive branch secrecy had been long
recognized in other quarters. 102 In 1974, historical practice was
enshrined in legal doctrine in Nixon I. Since that decision, the
federal courts have had several other occasions to further
consider the matter. These rulings provide little in the way of
unambiguous support for VPP, but the overall tenor of these
decisions is more favorable than not. Were VPP to be litigated
today, there is no comparable series of historical precedents for
VPP to rely upon in the way the executive branch did for
executive privilege—though Vice Presidents have hinted that
they do have such authority. 103 Nonetheless, the underlying
reasoning of these executive privilege decisions—particularly
that of Nixon I—provides support for VPP in that the rationale
broadly links constitutional privilege to the exercise of
enumerated constitutional powers.
1.

United States v. Nixon (Nixon I)

In Nixon I, the Supreme Court, for the first time, was
confronted squarely with an assertion of executive privilege. 104
In that much heralded decision, President Nixon attempted to
quash a subpoena duces tecum issued by a federal district court
requiring him to surrender a number of audio recordings and
other materials to the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which was
investigating the Watergate controversy. 105 These tapes and
papers reflected certain discussions held between Nixon and
several White House staff members. 106 Nixon asserted executive
privilege over the tapes, arguing that the privilege was absolute
and that his decision to keep the materials secret was

101
102
103
104
105
106

See, e.g., infra Part VIII.A.
See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 9, 117, 128.
See infra Part VI.E–F, VI.L.
418 U.S. 683, 703.
See id. at 686.
See id.
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unreviewable by the courts. 107 The Special Prosecutor’s Office
countered that it had an overriding need for the materials since
they involved a judicial proceeding related to potential criminal
matters. 108
The Court ruled unanimously109 that the tapes had to be
turned over to the special prosecutor since the materials were
linked directly to criminal proceedings, a vital Article III
function. While the decision led to the demise of Nixon’s
presidency, the Court enhanced the office as an institution by
formally recognizing a qualified executive privilege. 110 The
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, stated:
Human experience teaches that those who expect public
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a
concern for appearances and for their own interests to the
detriment of the decisionmaking process . . . .
[T]he
confidentially
of
Presidential
communications
has . . . constitutional underpinnings. . . .
The privilege is
fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. 111

The Court placed some emphasis on the particular need for
protection of military and diplomatic secrets. It stated that the
“need for confidentiality . . . [regarding conversations about]
foreign statesmen is too obvious to call for further treatment.” 112
At the same time, the Court limited its holding to the criminal
context. 113

See id. at 692–93.
See id. at 689, 711–12.
109
Justice Rehnquist recused himself, making it an 8–0 decision. See id. at 716.
110
See, e.g., ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 71; Miller, supra note 6, at 638.
111
Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705–06, 708; see also id. at 706 (“The President’s need for
complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the
courts.”).
112
Id. at 715; see also id. at 706 (recognizing the unique importance of
preserving “military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets”).
113
See 418 U.S. at 712 n.19 (“We are not here concerned with the balance
between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for
relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that between the confidentiality
interest and congressional demands for information, nor with the President’s
interest in preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict between the
President’s assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the
constitutional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.”). The Court did not
explain whether invocation of executive privilege in the context of a civil suit or a
congressional investigation might involve different standards. Dictum from a
subsequent decision indicates that the President enjoys greater leeway to withhold
107
108
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In its decision, the Court coupled pragmatic concerns with
the doctrine of separation of powers. 114 Reasoning that the
President’s need for candid advice from his advisers justified the
withholding of certain information from the public, the Court
explained that a “President and those who assist him must be
free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling
to express except privately.” 115
At no point did the Court leave room for a Vice President to
exercise executive privilege; references in the decision were made
only to the “President’s powers” and “the Chief Executive,”
omitting the Vice President altogether. The Court’s approach in
this regard tracked the legal position of President Nixon, 116
which did not embrace anyone but the President invoking
executive privilege. Of course, VPP is not a subset of executive
privilege. It entails the Vice President’s own privilege reflecting
his own unique constitutional role in American government.
2.

Post-Nixon I Jurisprudence

In the years following Nixon I, courts have had occasion to
decide a number of other cases involving executive privilege.
None of these decisions expressly considered whether a Vice
President has the benefit of such a power. Nevertheless, their
net effect is generally supportive of the notion of VPP.
a.

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Nixon II)

Following his resignation, Nixon claimed custody over his
presidential records as part of an agreement he had worked out
with the General Services Administration; this included
Watergate-related tapes and papers. Congress responded by
materials in the context of a civil suit than in a criminal matter. See Cheney v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004).
114
See, e.g., ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 47–48.
115
Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 708.
116
During the Nixon I litigation, counsel for the President asserted that
“executive privilege; in this case, [is] more accurately described as presidential
privilege. Unless this is so, the full panoply of power embodied in the executive
power, would be, in reality, greatly diluted, a concept at odds with the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution.” Brief for the Respondent, Cross-Petitioner, Richard M.
Nixon, President of the United States, Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683 (Nos. 73-1766 & 731834), reprinted in UNITED STATES V. NIXON, THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT 320, 350–51 (Leon Friedman ed., 1974) [hereinafter Nixon Brief] (emphasis
added).
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passing a statute to overturn this agreement and to address to its
satisfaction the disposition of Nixon’s presidential materials. In
Nixon II, 117 the Supreme Court held that former Presidents may
invoke executive privilege under certain scenarios, but with
respect to Nixon, the Court ruled the statutory scheme in
question did not compromise the confidentiality considerations
raised by the former President. 118 Thus, the Court concluded
that invocation of executive privilege was not limited to sitting
Presidents but also included former Presidents. 119 That said, a
former President’s interest in preserving confidentiality, the
Court reasoned, fades over time. 120
In this regard, the Court provided another hint of daylight
for VPP.
Since former Presidents, in addition to sitting
Presidents, enjoy authority to invoke a constitutional privilege to
protect their past deliberations, the decision broadens even
further the range of individuals who may invoke constitutional
privileges. If an individual who no longer even serves in an
official capacity may invoke a constitutional privilege, by
extension should not a sitting constitutional officer—the Vice
President—be all the more able to do so? 121
Lest it be overlooked, the Court also relied in part on
structural reasoning in supporting its decision. 122
b.

In re Sealed Case (Espy)

In 1997, the D.C. Circuit issued an important ruling
involving executive privilege in In re Sealed Case. 123 In that
decision, involving an independent counsel office’s investigation
of Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy, the court decided that the
independent counsel could have access to materials stemming
from a White House Counsel Office’s investigation of the
secretary. 124 The court did not accept the President’s invocation
of executive privilege in this instance, but it did further refine
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
See id. at 446–55.
119
See id. at 439.
120
See id. at 451.
121
Cf. infra Part VI.L.3 (discussing a 2001 executive order—since repealed—
that seemed to recognize authority for a Vice President or former Vice President to
invoke a constitutional privilege).
122
Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 447–48.
123
121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
124
See id. at 734.
117
118
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the doctrine. The court reasoned that the authority to withhold
information
was
divided
between
the
“presidential
communications privilege” and the “deliberative process
privilege.” 125 Presidential communications privilege, the court
explained, is a constitutional principle involving materials
prepared by the President’s closest advisers, 126 involving “final
and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones.” 127
This privilege, the court concluded, is nonetheless a qualified
one. 128 Thus, by reiterating the uniqueness of the President’s
constitutional role when discussing the constitutional
presidential communications privilege, In re Sealed Case does not
envision executive privilege extending far enough to permit the
Vice President to invoke this doctrine.
“Deliberative process privilege,” on the other hand, is akin to
a common-law privilege. 129 It “protects the deliberations and
decisionmaking process of executive officials generally” 130 and is
By acknowledging a
limited to pre-decisional materials. 131
deliberative process privilege, the court appeared to recognize a
broadening of the scope of executive privilege to include
communications outside of those directly involving the President
even if the court cautioned that deliberative process privilege was
easier to overcome. That apparent expansion of executive
privilege to include the deliberative process undertaken by
executive branch officials does not involve the question of VPP,
however. VPP concerns whether the Vice President holds his
own constitutional privilege, not whether he may hold a common
law privilege akin to that of a Cabinet secretary.
See id. at 737–40, 742–57.
See id. at 752 (“[C]ommunications made by presidential advisers in the
course of preparing advice for the President come under the presidential
communications privilege, even when these communications are not made directly to
the President. . . . In particular, the privilege should not extend to staff outside the
White House in executive branch agencies.”).
127
Id. at 745.
128
See id.
129
In this regard, the court indicated that such a privilege “allows the
government to withhold documents and other materials that would reveal ‘advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.’ . . . [I]t originated as a common
law privilege . . . [and requires that] the material[s] must be predecisional
and . . . deliberative.” Id. at 737. The “privilege is a qualified [one] . . . and can be
overcome by a sufficient showing of need.” Id.
130
Id. at 735.
131
See id. at 745.
125
126
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In re Sealed Case (Secret Service)

In yet another decision formally titled In re Sealed Case and
again involving privilege during the Clinton administration, the
courts had occasion to evaluate the merits of a purported
“protective function privilege.” The question in this case centered
around whether a “protective function privilege” could be invoked
by the Secretary of Treasury owing to the Secretary’s oversight of
the secret service detail protecting the President. 132 The Clinton
administration asserted that this privilege could be invoked
independently of the President and, once asserted, would shield
secret service agents from testifying about any presidential
conversations and activities they had seen or overheard. 133
The D.C. Circuit rejected this claim. 134 In dismissing this
novel assertion of privilege, the court followed reasoning that
prima facie would seem to cast some doubt on the notion of VPP.
The court stated that “the efficacy of the privilege is undermined
by its being vested in the Secretary of the Treasury and not in
the President, whose conduct the proposed privilege is supposed
to influence; we know of no other privilege that works that
way.” 135 By clearly rejecting the notion that another executive
branch official could assert this privilege, the D.C. Circuit
appeared to undercut the notion that the Vice President could
exercise a privilege independent from that of the President.
While eliminating the notion of vice presidential executive
privilege, the court’s reasoning does not undercut VPP. VPP,
after all, is not a subset of executive privilege. It is the Vice
President’s privilege based on the Vice President’s constitutional
powers. The Secretary is not a constitutional officer. Further,
unlike the Secretary, the Vice President is not exclusively a part
of the executive branch. The latter’s invocation of VPP would
stem from the Constitution, not from presidential delegation,
statute, or common law. Further, the Secretary had argued that
he had to protect the communications of a constitutional officer—
the President; VPP involves the constitutional officer protecting
his own conversations.

132
133
134
135

See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1077.
See id. at 1078–79.
See id. at 1077 (emphasis added).
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C. Executive Privilege Policies
Although little hint of executive privilege can be gleaned
from the Constitutional Convention, the debates over ratification,
as well as early practice, indicate that it was generally
understood in the late eighteenth century that the President
could withhold certain information from the public and even from
Congress, particularly in the realm of foreign and military
affairs. 136 Nowhere does it seem that there was any indication
that the Vice President might have similar needs.
Past practice 137 indicates that what is now called executive
privilege was not an alien concept during the early years of the
Constitution.
Ultimately, during the 1790s, an implicit
recognition of the authority of the President to withhold certain
information from Congress 138 and the public was established; at
the same time, Congress’s parallel authority to investigate the
executive branch was also acknowledged. 139
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 356 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills
ed., 1982); HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 9, 30, 32–33, 117, 128; THE FEDERALIST NO.
64, at 327 (John Jay) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). Such sentiments were not uniform
among the Framers, however. See 2 ELLIOT, supra note 28, at 480 (quoting James
Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 385 ((Max Farrand & David Matteson eds., rev.
ed. 1966) (quoting Charles Pinckney in the U.S. Senate in 1800); cf. ABRAHAM D.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 396–97
n.212 (1976).
The Vice President plays no constitutional role of his own in foreign or military
affairs. He, however, may have responsibilities in these areas delegated to him by
the President and delegated to him by statute, but those are by definition not
reflective of his own constitutional authority. See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). See
generally PAUL KENGOR, WREATH LAYER OR POLICY PLAYER?: THE VICE PRESIDENT’S
ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY (2000); JACK LECHELT, THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN FOREIGN
POLICY (2009).
137
Custom is often accorded great respect by the courts in determining the
constitutionality of an action. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401
(1989) (“ ‘[T]raditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the
Constitution.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343
U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 610–
11 (1952) (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon them. In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in
by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were
such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a
gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”).
138
See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 9, 117, 128; SOFAER, supra note 136, at
81–88.
139
See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 10–11, 13–14, 30–39.
136
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It is worth noting that on occasion President Washington
requested advice on policy matters from Vice President John
Adams. 140 During one of these consultations, the question of
secrecy arose, but it was Washington, not Adams, who raised the
issue. The President wrote to the Vice President that “I would
thank you for giving the papers herewith sent a perusal . . . .
None but the heads of department [sic] are privy to these papers,
which I pray may be returned this evening or in the morning.” 141
There seems no acknowledgement that the Vice President
himself enjoyed any right of confidentiality over the
documents. 142
Later in his administration, Washington became embroiled
in a conflict over information with the House regarding
documents related to the Jay Treaty. During a subsequent
debate over whether treaty materials should be disclosed to the
House of Representatives, Vice President Adams acknowledged
to his wife the lower chamber’s authority to call for the
documents. He wrote:
I cannot deny the Right of the H. to ask for Papers, nor to
express their opinions upon the Merits of a Treaty. My Ideas
are very high of the Rights and Powers of the H. of R. These
Powers may be abused and in this instance there is great
danger that they will be. 143

140
See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 240 n.10 (1997) (noting that President
Washington consulted with Vice President Adams on at least three occasions).
141
Letter from George Washington, President, U.S., to John Adams, Vice
President, U.S. (Jan. 8, 1794), in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 515 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1853). The documents likely discussed the actions of French
envoy Edmond Charles Genet’s attempts to recruit U.S. citizens for a filibustering
operation in Florida. See id. at 515 n.2.
142
Indeed, the definitive work on governmental secrecy in the Federalist period
makes no reference to either Vice President Adams or Vice President Jefferson
raising a question of vice presidential privilege. See LINDA DUDIK GUERRERO, JOHN
ADAMS’ VICE PRESIDENCY, 1789–1797: THE NEGLECTED MAN IN THE FORGOTTEN
Office 104 (1982). Harry C. Thompson, The Second Place in Rome: John Adams as
Vice President, 10 PRES. STUD. Q. 171 (1980). See generally HOFFMAN, supra note 6.
143
Letter from John Adams, Vice President, U.S., to Abigail Adams, wife (July
19,
1796),
available
at
http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/aea/cfm/
doc.cfm?id=L17960419ja. At least early in his career, Adams seemed to be favorably
disposed toward limited secrecy in government. See, e.g., BRUCE P. MONTGOMERY,
THE BUSH-CHENEY ADMINISTRATION’S ASSAULT ON OPEN GOVERNMENT xii (2008)
(“ ‘Liberty . . . cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people,
who have a right, from the frame of their nature, to knowledge . . . and a desire to
know; but besides this, they have a right, an indisputable, undeniable, indefensible,
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It seems doubtful Adams would have felt the President would
have had to turn over such sensitive materials to the House, but
at the same time, he would not have had to do the same should a
comparable issue have arisen involving vice presidential
authority.
Of course, Vice President Adams spent the overwhelming
portion of his time presiding over the Senate, which was the
predominant role for the officeholder at the time. For the first
five years of the Senate’s existence, its proceedings were closed to
In this respect, the Vice President
the general public. 144
participated in secret deliberations but cannot be said to have
exercised what amounted to a vice presidential privilege. 145 His
successor, Thomas Jefferson, however, played a minor role in
matters involving Senate secrecy. He voted to break a tie and
defeat a proposed Senate rule that would have imposed secrecy
obligations on Senators when debating treaties. 146 Again, this
action seems inconsistent with Vice Presidents having their own
privilege.
As far as the development of executive privilege, precedents
beginning in the Washington administration were built upon
over time. Gradually, assertions of the executive branch’s
perceived need to withhold information became a more common
occurrence. Following the New Deal and World War II, as the
federal bureaucracy grew larger and as the amount of
information collected by the national government increased, the
need for policies regularizing disclosure of executive branch
information became an increasingly pressing matter. During
this time, Presidents began issuing formal policies on executive
privilege. What is particularly noteworthy is that none of these
policies makes any reference to the Vice President possessing
executive privilege. Instead, the policies almost uniformly reflect
that the power to invoke executive privilege lies with the
President alone.
divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean, of the
characters and conduct of their rulers.’ ” (quoting Adams in 1765)).
144
See, e.g., ROY SWANSTROM, THE UNITED STATES SENATE: 1787–1801: A
DISSERTATION ON THE FIRST FOURTEEN YEARS OF THE UPPER LEGISLATIVE BODY
238 (1988).
145
Some have speculated that Adams may have contributed to the Senate’s
decision during its early years to conduct its business in private. See HOFFMAN,
supra note 6, at 56–57. Compare id., with note 143 and accompanying text.
146
See HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 214–15.
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In response to a congressional inquiry on his policy
regarding executive privilege, President Kennedy wrote that the
doctrine “can be invoked only by the president and will not be
President
used without specific presidential approval.” 147
Johnson, consistent with the example of his predecessor, stated
that during his administration “the claim of ‘executive privilege’
will continue to be made only by the president.” 148 In an internal
memorandum dated March 24, 1969, his successor, President
Nixon wrote in similar fashion: “Executive privilege will not be
used without specific Presidential approval.” 149 President Nixon
replied to a House inquiry on April 7, 1969, by commenting:
“Under this Administration, executive privilege will not be
asserted without specific Presidential approval.” 150 Professor
Mark Rozell notes, however, that both the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations acted counter to their stated guidance in this
regard. 151 President Nixon also seems to have violated his own
policy in this respect. 152 Notably, none of these anomalies
involved the Vice President. 153

ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 47.
Id.
149
Id. at 64.
150
Id.; see also Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the
Executive, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 438 (1971) [hereinafter Executive Privilege Hearing]
(“Senator ERVIN. . . . ‘It is your view that the question of invoking the executive
privilege is a question to be answered by the President himself rather than by some
subordinate in the executive branch of the Government?’ Mr. REHNQUIST.
‘Unquestionably.’ ” (quoting an exchange between Senator Sam Ervin and thenAssistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist)).
151
See, e.g., ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 46–48; cf. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., REFUSALS
BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE CONGRESS: 1964–
1973 (1974) [hereinafter REFUSALS].
152
See, e.g., ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 66–67. For instance, Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird declined to provide the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the
“Pentagon Papers.” See JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 194 (1976). Efforts to withhold information by
those in the Nixon administration other than the President led to several ultimately
unsuccessful efforts to legislate that only the President could invoke executive
privilege. See ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 58.
153
See REFUSALS, supra note 151, at 17–52. President Johnson’s Vice President,
Hubert Humphrey, and Nixon’s Vice President, Spiro Agnew, both made serious
soundings about the Vice President enjoying a constitutional privilege but both
stopped short of making formal invocations. See infra Part VI.E–F.
147
148
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While inquiries were made of President Ford about his views
on executive privilege, he apparently did not reply. 154 President
Carter seemed to adopt Ford’s approach and did not formally
communicate his executive privilege policy to Congress. 155
Carter’s staff, however, made informal representations, the
substance of which mirrored the formal policies issued by
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon156: “[O]nly the president is
authorized to invoke a claim of ‘executive privilege.’ ” 157 In 1980,
White House counsel Lloyd Cutler laid out internal guidance on
the invocation of executive privilege within the executive office of
the President. 158 That document indicated that the President
alone could waive executive privilege regarding materials sought
by outside parties. 159
Reagan’s posture with respect to the ultimate authority
regarding invocation of executive privilege was little different
from those of Carter, Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy. Anytime the
doctrine was to be asserted, the President would make the
decision and Congress would be notified “that the claim of
executive privilege is being made with the specific approval of the
president.” 160
President George H.W. Bush never replied to congressional
inquiries regarding his stance on executive privilege.161
Nonetheless, practice during his presidency seems to have
reaffirmed the policies of his predecessors. During the Bush
administration, the Department of Education (“ED”) became
embroiled in a conflict with a congressional committee over
documents. 162 Without the President’s blessing, the DOJ urged
The
the ED to invoke executive privilege on its own. 163
administration blinked in the face of strong political pressure
and backed away from asserting privilege. 164 The ED precedent
for the need for the President to provide his personal approval for

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

See ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 85.
See id. at 98–99.
See id.
Id. at 99.
See id. at 100–01.
See id. at 101.
ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 95.
See id. at 108.
See id. at 113–14.
See id. at 114.
See id. at 114–15.
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executive privilege was further underscored when President
Bush later asserted executive privilege himself over materials
involved with a Navy aircraft system. 165
The Clinton administration adopted a policy on the
invocation of executive privilege that was very much in keeping
with those of earlier administrations. Clinton’s White House
counsel stated in a memorandum: “Executive privilege belongs
to the President, not individual departments or agencies.” 166
Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, never issued a formal
policy on the doctrine. His administration claimed privilege on a
handful of occasions and at times came close to invoking a vice
presidential privilege of sorts but never actually did so. 167
In sum, no presidential policy statement has ever
acknowledged that a Vice President may invoke executive
privilege. Moreover, as a matter of practice, no President has
ever deviated from his own executive privilege policy to permit
the Vice President to make such a claim. That has been the case
even as Vice Presidents have steadily gained in stature and
influence during the past several decades. Perhaps it also
warrants mention that Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and
George H.W. Bush were all former Vice Presidents and
presumably were somewhat sensitized to the needs of the
position. None of them as President made any special allowances
for the Vice President to invoke executive privilege.
D. Prominent Authorities on the Exclusiveness of the President
Invoking Executive Privilege
The preceding discussion reflects that the longstanding
executive branch position has been that only the President, or
former President, may invoke executive privilege.
This
conclusion is one that has been embraced in lower courts, in the
halls of Congress and by prominent commentators.
No less than Chief Justice John Marshall, while riding
circuit, implied that executive privilege must be invoked by the
President himself. 168 In United States v. Burr, he wrote:
See id. at 115–16.
See id. at 124.
167
See infra Part VI.L; cf. infra Part VI.L.3 (discussing an executive order that
implied a form of vice presidential privilege).
168
See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191–92 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). The view
that only the President may invoke executive privilege has not been embraced with
165
166
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[M]uch reliance must be placed on the declaration of the
president; and I do think that a privilege does exist to withhold
private letters of a certain description. The reason is this:
Letters to the president in his private character, are often
written to him in consequence of his public character, and may
relate to public concerns. Such a letter, though it be a private
one, seems to partake of the character of an official paper, and
to be such as ought not on light ground to be forced into public
view. . . . The president may himself state the particular
reasons which may have induced him to withhold a paper, and
the court would unquestionably allow their full force to those
reasons. 169

Marshall went on to state: “The propriety of withholding it [the
document] must be decided by himself [the President], not by
another for him.” 170
The former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, George
MacKinnon, espoused the same view in a concurring opinion in a
case on executive privilege. 171 In Senate Select Committee v.
Nixon, he wrote that “the President, as distinct from the executive
establishment generally, possesses a constitutionally founded
privilege enabling him to protect the confidentiality of
conferences with his advisors.” 172 Three decades later, the D.C.
Circuit in Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice observed that
“[u]nlike the deliberative process privilege, which is a general
privilege that applies to all executive branch officials, the
presidential communications privilege is specific to the
President.” 173
In the early 1970s, during debate over executive privilege,
members of Congress expressed misgivings about executive
branch officials other than the President exercising what
respect to military secrets or state secrets privilege within government agencies. Cf.
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10–11 n.26 (1953). In these instances,
department or agency heads may invoke this nonconstitutional privilege. See id. at 4
(quoting the Air Force’s determination that release of information would not be in
the public interest).
169
Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 192 (emphasis added).
170
Id. (emphasis added).
171
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, C.J., concurring); see also In re Cheney, 334
F.3d 1096, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., dissenting) (“If executive privilege is
to be asserted, it therefore appears that the President must make the decision.”),
vacated and remanded by Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 293 (2004).
172
498 F.2d at 733 (emphasis added).
173
365 F.3d 1108, 1113–14 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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amounted to executive privilege. 174 For example, Representative
William S. Moorhead concluded that a “witness such as Dr.
Kissinger does not personally have an executive privilege. It is
only the President who enjoys and can invoke this privilege.” 175
Commentators have expressed the same view. Professor
Adam Carlyle Breckenridge, in his thoughtful book on the
subject, aptly concluded that “executive privilege should be
invoked only personally by a president. It should be called the
Executive privilege—with a capital E—and not be used as a
Professor Breckenridge
recourse to privilege generally.” 176
asserted that Presidents could withhold information for certain
reasons “but presumably only if asserted personally by the
president on a case-by-case basis.” 177 Professor Rozell, perhaps
the preeminent authority in the field of executive privilege,
echoes Breckenridge’s views. He has written that “the common
standard for years has been that presidents alone have the
authority to either assert executive privilege or direct an
administration official to do so.” 178
As noted throughout this subsection, the view that only the
President may assert executive privilege has been borne out by
executive privilege policies through the years. The Supreme
Court has seen fit to extend this principle only to former
Presidents. If only the President, or former President, may
invoke executive privilege, then by definition that would preclude
the Vice President from exercising the same privilege, preventing
him from exercising a constitutional privilege with respect to his
See ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 67.
BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 6, at 97. Legislative opposition to having
executive branch officials other than the President invoke what amounted to
executive privilege can be traced back to the 1790s. See HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at
122–23.
176
BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 6, at 155. Other authorities have taken a similar
view. See, e.g., REFUSALS, supra note 151, at 7 (“[T]he only person who can invoke
Executive privilege in the formal sense of the word is the President of the United
States.” (quoting William Bundy)); HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 183
(2005) (“[T]he president personally must invoke executive privilege—the decision
cannot be delegated.”); KURLAND, supra note 6, at 42 (“It was generally agreed at the
1971 [Senate Judiciary Subcommittee] hearings [on executive privilege] . . . that,
whatever the scope of executive privilege . . . it was a privilege personal to the
President and could be asserted only by him.”); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 776 n.40 (3d ed. 2000) (“[T]he asserted privilege is the
President’s and could be invoked only by him.”); supra note 12.
177
BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 6, at 57 (emphasis added).
178
ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 155.
174
175
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executive branch activities as delegated to him by the President
or by statute. Such a restriction would not, of course, limit the
Vice President in exercising a privilege so long as it concerns his
own constitutional powers.
III. LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE
Much as the President as a constitutional officer may invoke
a privilege to protect the confidentiality of his communications
when exercising his duties, members of the legislative branch
may do the same. 179 The authority of the President and federal
lawmakers to invoke such a privilege would seem to reinforce the
structural notion that the Vice President in his admittedly
limited constitutional duties would be able to invoke his own
privilege. Moreover, the Vice President himself should be able to
assert legislative privilege to the extent he is carrying out his
legislative branch duties. 180
For authorities discussing the confidentiality of intra-legislative branch
communication, see, for example, Amar, supra note 91 (“Senators must be free to
talk candidly with colleagues and staff in cloakrooms.”); Jennifer Yachnin, Hurdles
Confront Visclosky Probe, ROLL CALL, June 2, 2009 (“ ‘Those probing the
Congressman will not be able to get close to his discussion about legislation or
appropriations.’ ” (quoting former House general counsel Charles Tiefer); id. (“ ‘One
thing I think is pretty clear is the internal deliberations about earmarks inside the
Congress, between the staff and the Member or the committee and the Member, I
think are clearly protected.’ ” (quoting former House general counsel Stanley
Brand)). But cf. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 860 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[Former
Representative] Thompson claims that the Speech or Debate Clause bars the
introduction into evidence of his private conversations with Congressman Murtha on
the floor of the House of Representatives, in which he invited Murtha to join the
ranks of those accepting bribes. One would think that a Congressman, even when
grasping for objections to a criminal conviction, would understand that the Speech or
Debate Clause accords immunity to what is said on the House floor in the course of
the legislative process not to whispered solicitations to commit a crime.” (citations
omitted)). For a historical treatment of legislative privilege, see generally Cox, supra
note 6, at 1393–95; David Kaye, Congressional Papers and Judicial Subpoenas, 23
UCLA L. REV. 57 (1975).
180
The Vice President may exercise legislative privilege—as opposed to
executive privilege—because the former privilege is not unique to a single
constitutional officer. Any member of Congress may invoke the privilege. Moreover,
it is not contingent upon approval of either or both houses of Congress. See United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972) (“[T]he Speech or Debate
Clause . . . [was written] to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring
the independence of individual legislators.” (emphasis added)); id. at 524 (“[T]he
purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to protect the individual legislator.”);
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621–22 (1972) (“[T]he privilege
applicable . . . is viewed, as it must be, as the privilege of the Senator, and invocable
only by the Senator or by the aide on the Senator’s behalf.”); In re Grand Jury
179

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010)

2010]

VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY

469

Whereas executive privilege is not spelled out clearly in
constitutional text, legislative privilege has a plausible textual
basis: the Speech or Debate Clause. 181 Not only does the Speech
or Debate Clause supply potential textual support for members of
Congress to exercise a constitutional privilege, but courts have
also applied structural considerations and past practice to the
question of whether there is a privilege for lawmakers. In so
doing the courts recognized what in this Article will be called
“generalized legislative privilege.” 182

Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that the Speech or Debate
“privilege, although of great institutional interest to the House as a whole, is also
personal to each member”); see also Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) (“[T]he
privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the House as an organized
body, as of each individual member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege,
even against the declared will of the house . . . . [The lawmaker] derives [the
privilege] from the will of the people, expressed in the constitution . . . Of these
privileges, thus secured to each member, he cannot be deprived, by a resolve of the
house or by an act of the legislature.”); Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate,
Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1169–70
(1973) (“[T]he privilege is guaranteed to each member [of Congress] personally, and
its constitutional protection is not subject to collective discretion.”). On the other
hand, the Vice President may not exercise executive privilege since that authority is
unique to the President and only the President may assert it. See supra Part II.C–D.
181
See, e.g., David Kaye, Congressional Papers, Judicial Subpoenas, and the
Constitution, 24 UCLA L. REV. 523, 579 (1977) (“Where speech or debate would be
brought into question by compliance with a subpoena, the Constitution leaves it to
Congress to decide whether secrecy is in the public interest.”); id. at 572 (“[T]he
speech or debate clause privileges Congress from judicial discovery of those papers
that document or describe ‘legitimate legislative activity.’ ”); Note, Evidentiary
Implications of the Speech or Debate Clause, 88 YALE L.J. 1280, 1286 n.30 (1979)
(“The speech or debate clause’s evidentiary privilege insulates the legislative process
by providing both a limited guarantee of confidentiality and an exclusionary rule.”).
Other constitutional provisions such as the Arrest Clause, the Publication Clause,
and Congress’s authority over its own rules could also be read as supplying
authority to Congress to withhold documents from the other branches. See Kaye,
supra, at 525–46. These textual provisions, however, are much more difficult to link
to legislative privilege, as defined in this Article. For example, the privilege of
freedom from arrest has been construed narrowly by the courts. See, e.g., Brewster,
408 U.S. at 520–21. One noted authority in the area of legislative privilege has
rejected not only the Arrest Clause as a legitimate basis for legislative privilege but
also the Publication Clause. See Kaye, supra, at 526–46. Congress’s constitutional
power to make its own internal rules gives each body authority to compel its
members to keep information secret. Execution of this aspect of legislative
confidentiality is unlike that derived from the Speech or Debate Clause privilege or
the generalized legislative privilege, since rulemaking authority is contingent on
actions taken by the chamber as a whole whereas the latter two privileges are
invoked by individual members. See supra note 180.
182
See infra Part III.B.
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The Speech or Debate Clause as a Constitutional Privilege

The Constitution provides that regarding “Senators and
Representatives . . . for any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place.” 183 Courts have
interpreted the clause broadly to include an absolute
constitutional privilege permitting members of Congress to
withhold certain information from the public. 184
The intent behind the Speech or Debate Clause was to
protect the House and Senate from encroachment by the other
branches. 185 The Supreme Court has noted that “the privilege
has been recognized as an important protection of the
independence and integrity of the legislature.” 186 While the
“heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either House,” other
legislative actions may receive the Clause’s protection if they
constitute “an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate in
committee and House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or
with respect to other matters which the Constitution places
within the jurisdiction of either House.” 187
That said, in United States v. Brewster, involving whether an
investigation could be made into activities peripheral to the
legislative function, the Court cautioned that the provision was
“not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
See, e.g., United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 420 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (“permit[ting] Congress to insist on the confidentiality of [its]
investigative files”); United States v. Ehrlichman, 389 F. Supp. 95, 97–98 (D.D.C.
1974) (“[S]ince the requested transcript [of the committee hearing] would reveal the
deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in
committee and House proceedings . . . judicial efforts to compel production of that
document would, under the present circumstances, also violate the Speech and [sic]
Debate Clause . . . . That provision clearly prohibits the Court from forcing the
Chairman of the Subcommittee or the Speaker to . . . be required to produce at trial
the official record of that testimony or to put the issue to a vote of the full House.”
(internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted)); cf. Minpeco S.A. v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859–61 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Kaye, supra
note 181, at 552 n.130. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 597.
185
See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966) (stating that the
purpose of the Clause was to “prevent intimidation of legislators by the executive
and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary”).
186
Id. at 178.
187
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624–25 (1972).
183
184
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private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the
integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence
of individual legislators.” 188 While the scope of the Clause “does
not prohibit inquiry into activities that are casually or
incidentally related to legislative affairs,” 189 the Court elsewhere
has indicated it does restrict investigation into “[c]ommittee
reports, resolutions, and the act of voting . . . [as well as] ‘things
generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it.’ ” 190 Acts of voting would
certainly implicate the Vice President’s legislative duties since he
has the authority to break tie votes in the Senate.
In United States v. Johnson, 191 the issue arose as to whether
the government could ask a former member of Congress to
discuss a speech he gave on the House floor and the motivation
behind it. The Court concluded that “such an intensive judicial
inquiry, made in the course of a prosecution by the Executive
Branch . . . violates the express language of the Constitution.” 192
Moreover, as in Nixon II, the Court in Johnson interpreted the
Constitution in such a manner as to permit a former
constitutional officer to invoke a privilege. As noted earlier, if a
former constitutional officer may invoke such a privilege, it
would seem a fortiori that a sitting constitutional officer—the
Vice President—ought to be able to do the same.
In his dissenting opinion in Nixon II, Chief Justice Burger
tied the Speech or Debate Clause to a constitutional privilege.
He reasoned that
[t]he Constitution . . . expressly grants immunity to Members of
Congress as to any “Speech or Debate in either House . . .”; yet
the Court has refused to confine that Clause literally “to words
spoken in debate.” . . . Congressional papers . . . have been held
protected by the Clause in order “to prevent intimidation (of
legislators) by the executive and accountability before a possibly
hostile judiciary.” 193

408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972).
Id. at 528.
190
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969) (quoting Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)).
191
383 U.S. 169.
192
Id. at 177.
193
Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 511 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
188
189
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The Chief Justice noted that “[d]espite the Constitution’s silence
as to the papers of the Legislative Branch, this Court [has] had
no difficulty holding those papers to be protected from control by
other branches.” 194 In addition to relying on the Speech or
Debate Clause to support legislative privilege, Burger also noted
the importance of structural comparisons to the privileges
enjoyed by the magisterial branches of government. He wrote
that the “independence of the three branches of Government,
including control over the papers of each, lies at the heart of this
Court’s broad holdings concerning the immunity of congressional
papers from outside scrutiny.” 195
In Nixon v. Sirica, 196 in a per curiam opinion, the D.C.
Circuit also endorsed the Speech or Debate Clause as conferring
a constitutional privilege. As with Burger’s dissenting opinion in
Nixon II, the court in Sirica reinforced its position on legislative
privilege by placing it in the context of the privileges relied upon
by the other branches. The court stated that “[executive]
privilege, intended to protect the effectiveness of the executive
decision-making process, is analogous to that between a
congressman and his aides under the Speech and [sic] Debate
Clause; to that among judges, and between judges and their law
clerks.” 197
The very next year, in considering whether a Senate
committee’s subpoena duces tecum could overcome a presidential
assertion of privilege, the D.C. Circuit again analogized executive
privilege to the privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause. In
Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, the court quoted Sirica with
approval: “We recognized this great public interest, analogizing
the privilege, on the basis of its purpose, ‘to that between a
congressman and his aides under the Speech and [sic] Debate
Clause; to that among judges, and between judges and their law
clerks’ . . . .” 198
In United States v. Liddy, 199 the issue of a constitutional
privilege derived from the Speech or Debate Clause arose in a
more concrete fashion. In this case, a former Nixon aide tried to
194
195
196
197
198
199

Id. at 515 n.9.
Id. at 510–11.
487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
Id. at 717.
498 F.2d 725, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Sirica, 487 F.2d at 717).
542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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subpoena the testimony of witnesses who had appeared during
an executive session of the House Armed Services Committee. 200
The House refused to provide the materials. 201 In response, the
lower court concluded that it could not direct the House
committee to provide the documents. 202 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit took pains to avoid the privilege issue. It wrote that “[w]e
need not . . . indulge in any discussion as to whether . . . [the
congressman’s] response constituted a claim of privilege
under . . . Art. I, Sec. 5, Cl. 3 and under the Speech or Debate
Clause . . . or under the House Rules which prohibit production of
executive session testimony except upon affirmative vote of the
Committee or the House.”203 The court noted that the “specter of
an academic discussion giving rise to a possible future conflict
between co-equal branches of the government is both
unappealing
and
inappropriate
under
the
existing
Instead, the court determined that the
circumstances.” 204
House’s failure to produce the subpoenaed documents was not
prejudicial to the aide’s defense. 205
Of particular note regarding Speech or Debate privilege is
the 2007 D.C. Circuit decision, United States v. Rayburn House
In this case, the Federal Bureau of
Office Building. 206
Investigation (“FBI”) executed a search warrant for the office of
Representative William Jefferson without providing advance
notice to him or other congressional authorities. 207 The FBI
intended to use the nonprivileged materials seized during the
effort to prosecute Jefferson for bribery and racketeering. 208 The
lawmaker challenged the constitutionality of the raid, asserting
that the Speech or Debate Clause not only provides an
exclusionary rule with respect to evidence related to legislative
duties, but also that such materials should be considered
confidential and not reviewable by the executive branch. 209

See id. at 82.
See id.
202
See id. at 82 n.19 (quoting district court Judge Gesell, who stated that
“further proceeding to enforce the subpoenas would be futile”).
203
Id. at 82–83.
204
Id. at 83.
205
See id.
206
497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
207
See id. at 657.
208
See id. at 658.
209
See id. at 655.
200
201
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While Jefferson’s argument with respect to confidentiality
was not accepted at the district court level, 210 it was embraced on
appeal by the D.C. Circuit even though the matter involved a
criminal investigation. The court—often considered the second
highest judicial tribunal in the land—concluded that “[o]ur
precedent establishes that the testimonial privilege under the
[Speech or Debate] Clause extends to non-disclosure of written
legislative materials.” 211 The court reasoned that
exchanges between a Member of Congress and the Member’s
staff or among Members of Congress on legislative matters may
legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the
possibility of compelled disclosure may therefore chill the
exchange of views with respect to legislative activity. This chill
runs counter to the Clause’s purpose of protecting against
disruption of the legislative process. 212

Based on that premise, the court ordered Jefferson’s legislative
papers returned to him 213 and concluded that the privilege
involved was absolute. 214 The Supreme Court denied certiorari,
permitting the D.C. Circuit decision to stand. 215
In reaching its decision, the D.C. Circuit adopted the same
reasoning for Speech or Debate privilege as the Supreme Court
had applied earlier in Nixon I with respect to executive privilege:
Candor must be encouraged among constitutional officers and
their staffs, and that can only be achieved by preserving the
confidentiality of their deliberations. 216 Rayburn would seem to
210
See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 112
(D.D.C. 2006).
211
Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 655; see also id. at 664 (“The Speech or Debate Clause
protects against the compelled disclosure of privileged documents to agents of the
Executive.”).
212
Id. at 661; see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628–29 (1972)
(“Because the Speech or Debate Clause privilege applies both to Senator and aide, it
appear [sic] to us that paragraph one of the [lower court’s] order, alone, would afford
ample protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any
witness . . . concerning communications between the Senator and his aides during
the term of their employment and related to said meeting or any other legislative act
of the Senator.”).
213
See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 666; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“A party is no more entitled to compel
congressional testimony—or production of documents—than it is to sue
congressmen.”).
214
See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (“The bar on compelled disclosure is absolute.”).
215
See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 522 U.S. 1295 (2008).
216
For similar reasoning, see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1208
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“In some respects, the Speech or
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protect from inquiry lawmakers’ conversations with staff,
internal memoranda, and draft documents as they relate to
legislative activities. Such a conclusion can be read to provide
support for VPP to the extent the Vice President is carrying out
his legislative duties. 217
B. Support for the Generalized Legislative Privilege
In addition to justifying a constitutional privilege for
members of Congress based on the Speech or Debate Clause,
federal judges have also endorsed such authority for lawmakers
on other grounds. In these opinions, judges have concluded that
there exists what in this Article is called the generalized
legislative privilege; 218 that is to say, members of Congress may
claim a constitutional privilege based on structural comparisons
to executive privilege and judicial privilege 219 or based on past
practice.
In his opinion in Sirica, 220 Judge MacKinnon reasoned that
generalized legislative privilege should be recognized. While
concurring in part and dissenting in part, he wrote that
the House or the Senate itself judges and controls the extent to
which its members and documents should be produced in courts
and before grand juries in response to subpoenas. Congress
since 1787 has claimed that it has the absolute privilege to
decide itself whether its members or employees should respond
to subpoenas and to determine the extent of their response. As

Debate Clause is a counterpart to the executive privileges that constitute an
essential part of the President’s ‘executive power’ under Article II.”).
217
See infra Part VII.A.1.
218
See Common Cause v. Bailar, Civ. No. 1887-73 (D.D.C. 1973), Order of July
30, 1975, in REP. OF THE J. COMM’N ON CONG. OPERATIONS, COURT PROCEEDINGS
AND ACTIONS OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE CONGRESS, 94TH CONG. 209, 211 (Comm.
Print 1976) (“[w]e can agree that a privilege for Senatorial documents exists”);
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 220 (5th Cir. 1975) (concluding that, despite the
House’s failure to release information from an executive session of a House
committee to Lieutenant Calley, he was not deprived of his rights); cf. Kaye, supra
note 179, at 76 (“[Congress] has come to . . . occasionally treat[ ] matters relating to
executive sessions as inviolate.”). But cf. United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
341, 25 F. Cas. 626, 626 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (denying that there is “any privilege to
exempt members of Congress from the service, or the obligations, of a subpoena, in
such cases”). For a discussion of these and related cases, see generally Kaye, supra
note 181.
219
See supra Part I.C.1.
220
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 729 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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far as I have been able to discover, that practice has never been
successfully challenged. 221

In the same case, Judge Wilkey agreed with Judge
MacKinnon on the legitimacy of the generalized legislative
privilege, also basing his conclusion on past practice. 222 In his
dissent in Sirica, Judge Wilkey wrote that “the Legislative
Branch has never acceded to a demand of the Judicial Branch for
papers in any case without an assertion and preservation of
Congressional privilege.” 223 He continued by asserting that
“similar precedents [as to access to congressional documents] in
both Houses are ancient, numerous, and established beyond
question in the Legislative Branch.” 224 To buttress his argument,
he quoted with approval the words of long-serving Senator John
Stennis: “I know of no case where the court has ever made the
Senate or the House surrender records from its files, or where
the Executive has made the Legislative Branch surrender
records from its files—and I do not think either of them could. . . .
[T]he rule works three ways.” 225
In a 1977 Second Circuit case, Herbert v. Lando, 226 Judge
Thomas Meskill issued a dissent, the merits of which were later
upheld by the Supreme Court. In so doing, he discussed
legislative privilege within the context of governmental
structure. He wrote that his collegue’s concurring opinion
Id. at 739–40.
For Judge Wilkey’s reasoning that legislative privilege can also be justified
based on constitutional structure, see supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.
223
Sirica, 487 F.2d at 772 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting); see also
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1081–82 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring)
(“While the constitutional privilege has been asserted most frequently in our history
by the executive against the demands of the legislature, yet the Congress itself has
always recognized a privilege for its own private papers and deliberations. Not only
is there no provision or procedure for a demand by a private citizen for access to any
papers deemed confidential, but no court subpoena is complied with by the Congress
or its committees without a vote of the house concerned.”).
224
Sirica, 487 F.2d at 772–73.
225
Id. at 773. Other prominent lawmakers have echoed Senator Stennis’s views.
See, e.g., 108 CONG. REC. 3627 (1962) (statement of Sen. McClellan) (noting that the
Senate may exercise a constitutional privilege since it is part of “a separate and
distinct branch of Government”); Kaye, supra note 181, at 573 n.212 (“[T]he
Constitution created the Congress as an independent branch of the government,
separate from and equal to the executive and judicial branches. As a separate
branch, it is our belief that only the Congress can direct the disclosure of legislative
records.” (quoting Rep. Hebert)).
226
See 568 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J., dissenting), rev’d, 441 U.S.
153 (1979).
221
222
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“appears to convert the fourth estate into an institution not
unlike an unofficial fourth branch of government. This fourth
branch is given a special privilege presumably for the same
reasons that the three official branches are given executive,
congressional and judicial privileges.” 227
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed
the issue of lawmaker confidentiality—neither Speech or Debate
nor generalized legislative privilege—lower federal courts,
including the D.C. Circuit, have repeatedly recognized the
legitimacy of such a privilege. Admittedly, none of the cases
discussed above mentions anything directly about the Vice
President holding the same or similar privilege. Nonetheless, the
existence of legislative privilege reinforces the notion of VPP on
two counts: (1) by analogy since he too is a constitutional officer;
and (2) by virtue of his acting legislatively within the Senate
when he presides over the upper chamber and votes to break
ties. 228
C. Political Practice and Legislative Privilege
Legislative privilege is also supported by custom. For
example, the Senate or the House must pass a unicameral
resolution before the chamber in question can provide committee
information to executive branch investigators or to the courts. 229
Id.
See infra Part VII.A.1.
229
For examples of such assertions of legislative privilege, see S. RES. 333, 110th
Cong., 153 CONG. REC. S12,156 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2007) (enacted) (“Whereas, by the
privileges of the Senate of the United States and Rule XI of the Standing Rules of
the Senate, no evidence under the control or in the possession of the Senate can, by
administrative or judicial process, be taken from such control or possession but by
permission of the Senate . . . . That the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, acting jointly, are authorized to provide to
federal or state law enforcement or regulatory agencies and officials records of the
Subcommittee’s investigation into abusive practices by the credit counseling
industry.”); S. RES. 411, 108th Cong., 150 CONG. REC. S8,485 (daily ed. July 20,
2004) (enacted) (stating that under the privileges of the Senate and Senate Rule XI
“no evidence under the control or in the possession of the Senate may, by the judicial
or administrative process, be taken from such control or possession but by
permission of the Senate . . . Resolved That the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, acting jointly, are authorized to provide to
the United States Department of Justice, under appropriate security procedures,
copies of Committee documents sought in connection with its investigation into the
involvement of U.S. government officials in the counter-narcotics air interdiction
program in Peru.”); S. RES. 338, 93d Cong., 120 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1974) (enacted)
227
228
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There are also examples of one house of Congress declining
outright to release legislative materials to the judiciary. Since
the Supreme Court places a premium on past practice when
considering the constitutionality of an action, these political
precedents are useful in evaluating the lawfulness of VPP. 230
In 1876, members of a House committee involved with the
impeachment of Secretary of War William Belknap were directed
by a District of Columbia court to produce “all papers,
documents, records, checks, and contracts in [their]
possession.” 231 The matter was debated on the House floor and a
resolution ultimately passed the chamber ordering the committee
to ignore the court’s instructions.
It read that “the said
committee and members thereof are hereby directed to disregard
said mandate.” 232

(“[N]o evidence under the control and in the possession of the Senate of the United
States can, by the mandate of process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from
such control or possession, but by its permission. . . . [But this resolution hereby
authorizes the committee staff member in question] to furnish an affidavit [to
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski about certain legislative activities, subject to
various limitations].”); S. RES. 338, 93d Cong., 120 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1974)
(enacted); S. RES. 307, 87th Cong., 108 CONG. REC. 3,626 (1962) (enacted) (“Senator
John L. McClellan is granted leave in his discretion to appear at the place and before
the court named in the subpoena duces tecum before mentioned, but shall not take
with him any papers or documents on file in his office or under his control or in his
possession as chairman of [a Senate subcommittee].”). For an extensive listing, see
Senate Office of Legal Counsel, List of Resolutions Relating to Office or Senate
Litigation Resolutions—Chronological Listing (as of Feb. 20, 2009) (on file with
author).
On the House side, see, for example, 116 CONG. REC. 37,652 (1970) (“The rules and
practices of the House . . . indicate that no official of the House may, either
voluntarily or in obedience to a subpoena duces tecum, produce such records without
the consent of the House being first obtained.” (quoting a Letter to the Speaker of
the House from the House clerk); H.R. Res. 255 & 256, 87th Cong., 107 CONG. REC.
5851–52 (1961) (enacted) (not permitting disclosure of “confidential papers,
documents, or files”); H.R. Res. 177, 87th Cong., 107 CONG. REC. 2481 (1961)
(enacted) (“[I]n no circumstances shall any minutes or transcripts of executive
sessions, or any evidence of witnesses in respect thereto, be disclosed or copied.”).
For a historical discussion of Congress’s efforts to secure its own documents, see
generally Kaye, supra note 179.
The executive branch has also recognized the legitimacy of legislative privilege. See,
e.g., Nixon Brief, supra note 116, at 357–59 (acknowledging the lawfulness of
legislative privilege); infra note 294 and accompanying text.
230
See, e.g., supra note 137; see also supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text
(detailing judicial reliance on the past practice of legislative privilege).
231
3 HINDS’, supra note 13, § 2661, at 1111–12.
232
Id. § 2661, at 1112. During the debate, Representative Otho Singleton argued
forcefully that “the members of a committee cannot be compelled to disclose what
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Fifty years later, Representative Fiorello LaGuardia was
subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury. 233 LaGuardia
attempted to put the question of whether he should honor the
subpoena to the full House for its consideration. 234 The chamber
took no action, apparently declining the lawmaker’s request that
he be allowed to appear before the tribunal. 235
In 1929, Senator Coleman Blease was subpoenaed by the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to appear before a
grand jury. 236 The Senator stated that he would disobey the
subpoena. 237 Without conceding the legal question, the judge
admitted there was little the court could do to compel Blease’s
appearance. 238
Thus, political practice involving Congress’s firm control over
its own internal documents and records bolsters the argument in
favor of legislative privilege.
D. Conclusion
In Rayburn, the court was faced squarely with the question
of whether a legislative privilege derived from the Speech or
Debate Clause exists with respect to the confidentiality of
internal congressional documents. The D.C. Circuit ruled that
the clause does in fact provide members of Congress with such a
privilege, protecting the confidentiality of lawmakers’ interaction
with their aides. In this regard, Rayburn builds on dicta from
opinions such as Chief Justice Burger’s dissents in Nixon II and
New York Times and D.C. Circuit opinions such as Sirica and
Senate Select Committee. Additional support for a privilege for
members of Congress is found in judicial opinions such as Judge
MacKinnon’s opinion in Sirica, Judge Wilkey’s concurrence in
Soucie and dissent in Sirica, and Judge Meskill’s dissent in
Herbert. Portions of the latter four opinions support the notion of
legislative privilege for reasons other than the Speech or Debate
took place in the committee-room.” 4 CONG. REC. 1527 (1876); see also id. at 1522,
1528 (members referring to committee secrecy).
233
See 6 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES § 586, at 825 (1935) [hereinafter CANNON’S].
234
See id.
235
See id.
236
See id. § 588, at 828; see also 72 CONG. REC. 109 (1929).
237
See CANNON’S, supra note 233, § 588, at 828.
238
See id. § 588, at 829 (“Unless the gentlemen see fit to obey the subpoenas,
this court at the present time has no power to compel them to do so.”).
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Clause. Finally, the concept of legislative privilege is buttressed
by past congressional practice and the acquiescence of the
judiciary in such episodes.
That constitutional officers under Article I may invoke a
privilege to withhold information from the public and the courts
would appear to provide two-pronged support for VPP. First,
when acting as part of the legislative branch, the Vice President
may draw on a legislative privilege when carrying out his Article
I duties. 239 Second, since his fellow constitutional officers may
exercise such a privilege, by analogy, the case for the Vice
President having his own constitutional privilege is bolstered
accordingly.
IV. JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE
Much as the President and members of Congress each may
invoke a privilege to withhold certain information from public
view when exercising their own constitutional authority, so too
can federal judges. 240 Because the notion of federal judges having
authority to preserve internal confidentiality seems widely
acknowledged, further support is lent to the structural argument
that the Vice President as a constitutional officer himself enjoys
a right of confidentiality in carrying out his own constitutional
powers.
A.

The Vesting Clause of Article III

As with executive privilege, judicial privilege lacks explicit
textual support. Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution
appears the most plausible textual provision in support of
judicial privilege. It provides that the “judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.” 241 That language mirrors that of Section 1 of
Article II, which states without apparent restriction, that the
See infra Part VII.A.1.
It would seem doubtful that non-Article III judges would enjoy judicial
privilege. This is because the authority exercised by, for example, an Article I judge
is delegated legislative authority, not Article III constitutional authority. See Am.
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (“These [Article I] courts, then,
are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the
constitution on the general government, can be deposited.”). The author would like
to thank Fred Karem for raising this issue.
241
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
239
240
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“executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.” 242 As discussed earlier, 243 the Vesting Clause
of Article II has been viewed by some as a textual basis for
executive privilege. Like that of Article II, the Vesting Clause of
Article III is similarly free from express language of limitation 244
and would seem by analogy to provide the judiciary with similar
implied powers, perhaps even those of judicial privilege.
However, none of the case law or other authority involving
judicial privilege seems to link the privilege to Article III’s
Vesting Clause. Thus, as with executive privilege, one must look
elsewhere for its constitutional justification. In this regard,
judicial privilege—like executive privilege—is best supported by
structural considerations. 245
B. Judicial Treatment of Judicial Privilege
There are numerous judicial opinions that have implicitly
recognized the principle of judicial privilege, relying on
constitutional structure and symmetry—to the extent a
developed rationale was provided. 246 The first is In re Certain
Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Committee of
Id. art. II, § 1.
See supra Part II.A.
244
See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 1175–76.
245
See, e.g., supra Parts II–III.
246
See Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV. 89, 125
(1987) (“Clearly, the judiciary has long believed in its privilege to protect the
confidentiality of its internal decision-making process, even from the other branches
of government.”); id. at 120 (“[I]nsofar as is determinable, every court that has
considered the question as a matter of dicta has concluded that conversations and
records of federal judges and their immediate staff concerning the manner in which
a judge conducts the judicial office are protected from compelled disclosure.”); see
also Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 805 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The inner workings of
administrative decision making processes are almost never subject to discovery.
Clearly, the inner workings of decision making by courts are kept in even greater
confidence.” (citations omitted)); Catz & Lange, supra, at 117 (“My relationship with
my law clerks is a close and confidential one. If I cannot speak freely to them, they
cannot do their job for me. And I could not speak freely to them if I thought that my
questions, soul-searching, and opinions would be made matters of public record . . . .”
(quoting an anonymous judge) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Executive
Privilege, Secrecy in Gov’t, Freedom of Info.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Gov’t Operations and the Subcomms.
on Separation of Powers and Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 333–42 (1973) (discussing the possible existence of a “Judicial
Conference Privilege”).
Like legislative privilege, judicial privilege has been under examined in the
academic literature. One notable exception is Catz & Lange, supra, at 120–43.
242
243
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the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit. 247 This decision
involved a federal judge, Alcee Hastings, and his employees who
challenged the lawfulness of a subpoena duces tecum issued to
them to provide documents pertaining to their work in
chambers. 248 The subpoena was issued by a judicial council
created by statute to investigate alleged wrongdoing in the
federal judiciary. 249 Among the arguments made by Hastings
and his employees was that they could not reveal such material
since doing so would violate judicial privilege. 250
While the court rejected the assertion of privilege in this
instance, it supported the notion of judicial privilege in general.
Citing Sirica, Senate Select Committee, and Judge Wilkey’s
concurrence in Soucie, the court commented that “[a]lthough we
have found no case in which a judicial privilege protecting the
confidentiality of judicial communications has been applied, the
probable existence of such a privilege has often been noted.” 251
The Eleventh Circuit also analogized judicial privilege to
that of executive privilege. Highlighting the familiar argument
of the need to encourage candor in internal governmental
decisionmaking, the court concluded that the “Supreme Court’s
reasons for finding a qualified privilege protecting confidential
Presidential communications in United States v. Nixon support
the existence of a similar judicial privilege.” 252 The court
continued by explaining that since Nixon I “discerned the
constitutional foundation for the executive privilege—
notwithstanding the lack of any express provision—in the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers and in the very
nature of a President’s duties . . . the same must be true of the
judiciary.” 253 The court observed further that
[j]udges, like Presidents, depend upon open and candid
discourse with their colleagues and staff to promote the effective
discharge of their duties. The judiciary, no less than the
executive, is supreme within its own area of constitutionally
assigned duties.
Confidentiality helps protect judges’
247
See 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986). For discussion of the case, see Catz &
Lange, supra note 246, at 128–43.
248
See In re Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1491–92.
249
See id. at 1491.
250
See id. at 1517–25.
251
Id. at 1518.
252
Id. at 1519 (citation omitted).
253
Id.
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independent reasoning . . . . We conclude, therefore, that there
exists a privilege (albeit a qualified one) protecting confidential
communications among judges and their staffs in the
performance of their judicial duties. 254

What is noteworthy for purposes of this Article is that the court’s
reasoning in justifying judicial privilege—analogizing it to
executive privilege—reflects this Article’s main argument
supporting VPP.
Despite its recognition of judicial privilege in In re Certain
Complaints, the court was careful to limit it “only to
communications among judges and others relating to official
judicial business such as . . . the framing and researching of
opinions, orders, and rulings.” 255 The court concluded that as a
qualified privilege it could be overridden by a proper showing of
need by the council. 256 In this instance, the court determined
that the council’s interest overcame the judge’s desire for
confidentiality. 257
A second decision that has relevance to the subject of judicial
privilege is United States v. Mendoza. 258 In that case, a federal
district court reviewed the constitutionality of the Feeney
Amendment, a congressional reporting requirement mandating
that the DOJ report to Congress when individual judges departed
from the federal sentencing guidelines. 259 The court ruled that
this reporting requirement was unlawful. 260 It reasoned that the
“judiciary must provide a defense against attempts to usurp
judicial independence through inappropriate controls and the
dissemination
of
information
that
fosters
distrust,
misunderstanding, and apathy towards the function of the
court.” 261 While not explicitly asserting a judicial privilege, the
court, by striking down this congressional reporting requirement,
seemed to be staking out the constitutional position that the
Id. at 1519–20.
Id. at 1520.
256
See id. at 1521.
257
See id. at 1525.
258
No. 03-CR-730-ALL, 2004 WL 1191118, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004); see
also ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF JUDGES AND JUSTICES 2–3, 30–33 (2005).
259
See Mendoza, 2004 WL 1191118, at *1–2.
260
See id. at *6–7; BAZAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 258; see also Douglas A.
Kelley, Minnesota Federal Judge Caught in Constitutional Crossfire, 27 HAMLINE L.
REV. 427, 450–51 (2004).
261
Mendoza, 2004 WL 1191118, at *3.
254
255
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judicial branch may not be compelled by Congress to provide
certain information about the execution of its duties. 262 In this
regard, the opinion seems to recognize judicial privilege without
explicitly saying so.
In addition to these two decisions, there are also a fair
amount of dicta supporting the view that federal judges may
protect the confidentiality of their internal deliberations. In
Nixon I, the Court drew a comparison between executive
privilege and judicial privilege. It reasoned that
[t]he expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his
conversations and correspondence, like the claim of
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the
values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all
citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking. 263

Chief Justice Burger, in dissent in New York Times Co. v.
United States, even more forcefully asserted the existence of
judicial privilege. He wrote that:
With respect to the question of inherent power of the Executive
to classify papers, records, and documents as secret, or
otherwise unavailable for public exposure, and to secure aid of
the courts for enforcement, there may be an analogy with
respect to this Court. No statute gives this Court express power
to establish and enforce the utmost security measures for the
secrecy of our deliberations and records. Yet I have little doubt
as to the inherent power of the Court to protect the

262
Impeachment proceedings would presumably be an exception to this rule.
House committee subpoenas issued to the judiciary as part of impeachment efforts
against sitting judges are generally thought to be permissible. See BAZAN &
ROSENBERG, supra note 258, at 18–19; see also KYVIG, supra note 12, at 101 (quoting
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas who, prior to a hearing on his potential
impeachment, permitted a House Judiciary subcommittee full access to all
documents in his possession, “whether [they] concern[ ] Court records,
correspondence files, financial matters or otherwise” (emphasis added)); cf. 14
ANNALS OF CONG. 262–67 (1805) (reflecting Chief Justice Marshall’s testimony
during the impeachment trial of Justice Chase); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND
INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND
PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 81, 84–85 (1999).
It is also possible that judges could have judicial materials subpoenaed as part of
their Senate confirmation hearings for higher judicial office. See BAZAN &
ROSENBERG, supra note 258, at 7.
263
United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (emphasis added).
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confidentiality of its internal operations by whatever judicial
measures may be required. 264

On the other side of the ideological spectrum, Justice
William Douglas also implicitly recognized the legitimate need
for secrecy in judicial deliberations. In his dissent in Gravel v.
United States, Douglas wrote that “there may be situations and
occasions in which the right to know must yield to other
compelling and overriding interests. . . . [M]any deliberations in
Government are kept confidential such as . . . our own
Conferences, despite the fact that the breadth of public
knowledge is thereby diminished.” 265
Justice John Paul Stevens, in an opinion involving a denial
of a certiorari petition, expressed similar views. He wrote that
[t]here are those who believe that these [Supreme Court]
Conferences should be conducted entirely in public or, at the
very least, that the votes on all Conference matters should be
publicly recorded. The traditional view, which I happen to
share, is that confidentiality makes a valuable contribution to
the full and frank exchange of views during the decisional
process; such confidentiality is especially valuable in the
exercise of the kind of discretion that must be employed in
processing the thousands of certiorari petitions that are
reviewed each year. In my judgment, the importance of
preserving the tradition of confidentiality outweighs the
minimal educational value of these opinions. 266

Justice Abe Fortas took a similar view.
During his
nomination hearing to serve as Chief Justice, Fortas explained to
the Senate Judiciary Committee why he felt he could not discuss
the background behind his judicial work. He explained that
“ ‘members of the Congress shall not be called to answer in any
other place for their votes or statements on the floor. And I think
that probably it is true that the correlative of that applies to the
Court.’ ’’ 267
403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 642 n.10 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
266
Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 940, 945 (1978).
267
Hearings on Nomination of Abe Fortas, of Tenn., To Be Chief Justice of the
U.S. and Nomination of Homer Thornberry, of Tex., To Be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the U.S., Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 121–22
(1968) [hereinafter Fortas Hearings]; see also id. at 100–01 (“Just as a Senator or a
Congressman may not be called upon by courts to explain or justify his votes as a
representative of the people, or his speeches on the floor of Congress, so a Justice of
264
265
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Judge MacKinnon of the D.C. Circuit, while concurring in
part and dissenting in part in Sirica, also evaluated judicial
privilege from a structural perspective. He wrote that, much as
Congress can restrict information from being made public, the
judiciary can do the same. 268 He reasoned that the “judicial
branch of our government claims a similar privilege [to that
exercised by the Congress], grounded on an assertion of
independence from the other branches.” 269 MacKinnon noted
that “the judicial branch asserts the same immunity from being
compelled to respond to congressional subpoenas that past
Presidents have asserted.” 270 He concluded that its “source is
rooted in history and gains added force from the constitutional
separation of powers of the three departments of government.” 271
In sum, while the Supreme Court has never decided the
issue on the merits, judicial privilege has been recognized—
implicitly or otherwise—in several notable judicial opinions.
C. Political Practice and Judicial Privilege
In addition to court opinions and dicta supporting judicial
privilege, there is also political precedent that favors the exercise
of this authority. 272 On more than one occasion members of the
federal judiciary have had conflicts with congressional
In these
committees about whether they must testify. 273
the Supreme Court may not be required, by the Senate or a Senate committee, to
explain or justify his votes on decisions by the Court or his judicial opinions.”
(quoting Sen. Gore); James A. Thorpe, The Appearance of Supreme Court Nominees
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 18 J. PUB. L. 371, 389–95 (1969). For more
on Fortas’s testimony, see MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIAL CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS 22–24 (2d ed. 2007). When Fortas declined to
discuss his conversations with President Johnson on executive branch matters,
concerns over judicial and executive privilege seemed to converge. See Fortas
Hearings, supra, at 167–68; see also SILVERSTEIN, supra, at 24.
268
See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 739–40 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
269
Id. at 740.
270
Id. at 741.
271
Id. at 740.
272
As noted above, past practice is an important indicator of constitutionality.
See supra note 137; cf. WIGDOR, supra note 58, at 1036 (“[T]he tradition of judicial
secrecy . . . was firmly established by the Marshall Court.”).
273
Sitting judges who have been nominated to higher positions within the
federal judiciary routinely testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee. This was
not always so. Then Judge Sherman Minton of the Seventh Circuit declined to
appear at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing following his nomination by
President Truman to serve on the Supreme Court. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
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instances, judges have asserted what amounts to a judicial
privilege.
In 1953, a House Judiciary subcommittee invited Supreme
Court Justice Tom Clark to make an appearance to discuss issues
involving the DOJ during his service as Attorney General. 274
This effort to have a sitting Supreme Court Justice testify before
a congressional committee was thought to be unprecedented. 275
Clark refused to appear. 276 In so doing, he noted to the panel
that the “invitation involves a high principle of great importance,
the preservation of the independence of three branches of
Government. As with the Executive and Legislative Branches,
our constitutional system makes the Judiciary completely
independent . . . [, which]
is
necessary
for
the
proper
JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 36 (5th ed. 2008). He argued that it
was improper for him to appear as a sitting judge. See id. Ultimately, the committee
ignored the slight, and Minton was confirmed by the Senate. See id.; see also Thorpe,
supra note 267, at 378–84; Text of Minton Letter to Senate Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1949, at 24.
Supreme Court Justices will also often appear voluntarily before the appropriations
committees to defend the annual budget request for the federal judiciary, but rarely
do so in other contexts. See, e.g., Letter from William Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court, to Sen. Joseph Lieberman, June 7, 1993, in SUSAN LOW BLOCH ET
AL., INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT: THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 1047 (2d.
2008) (declining to testify at a Senate hearing on the disposition of judicial papers
and raising separation of powers concerns about proposed legislation to govern
preservation of judicial materials). There is also precedent for former Justices
appearing before congressional committees to discuss extrajudicial, governmental
activities. See Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on the Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack (pt. 7), 79th Cong. 3259–303 (1946) (congressional testimony provided
by former Justice Owen Roberts in his capacity as a former member of an
investigative commission); see also Peter Alan Bell, Extrajudicial Activity of
Supreme Court Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587, 592 & n.27 (1970).
Sitting Supreme Court Justices have testified in court regarding criminal matters.
For example, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Stanley Reed appeared in federal court
at the perjury trial of Alger Hiss. See William R. Conklin, Frankfurter, Reed Testify
to Loyalty, Integrity of Hiss, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1949, at 1. Reed was served with a
subpoena, while Frankfurter “deemed it an unnecessary formality to be formally
served with a subpoena.” A “Duty” To Testify, Says Frankfurter, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
1949, at 7; see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31 (1980) (“Neither are we aware
of any rule generally exempting a judge from the normal obligation to respond as a
witness when he has information material to a criminal or civil proceeding.”).
274
See Harold B. Hinton, House Unit Invites Clark To Testify, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 1953, at 14.
275
See id.; see also BAZAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 258, at 3. But cf. 14
ANNALS OF CONG. 262–67 (1805) (testimony of C.J. Marshall).
276
See Harold B. Hinton, Justice Clark Rejects Bid to House Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1953, at 1.
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administration
of
justice.” 277
Although
somewhat
underdeveloped, his argument—by noting the shared interest of
each of the three branches in their own independence—seemed to
reflect structural considerations.
Following Justice Clark’s
refusal to appear, the committee decided not to pursue the
matter further even though it involved issues that preceded his
tenure on the Court. 278
In November of the same year, the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities (“HUAC”) went a step further and issued a
subpoena to Justice Clark. 279 Here again, the Justice declined.
This time, Clark made public his reasons for refusing to appear.
In this regard, his arguments largely mirrored those offered
earlier to the House Judiciary subcommittee. Clark wrote that
I have your subpoena dated Nov. 10, 1953, calling upon me to
appear before your committee . . . .
As you know, the
independence of the three branches of our Government is the
cardinal principle on which our constitutional system is
founded.
This complete independence of the judiciary is
necessary to the proper administration of justice. In order to
discharge this high trust, judges must be kept free from the
strife of public controversy. . . . For this reason, as much as I
wish to cooperate with the legislative branch of the
Government, I must forego an appearance before the committee.
However . . . you may rest assured that such written questions
as you and your committee may wish to send me will receive my
serious consideration subject only to my duties under the
Constitution. 280

The committee chose not to pursue contempt proceedings against
Justice Clark. 281
Id. at 33.
See Decision Put off on Calling Clark, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1953, at 16
(“[T]here was every indication that considerable difference of opinion existed over
both the legality and the advisability of directing Mr. Clark to appear.”); see also
House Group Bars a Clark Subpoena, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1953, at 19.
279
See W.H. Lawrence, Velde Unit ‘Invites’ Brownell and He Promises To Testify,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1953, at 1.
280
Clark’s Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1953, at 9 (letter from Associate Justice
Tom C. Clark to Rep. Harold Velde).
281
See W.H. Lawrence, Senators To Hear Brownell Tuesday, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 1953, at 1. In a 1956 speech, Justice Clark again asserted the importance of
judicial independence, emphasizing the value of deliberating in private. Were it
otherwise, he explained, “the whole process of decision [would be] destroyed.” Arthur
Selwyn Miller & D.S. Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Need for
Piercing the Red Velour Curtain, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 799, 805 (1973).
277
278
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Also in 1953, a group of federal district court judges opposed
a House committee subpoena issued to one of its members, Judge
Louis E. Goodman. 282 In a statement to the committee, the
judges noted that the “Constitution does not contemplate that
such matters be reviewed by the Legislative Branch . . . . [W]e
know of no instance, in our history where a committee such as
yours, has summoned a member of the Federal Judiciary.” 283
Goodman appeared before the subcommittee but refused to
answer questions specifically involving his judicial duties. 284
In 1973, Senator Ted Stevens contacted the Chief Judge of
the D.C. Circuit, David Bazelon, inquiring about which judges
had recused themselves in litigation involving the Alaska
pipeline. Senator Stevens wrote: “I have been told one or more
judges have disqualified themselves in the trans-Alaska pipeline
case currently under advisement. Kindly advise me of their
identities and reasons if this is the case. I would appreciate a
reply in writing as soon as possible. Thank you very much.” 285
Judge Bazelon declined Senator Stevens’s request. He
wrote:
In re your telegram of February 5, 1973 inquiring as to whether
1 or more judges have disqualified themselves in the trans
Atlantic [sic] pipeline cases currently under advisement and in
which you request their identities and reasons if this is the case.
The opinion, when issued, will reveal the names of the judges
who have participated therein. With great respect, we believe
that further reply to your inquiry would not be appropriate with
cordial wishes. 286

In 2002, a federal judge voluntarily appeared before a
congressional committee to offer his views about federal
sentencing guidelines. 287 The judge’s remarks at the hearing
See Statement of the Judges of the U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal.,
Made to the Subcomm. of the Comm. of the House of Representative To Investigate
the Dep’t of Justice of the U.S., 14 F.R.D. 335 (1953).
283
Id. at 336. The hearing involved concerns regarding a recent grand jury
inquiry into controversies under the Truman administration. See, e.g., Lawrence E.
Davies, U.S. Judge Rejects Queries at Inquiry, Tells House Unit Replies Would Make
Judiciary “Subservient to Legislative Branch,” N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1953, at 22.
284
See Hinton, supra note 274, at 14. Two of Goodman’s colleagues on the bench
also testified. See Davies, supra note 283.
285
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (MacKinnon,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Senator Stevens’s letter).
286
Id. (quoting Chief Judge Bazelon’s response to Senator Stevens’s letter).
287
See Kelley, supra note 260, at 430–32.
282
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contained some controversial assertions about the guidelines,
and the committee subsequently asked that he submit materials
to back up his statements. 288 To the chagrin of the committee,
the judge declined to produce several sentencing documents. 289
The committee responded by intimating it might subpoena the
judge’s materials. 290 Ultimately, the documents seem to have
been given to the panel. 291 At the time of the controversy, Chief
Justice Rehnquist publicly expressed concern about the
investigation, stating that “efforts to obtain information may not
threaten judicial independence or the established principle that a
judge’s judicial acts cannot serve as a basis for his removal from
office.” 292
These political precedents involving the judiciary and
Congress underscore that a judicial privilege exists. They are
further supported in that the executive branch has also
recognized this privilege over the years. For example, in one of
its briefs during executive privilege litigation during the
Watergate era, executive branch lawyers noted:
It has always been recognized that judges must be able to confer
with their colleagues, and with their law clerks, in
circumstances of absolute confidentiality. Justice Brennan has
written that Supreme Court conferences are held in “absolute
secrecy” for “obvious reasons.” Justice Frankfurter has said
that the “secrecy that envelops the Court’s work” is “essential to
the effective functioning of the Court.” 293

While serving as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel (“OLC”), Rehnquist acknowledged the legality of
judicial privilege. In testimony before Congress, he stated: “The
President is entitled to undivided and faithful advice from his
subordinates, just as Senators and Representatives are entitled
to the same sort of advice from their legislative and
See id. at 432.
See id.
290
See id. at 434.
291
See id. at 439–40.
292
Id. at 441; see also id. at 442 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist). In 2009, a
controversy arose following the Senate Judiciary Committee’s request of a sitting
court of appeals judge to appear before the panel to discuss matters involving his
tenure in the executive branch. See Carrie Johnson, Judge Invited To Testify About
Role in Interrogation Memos, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2009, at A7.
293
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (MacKinnon,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing with approval a brief submitted
by the President).
288
289
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administrative assistants, and judges to the same sort of advice
from their law clerks.” 294
D. Conclusion
As with the President and members of Congress, federal
judges enjoy a constitutional privilege. This is because the
Constitution places a premium on encouraging effective
decisionmaking by its constitutional officers.
It would be
inconsistent with constitutional norms for the Vice President to
lack a privilege of his own.
This anomaly would seem
particularly striking when considered in light of judicial
privilege. One would assume that the Vice President, as an
elected official who owes his job to the electorate, would have a
greater need for having his sensitive deliberations shielded from
disclosure than a life-tenured judge. After all, while a judge may
experience temporary discomfort from disclosure of his
deliberations, he would not stand to be driven from office based
on such revelations, provided his conduct was not impeachable.
A Vice President, on the other hand, could have his political
future jeopardized by such revelations and therefore without a
privilege may become unduly cautious in his decisionmaking.
Thus, one would assume judicial decisionmaking would be less
susceptible to harm in light of disclosures or potential disclosures
than would that of the Vice President.
294
Executive Privilege Hearing, supra note 150, at 425 (statement of Assistant
Att’y Gen. William H. Rehnquist).
Academic opinion also seems to come down in favor of judicial privilege. See Amar,
supra note 91 (“Senators must be free to talk candidly with colleagues and staff in
cloakrooms; judges need similar freedom to converse with each other in judicial
conferences and with clerks in closed chambers.”); Catz & Lange, supra note 246, at
117–19 (“The element of confidentiality between a judge and those who aid her in
chambers is essential . . . to the execution of the judicial office. . . . [T]he principle of
separation of powers requires the availability of the judicial privilege in order to
protect courts from improper interference from other branches.”); Alan K. Ota,
House Leaders Wary of Being Too Helpful, CQ TODAY, May 18, 2006, at 42 (“If
Congress sought records from the White House or from the chief justice . . . the
requests would be denied.” (quoting former congressional committee counsel William
Canfield)); cf. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 123–24 (8th ed. 2008) (“Isolation from the Capitol and the close
proximity of the justices’ chambers within the Court promote secrecy, to a degree
that is remarkable . . . . The norm of secrecy conditions the employment of the
justices’ staff . . . .”); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 298–
304 (1993) (discussing the elaborate efforts undertaken by the Supreme Court to
preserve confidentiality when deliberating on the first Brown v. Board of Education
decision). But see generally Miller & Sastri, supra note 281.
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT:
THE VICE PRESIDENCY, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE
V. THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE CONSTITUTION
A.

The Framers and the Evolving Role of the Vice President

What the Framers of the Constitution had in mind about the
role of the Vice President is in no small part a matter of
conjecture. 295 They were largely silent about their handiwork.
One author described the Framers’ treatment of the Vice
President as “a hasty postscript,” 296 as formulation of the office
was not undertaken until late in the Constitutional
Convention. 297 A few generalizations, however, can be hazarded.
First, since the Framers did not anticipate political parties, they
set up a system whereby a member of the electoral college would
vote for two candidates for President, with the caveat that only
one could hail from the same state as the elector. This
precaution thereby prevented each state from voting only for its
“favorite son.” 298 Of the top two Presidential candidates, the one
with the majority of electoral votes would become President. 299
The Vice President would be the person with the second-most
electoral votes.
The Twelfth Amendment modified this
arrangement after the election of 1800 almost made Aaron
Burr—the clear vice presidential candidate for the Jeffersonian
party—President instead of Vice President.

295
See, e.g., JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 4 (1982).
296
EDGAR WIGGINS WAUGH, SECOND CONSUL: THE VICE PRESIDENCY: OUR
GREATEST POLITICAL PROBLEM 25 (1956).
297
See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, An Overview of the Vice-Presidency, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 786, 789 (1977). For example, neither the Virginia Plan nor the New Jersey
Plan included a means of succession for the executive. See RUTH SILVA,
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 4 (1951). Hamilton and Charles Pinckney, on the other
hand, drafted plans that addressed the issue. See id.
298
See Goldstein, supra note 297. In this same vein, Joel Goldstein has argued
that the Framers established the vice presidency to increase the likelihood that
capable Presidents would be elected. See Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional
Vice-Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505, 512–13 (1995).
299
See Goldstein, supra note 297.
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Second, the Framers were concerned about presidential
succession. Preliminary versions of the charter had the Chief
Justice or an executive council filling in for the fallen
executive. 300 Other ideas included having the President of the
Senate so serving—at that point during the constitutional
drafting there was no Vice President. 301
Third, there was the question about who would preside over
the Senate. 302 This involved two related issues, one being
concern that, if the presiding officer was a Senator, he could not
cast a vote and one state would have diminished
representation. 303 The other was that since the Constitution
provided for two Senators per state, the body’s membership
would always be evenly numbered. Therefore, the Framers were
concerned that the Senate could become regularly deadlocked
and be unable to make decisions. 304 The result was that the Vice
President was tasked with presiding over the Senate,
presumably to allow all the Senators to have a vote and to permit
ties to be broken, thus alleviating these concerns. 305
The net result of the Framers’ actions is that vice
presidential power flows very little from constitutional grants but
largely from formal and informal delegations from the
President 306 and Congress. 307 In fact, throughout most of U.S.
See id.
See id.
302
See id.
303
See id.
304
See id.
305
See id.
306
See, e.g., FOIA Opinion, supra note 24, at 10 (“[T]he Vice President and his
staff do not have ‘substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific
functions,’. . . but rather have the sole function of advising and assisting the
President. The Vice President has no constitutional or statutory responsibilities as
an executive branch officer . . . .” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); cf.
3 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (authorizing funds to the Vice President “[i]n order to enable
the Vice President to provide assistance to the President in connection with the
performance of functions specifically assigned to the Vice President by the President
in the discharge of executive duties and responsibilities” (emphasis added)); Meyer v.
Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[D]espite the Vice President’s rank, we
do not believe his status as Chairman [of the interagency group] lent the Task Force
any authority independent of the President.”); PAUL C. LIGHT, VICE-PRESIDENTIAL
POWER: ADVICE AND INFLUENCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE 5 (1984) (contending that
“Vice-Presidents must function on the basis of ever-changing customs and practices,
with no constitutional mandate in the policy process”); David Nather, A Power Surge
Under Scrutiny, CQ WEEKLY, June 17, 2007, at 1734, 1738 (the Vice President’s
“power depends almost entirely on how much a president is willing to hand over”).
300
301
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history under the Constitution, Vice Presidents played only a
minor role in the executive branch. Owing to their responsibility
to preside over the Senate, they were long thought to be more a
part of the legislative branch than the executive. 308 Seldom did
they receive important assignments from the President.
Beginning in the early 1920s, however, Vice Presidents
began to participate in Cabinet deliberations. 309 President
Franklin Roosevelt’s Vice President, John Nance Garner, not
only sat in on Cabinet meetings, but represented the President
on a foreign visit. 310 By the time of U.S. entry into World War II,
Vice Presidents had begun to enjoy much greater executive
branch responsibility as the President and Congress delegated
ever increasing authority to them. 311 In this regard, Franklin
Roosevelt’s second Vice President, Henry Wallace, was the first
to be delegated serious, formal authority within the executive

For example, Congress included the Vice President on the National Security
Council (“NCS”) when it was modified in 1949. See 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2006); see also
Harold C. Relyea, The Law: The Executive Office of the Vice President: Constitutional
and Legal Considerations, 40 PRES. STUD. Q. 327, 329 (2010) [hereinafter The
Executive Office]. Before the NSC assignment, he was slated by statute in the midnineteenth century to serve on the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian. See, e.g.,
HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE VICE PRESIDENCY: EVOLUTION OF
THE MODERN OFFICE: 1933–2001, at 1–2 (2001); see also Relyea, supra, at 328–29
(listing other commissions upon which the Vice President served).
308
See, e.g., IRVING G. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN VICE-PRESIDENCY: NEW LOOK
3–4 (1954) (“The presiding officer’s role has been the main item of a Vice President’s
constitutional work, and in general the standard by which he has been judged
competent or not.”); H.B. Learned, Some Aspects of the Vice-Presidency, 8 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. SUPP. 162, 170 (1913) (“[T]he [vice presidential] office as constitutionally
limited to legislative functions . . . [was an] assumption, although unacknowledged,
[that] . . . has probably guided most of [Jefferson’s] successors.”); Reylea, supra note
307, at 328 (“Throughout the nineteenth century, the vice presidency was regarded
as a legislative position, the primary duty being to preside over deliberations of the
Senate.”); infra note 323 (quoting Adams and Jefferson).
309
See infra note 670. Vice President Marshall sat in on Cabinet meetings while
President Wilson was in Europe at the Versailles peace conference, but Vice
President Coolidge was the first to attend such gatherings as a matter of course. See,
e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 136. The latter’s Vice President, Charles Dawes,
refused to do so, but the practice was revived a few years later during Charles
Curtis’s tenure. See 1 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS
HISTORY AND PRACTICE 229 n.2 (1960 ed.); Hoover Aims To Reform Machinery for
Enforcing Dry Law and Many Others, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1929, at 1.
310
See, e.g., The Executive Office, supra note 307, at 329.
311
Beginning in earnest with Wallace, the “constitutional aspect of his functions
[were placed below] . . . his extraconstitutional ones.” WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at
37.
307
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branch. 312 Roosevelt appointed him head of the Economic
Defense Board—later re-christened the Board of Economic
Warfare (“BEW”). 313
Gradually, this growing executive branch responsibility was
matched by less emphasis on the Vice President’s legislative
duties. This political trend was underscored as a constitutional
matter by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967, which
acknowledged the enhanced executive branch role played by the
Vice President 314 and simultaneously raised his stature within
the national government. 315 Because of this history, it is not
surprising that the issue of Vice Presidents withholding
information arose infrequently in the first century and a quarter
under the Constitution. As the vice presidency has evolved in the
past several decades to become more of an executive branch
institution and undertaken more substantive duties, occupants of
the office have inevitably and increasingly found themselves
entangled in conflicts over access to information.
B. The Vice President’s Enumerated Powers
Under the Constitution, the Vice President is granted no
powers other than the authority to: (1) preside over the Senate, 316
except in the case of presidential impeachment 317—a power

312
See, e.g., MICHAEL DORMAN, THE SECOND MAN: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE
VICE PRESIDENCY 152–53 (1968).
313
See id. at 152.
314
See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 7937 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“The Vice
President is part of the official family of the President . . . . He is essential, I would
say, in present-day government.”); 110 CONG. REC. 22,993–94 (1964) (statement of
Sen. Fong) (“The Vice-Presidential office under our system of government is tied
very closely with the Presidency.”); Amar, supra note 7, at 207 (concluding that the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment “formally concretizes an evolving importance of the vice
presidency to the executive branch”); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 181 (“Bayh and his
colleagues viewed the vice president as part of the executive branch.”).
315
See, e.g., Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811,
870 (2005) (“Structurally, constitutional amendments have changed the face of the
office [of vice president] and catapulted the Vice Presidency into the pantheon of
American domestic and foreign influence.”); Goldstein, supra note 297, at 792 (“The
legislative history of the twenty-fifth amendment overflows with assertions of the
significance of the [vice presidential] office. Indeed, that amendment both recognized
the growth of the Vice-Presidency in section two and contributed to its prominence in
sections three and four.” (emphasis added)).
316
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
317
See id. cl. 6.
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which is typically ceremonial; 318 (2) vote to break ties as the
Senate’s presiding officer; 319 (3) open certified listings of
presidential electors and—presumably—be involved in the
counting, a responsibility that no longer entails substantive
authority; 320 (4) succeed the President should he die; 321 and (5) fill
in for the President should he become unable to fulfill his duties,
318
This was not always so. Early Senate rules and customs left the Vice
President with considerable authority as far as maintaining order in the upper
chamber. See MARK O. HATFIELD, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–
1993, S. Doc. No. 104-26, at xvi (1997) [hereinafter HATFIELD]; see also JULES
WITCOVER, CRAP SHOOT: ROLLING THE DICE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 19 (1992)
(likening Vice President Adams to a “majority leader” during his tenure as presiding
officer); Michael Nelson, Background Paper, in A HEARTBEAT AWAY: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 62 (Michael
Nelson rapporteur, 1988) [hereinafter TASK FORCE] (“The first vice president, John
Adams, operated in a manner not unlike a modern Senate majority leader, helping
to shape the Senate’s agenda and organizing and intervening in debate.”);
Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to the Vice President 3 (Mar. 9, 1961) [hereinafter Katzenbach Memo]
(“John Adams . . . originally conceived of his Constitutional duties in the Chair of the
Senate as tantamount to leadership . . . [, and he] played a decisive part in its work
during the first few years of its existence.”); Oliver P. Field, The Vice-Presidency of
the United States, 56 AM. L. REV. 365, 376 (1922) (“Adams was an important figure
in the Senate during these first sessions.”); cf. 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 220
(“Early Presidents of the Senate [such as Adams and Burr] assumed some
responsibility for the members’ procedure in debate.”).
319
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. In reality, the power to break ties is less
than it appears, as a tie vote means the matter under consideration automatically
fails. See, e.g., 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 232–33; WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at
39. That said, the Vice President appears to be able to break ties even in a contested
vice presidential election decided by the Senate. See William Josephson, Senate
Election of the Vice President and the House of Representatives Election of the
President, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 597, 618–20 (2009).
320
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and
the votes shall then be counted.”). That the counting of the votes is in the passive
voice raises some question as to whom the Framers entrusted this authority. See
Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the
Presidency, 90 VA. L. REV. 551, 552, 608, 636 (2004). In the early years under the
Constitution, tabulating electoral votes placed some discretion in the hands of the
Vice President. See WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 5. Both Adams and Jefferson made
decisions regarding whether a handful of votes should be counted and Congress
acquiesced. See id.; see also Ackerman & Fontana, supra, at 553–54 (“Without the
decisive use of his power as President of the Senate, Jefferson might never have
become President of the United States.”). In the years since, Congress has appeared
to occupy the field. See id. at 636, 640–42; see also 3 U.S.C. §§ 12–18 (2006) (defining
in statute the Vice President’s duties).
321
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1; see also id. amend. XX, § 3 (detailing
procedures for the Vice President elect to become President upon death of the
President elect).
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and help make a determination as to the President’s inability
should there be uncertainty in this regard. 322 The only other
constitutional clauses related to the Vice President concern
election and selection procedure.
For purposes of this Article, there are three distinctive
features about the vice presidency under the Constitution. First,
the Vice President is not assigned to a single branch of the
federal government, even though as a practical matter almost all
of his time is spent completing tasks assigned by the President. 323
Article I, Section 3 provides that the

See id. amend. XXV, §§ 3–4.
There are four potential answers to the question: to which branch—or
branches—does the Vice President belong? They are: (1) that he is solely a part of
the legislative branch; (2) that he is a solely a part of the executive branch; (3) that
he is a part of neither; and (4) that he is a part of both the executive and legislative
branches with his exact location depending on the function he is performing at the
time—consequently he would be either evenly split between the two branches,
primarily legislative or primarily executive. In light of the clear textual commitment
of the Vice President to preside over the Senate and at the same time the fact that
modern Vice Presidents spend almost all of their time on executive branch matters,
the fourth of these positions is the most persuasive. Thus, the Vice President is
primarily—but not exclusively—an executive branch official since that is where he
spends most of his time.
With regard to the first position—that the Vice President is solely a part of the
legislative branch—there is some judicial dicta to support it. See FDIC v. Hurwitz,
384 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1098 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“The Vice President of the United
States is an officer of the legislative branch. His official function is to preside in the
Senate.”), rev’d in part sub nom. on other grounds, FDIC v. Maxxam, 523 F.3d 566
(5th Cir. 2008); Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 958 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (“[I]t is impossible to say that we intrude upon the prerogatives of the
Legislative Branch less severely when we resolve, for example, an internal dispute
regarding the provision that ‘[t]he Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate,’ than we do when we resolve an internal dispute regarding
the provision that ‘[n]either House, during the Session of Congress shall, without the
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days’ . . . .” (citations omitted)); cf.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (“[I]n the impeachment of a President
the presiding officer of the ultimate tribunal is not a member of the Legislative
Branch, but the Chief Justice of the United States.” (emphasis added)). Moreover,
many prominent early authorities viewed the Vice President to be solely part of the
legislative branch. For instance, the first Vice President, John Adams, wrote in 1790
that the Vice President was “totally detached from the executive authority and
confined to the legislative.” HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 7. The second Vice
President, Thomas Jefferson, concurred. See infra notes 657–58 and accompanying
text. This view, while likely valid in the 1790s, now confronts the reality that the
modern Vice President spends little time presiding over the Senate and most of his
energies on executive branch duties. Moreover, it overlooks that he is elected
alongside the President and can only be removed during his term through
impeachment, a mode of removal reserved for executive and judicial branch officials.
322
323
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Neither does it account for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which both recognized and
formalized the Vice President’s executive branch role. See, e.g., supra note 314.
The second position—that the Vice President is solely a part of the executive
branch—is supported by an even greater body of dicta. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004) (“The discovery requests are directed to the Vice
President . . . . The Executive Branch, at its highest level, is seeking the aid of the
courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives . . . . [S]pecial considerations control
when the Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and
safeguarding the confidentiality of its communication are implicated.” (emphasis
added)); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 508 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[E]xecutive power was vested in the President; no other offices in the
Executive Branch, other than the Presidency and Vice Presidency, were mandated
by the Constitution. Only two Executive Branch offices, therefore, are creatures of
the constitution; all other departments and agencies . . . are creatures of the
Congress . . . .”); Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Defendants
are the United States and four Executive Branch officials—Vice President Richard
B. Cheney [among others].”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2825 (2009); Williams v. United
States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“It is worth noting that the ‘high-level’
officials to which the Commission’s recommendations are addressed includes [sic]
the Vice President and 833 other Executive Branch positions . . . .” (emphasis
added)); United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 148 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The
President, Vice President, and other Executive Branch officials file their disclosure
reports with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. . . . Members of the
Senate file their disclosure statements with the Secretary of the Senate . . . .”
(emphasis added)); Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“The Vice
President is the only senior official in the executive branch totally protected from the
President’s removal power.” (emphasis added)); New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147,
1150 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“The Council [on Competitiveness] . . . is chaired by the
Vice President and its members include other executive branch officials.” (emphasis
added)); Sykes v. Frank, No. 8:08-4049-GRA-BHH, 2009 WL 614806, at *8 (D.S.C.
Mar. 6, 2009) (“[T]he former President and Vice President of the United States [are]
officials in the executive branch of the federal government.”); Walker v. Cheney, 230
F. Supp. 2d 51, 74–75 (D.D.C. 2002) (“This rigorous standing assessment may seem
overly protective of the Vice President, and hence of the Executive Branch, at the
expense of the statutory responsibilities of the Comptroller General and the
constitutional obligations of Congress.”).
This position, however, overlooks the Vice President’s most clearly assigned
constitutional duty, which is to preside over the Senate. It also ignores his role in
presiding over the counting of electoral votes, see, e.g., Ackerman & Fontana, supra
note 320, at 552, as well as a host of other structural factors that imply he should
not be considered exclusively part of the executive branch. For example, unlike the
President, the Vice President is not term limited; he can have his salary lowered; he
can participate in the consideration of constitutional amendments; he can vote on
unicameral resolutions; and he can vote on matters involving internal Senate
organization.
Third, some have apparently taken the view that the Vice President, as a
constitutional matter, belongs to neither the legislative nor the executive branch.
See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 162 (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1981) (1885) (“[The Vice President’s] position is one of anomalous
insignificance and curious uncertainty. Apparently he is not, strictly speaking, a
part of the legislature,—he is clearly not a member,—yet neither is he an officer of
the executive. It is one of the remarkable things about him, that it is hard to find in
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sketching the government any proper place to discuss him. He comes in most
naturally along with the Senate to which he is tacked; but he does not come in there
for any great consideration. He is simply a judicial officer set to moderate the
proceedings . . . . So long as he is Vice-President, he is inseparable officially from the
Senate . . . .”). Such a view clearly does violence to constitutional text, which admits
of only three branches of government. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1,
cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1; United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (“In
designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign
power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to
provide a comprehensive system . . . .”).
Finally, with respect to the fourth position—that the Vice President is a part of both
political branches—there is dictum that is supportive. See Estate of Rockefeller v.
Comm’r, 83 T.C. 368, 376 (1984) (“[T]he office of Vice President is a unique
position . . . . The Vice President stands by to succeed the President in case of death,
resignation, or removal from office. He holds the position of President of the Senate,
and serves as alter ego for the President of the United States on many occasions. In
addition, the Vice President has, in recent years, carried a heavy load of
responsibilities in the administration of the executive branch of the Government.”
(citations omitted)). Moreover, numerous authorities shared this view even before
the advent of the modern vice presidency. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 639 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 2
FARRAND] (quoting George Mason as stating that the holder of the vice presidency is
a “dangerous . . . officer . . . who . . . is made president of the Senate, thereby
dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers”); id. at 536–37 (“We
might as well put the President himself at the head of the Legislature. The close
intimacy that must subsist between the President & vice-president makes it
absolutely improper.”). Authorities in more recent times have also adopted this view.
See, e.g., Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Counsel to the
President 2 (Feb. 7, 1969) (on file with author) (“The Vice President, of course,
occupies a unique position under the Constitution. For some purposes, he is an
officer of the Legislative Branch, and his status in the Executive Branch is not
altogether clear. . . . [H]is status may be characterized as Legislative or Executive
depending on the context . . . .”). The view that the Vice President is part of both
branches—his exact locus varying according to the duties he is carrying out at the
time—largely reconciles the first two positions discussed above. More importantly, it
reflects the reality that the Vice President plays constitutional roles in both political
branches.
One potential counter to the fourth position is Article I, Section 6, Clause 2, which
prohibits members of Congress from serving in the executive branch or from
receiving tasks delegated by the executive branch. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Is Dick Cheney Unconstitutional?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1539, 1542 (2008). The
argument would be that this prohibition precludes the Vice President from serving
in both branches. See PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE
POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 228 n.60 (2009). Such a position is likely
to fail for several reasons. First, it presumes that the Vice President is a member of
Congress, which he clearly is not—he is part of the legislative branch but not a
member. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the VicePresidency, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1720, 1731–34 (1988); Letter from Harold F.
Reis, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
the Honorable Walter Jenkins, Admin. Assistant, Office of the Vice President 4 (July
24, 1962) [hereinafter Reis Letter] (“[T]he Vice President has a unique status in the
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Vice President of the United States shall be President of the
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or
when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United
States. 324

Thus, the Vice President’s most tangible constitutional
assignment involves the legislative branch where he has the
authority to preside over the Senate and to break ties.
At the same time, the Vice President’s term of office is
obviously linked to the President under Article II and not to the
Senate under Article I. 325 A similar pattern of vice presidential
selection is followed under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
whereby the President nominates the Vice President, not

legislative branch.”); Letter from Laurence H. Silberman, Acting Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable Howard W. Cannon, Chairman, Comm. on Rules
and Admin., U.S. Senate 6 (Sept. 20, 1974) (on file with author) (“Considered as a
whole, [the Constitution] indicate[s] that the Vice President has a unique status in
the Legislative branch, but not the status of a ‘Member’ of the Congress within the
meaning of the Constitution.”); infra Part VII.A.1.b. Second, his status as part of
both legislative and executive branches is part of the text of the Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 4–5; id. amend. XII; id. amend. XXV. In order to reconcile
these provisions, rather than read one or more of them completely out of the
Constitution, the better view is to interpret Article I, the Twelfth Amendment and
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as placing the Vice President in both branches and
having Article I, Section 6, preclude lawmakers—but not the Vice President—from
serving in the executive branch.
For more on the question of which branch the Vice President belongs to, see the
author’s forthcoming article, “Constitutional Chameleon: The Vice President’s Place
in Both the Executive and Legislative Branches.” See also Myers, supra note 45, at
906–11; Todd Garvey, Note, A Constitutional Anomaly: Safeguarding Confidential
National Security Information Within the Enigma That Is the American Vice
Presidency, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 565 (2008); Aryn Subhawong, Comment, A
Realistic Look at the Vice Presidency: Why Dick Cheney Is an “Entity Within the
Executive Branch,” 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 281 (2008).
324
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 4–5.
325
See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The . . . President of the United States of
America . . . shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years . . . together with the
Vice President, chosen for the same Term . . . .”). The term is further defined by the
Twentieth Amendment. See id. amend. XX, § 1 (“The terms of the President and the
Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of
Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January . . . .”). The Vice
President’s election is also linked to that of the President under the Twelfth
Amendment—which amended Article II in this regard—and not to that of the Senate
under Article I. See id. amend. XII. Likewise, his qualifications reflect those of the
President, not those of Senators. See id. The author would like to thank Joel
Goldstein for many keen observations in this area.
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Congress. 326 Removal of the Vice President is governed by Article
II, 327 not by Article I as it is for federal lawmakers. 328 Similarly,
when determining presidential inability, the Vice President must
consult with the President’s Cabinet, 329 which again implies a
vice presidential bond with the executive branch. 330 While the
Vice President’s duties under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
involve the executive branch, they do not implicate constitutional
executive power as defined under Article II. And, of course, the
Vice President takes over for the President as head of the
executive branch should the latter office become vacant. 331
Second, as a legal matter, the President may not remove the
Vice President from office during his term, rendering him
independent from the President from a constitutional
standpoint. 332 Removal, of course, is one of the primary means at
the President’s disposal to control the executive branch. Thus,
the Vice President’s status is unlike that of a Cabinet secretary
who can be both relieved from office by the President and
The Vice
expelled through the impeachment process. 333
President can be removed only through the latter mechanism. 334
Late in his first term, the President may, of course, select
326
See id. amend. XXV, § 2 (“Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.”).
327
See id. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
328
See id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may . . . , with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member.”).
329
“Cabinet” will be used in this Article to denote the “principal officers of the
executive departments.” See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886–87 & 887 n.4
(1991); see also Scott E. Gant, Presidential Inability and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment’s Unexplored Removal Provisions, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L.
791, 794 n.12.
330
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers
of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Id.
331
See id. § 1.
332
See, e.g., Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
333
See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
334
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010)

502

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:423

another running mate. That does not constitute removal from
office, however, since the sitting Vice President legally may
complete his four-year term. Therefore, the Vice President is
independent of the President as a constitutional matter. 335 This
vice presidential independence is underscored by the fact that
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which governs the
making of a presidential inability determination, anticipates that
the Vice President may be pitted directly against the President in
such a scenario. 336
Third, there is essentially no case law discussing the
constitutional power of the Vice President. 337 Thus, analysis of
vice presidential authority relies heavily on constitutional
structure on one hand and past practice and opinion on the other.
VI. INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING VICE PRESIDENTS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE
It bears noting up front that no Vice President has ever
formally invoked VPP. That said, former Vice President Cheney
took positions that came close to or alluded to the possibility of
such a doctrine. 338 Vice Presidents prior to Cheney made similar

See infra notes 652–97 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 323, at 1727 n.101 (“[T]o make a disability
determination stick against an unwilling president, he would have to be opposed not
only by the vice-president but also by two-thirds of each house and, unless Congress
designates a different group, a majority of the department heads.”); Goldstein, supra
note 2, at 190 (“Transfer under Section 4 [of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment] comes
without presidential sanction. Section 4 authorizes involuntary transfer of power to
the vice president under a range of circumstances.”). While Cabinet officers are also
included in the inability determination process under current law, their role can be
revoked by statute. The Vice President is the one actor in the process who may not
be replaced.
337
See generally CRS, supra note 12, at 123–24, 457, 1654, 2087, 2103–04, 2109–
11.
338
Aside from written positions tied to disputes over access to information,
public statements from Vice President Cheney’s office at times seemed to assert a
form of vice presidential privilege. See, e.g., Dana Milbank & Justin Blum, Document
Says Oil Chiefs Met with Cheney Task Force, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2005, at A1
(quoting the Vice President’s spokeswoman who referred to “the constitutional right
of the president and vice president to obtain information in confidentiality”
(emphasis added)); LOU DUBOSE & JAKE BERNSTEIN, VICE: DICK CHENEY AND THE
HIJACKING OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 12 (2006) (“I’m a duly elected
constitutional officer. The idea that any member of Congress can demand from me a
list of everybody I meet with and what they say strikes me as—as inappropriate,
and not in keeping with the Constitution.” (quoting Vice President Cheney) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
335
336
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assertions but, like him, never officially took steps to back up
their intimations of privilege. The history of the office not only
reflects a number of instances of Vice Presidents implying they
held a privilege of nondisclosure, but it also demonstrates that no
congressional committee has ever successfully compelled the Vice
President’s appearance. 339
339
No President has ever been forced to appear before a congressional
committee although some have done so voluntarily. See Sitting Presidents and Vice
Presidents Who Have Testified Before Congressional Committees, prepared by the
Senate
Historical
Office
and
Senate
Library,
2004,
available
at
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/resources/pdf/PresidentsTestify.pdf
[hereinafter
Sitting Presidents and Vice Presidents Who Have Testified] (noting that Presidents
Lincoln, Wilson, and Ford testified voluntarily as sitting Presidents); cf. Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692 n.14 (1997) (“[N]o sitting President has ever testified, or
been ordered to testify, in open court.” (emphasis added)). Despite never having been
asked to testify before the Senate Watergate Committee, Nixon preemptively
announced he would not make an appearance. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
45, at 949–50. Truman, as a former President, declined to appear before the House
Committee on Un-American Activities in 1953 when subpoenaed. See id. at 949–51.
On the other side of the ledger, former Presidents John Quincy Adams and John
Tyler complied to varying degrees with subpoenas issued by select committees in
1846 about their use of secret funds while in office. See id. at 948–49. Theodore
Roosevelt appeared voluntarily before a House investigative committee in 1911 and
did the same before a Senate panel in 1912. See Senate Historical Office & the
Senate Library, Former Presidents Who Have Testified Before Congressional
Committees, 2004. Truman made an appearance before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in 1955 to discuss the U.N. charter and Ford testified on the
U.S. Constitution’s bicentennial in 1983. See id.
On a related note, several former Vice Presidents have appeared voluntarily before
congressional committees to testify about public policy concerns. Henry Wallace
appeared before the Senate Commerce Committee under unique circumstances in
January 1945. His term as Vice President had just concluded and President
Roosevelt had nominated him to serve as Secretary of Commerce. Wallace’s
appearance before the panel served essentially as a confirmation hearing. See John
H. Crider, Wallace To Accept If Post Is Divided, Urges Sift of RFC, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1945, at 1. His actions as Vice President, however, were only indirectly raised in
the hearing and none of the discussion delved into Wallace’s decisionmaking while in
that position. See Hearings on S. 375 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 79th Cong.
71–134 (1945) (providing a transcript of Wallace’s appearance and questioning
before the committee). Following Senate confirmation as secretary, Wallace testified
on a number of occasions before various congressional committees. See, e.g.,
Frederick R. Barkley, Employment Bill Urged by Wallace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1945,
at 15; Wallace Clashes on Tariff Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1945, at 40. In 1964,
Richard Nixon testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee about presidential
succession and inability. See, e.g., Nixon Asks Speed on Vice President, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 1964, at 1. Walter Mondale testified before the Senate Government Affairs
Committee in favor of campaign finance reform in 1997. See David E. Rosenbaum,
Pair of Elder Statesmen Urge That Soft Money Be Outlawed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1997, at A20. He also appeared before the Senate Rules Committee in 1988 to talk
about reforming the presidential nomination process. See Mondale Urges Primary

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010)

504

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:423

Should the broad trend toward greater vice presidential
responsibility in the executive branch continue and should Vice
Presidents continue to play an increasingly prominent role in
public affairs, it is possible, if not likely, that future Vice
Presidents could build upon these earlier “not-quite VPP”
assertions and actually invoke a constitutional privilege of their
own. 340 This Part will review the history of investigations
involving Vice Presidents and examine to what extent, if at all,
Vice Presidents have raised their own confidentiality concerns.
Because of the importance of past practice in constitutional
interpretation, 341 this Part will inform discussion over whether
VPP should be recognized.
Since Vice Presidents have only within the past several
decades become involved in the day-to-day activities of the
executive branch, much of the political precedent regarding
demands for information from them has been tied to perceived
impropriety and less to policy disputes. 342 As Vice Presidents
over time have assumed greater duties within the executive
branch, these demands for information have become more related
to policy matters and increasingly relevant to the inquiry at
hand. Prior to the vice presidency of Richard Cheney, several
Vice Presidents had become entangled in conflicts that involved
congressional or judicial requests for information. They include
Vice Presidents Tompkins, Calhoun, Colfax, Wallace, Humphrey,
Agnew, Ford, Rockefeller, Bush, Quayle, and Gore. 343
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1988, at B10. In 2009, Al Gore testified before committees
in both houses about climate change. See, e.g., Gore Testifies on Climate Change on
Capitol Hill, NPR (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=99952240; Gore Testifies on Climate Change, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Apr.
24,
2009),
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/04/24/Gore-testifies-on-climatechange/UPI-50791240603208.
340
See infra note 834.
341
See supra note 137.
342
See David Nather, How Cheney Has Used His Clout, CQ WEEKLY, June 11,
2007, at 1739 (“There hasn’t been much [congressional] oversight [of the Vice
President] because there hasn’t been a lot to oversee.” (quoting Professor Andrew
Rudalevige)); see id. (“[U]ntil Dick Cheney, the vice presidency had been somewhat
shielded from congressional scrutiny because the notion of a vice president being
involved in anything worth Congress’ attention was laughable.”).
343
While Vice President, Aaron Burr was indicted in New Jersey for criminal
homicide following his shooting of Alexander Hamilton in their infamous duel. See,
e.g., ROGER G. KENNEDY, BURR, HAMILTON, AND JEFFERSON: A STUDY IN
CHARACTER 187 (2000). In the ensuing investigation, there does not seem to have
been any dispute over access to materials in the Vice President’s possession,
however. Even had there been, it is difficult to see how the materials could have
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Daniel Tompkins

Daniel Tompkins is a largely forgotten Vice President,
having served with President James Monroe from 1817 to 1825.
Prior to his tenure as Vice President, he had been Governor of
New York, holding office during the War of 1812. In the whirl of
events associated with the conflict, Tompkins had used his own
personal funds to help advance the military effort. 344 During this
time, he carelessly blended his own assets with public funds—
both state and federal—and emerged from the governorship in
dire financial straits. 345 As a result, Tompkins spent a good part
of his vice presidency trying to recoup what both the federal and
state governments owed him. 346 In so doing he became enmeshed
in litigation in the federal courts 347 and cooperated with

been tied to Burr’s official duties. Nor were any analogous issues of immunity
apparently raised. See Eric M. Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is
a President Immune from Criminal Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS
CON. L.Q. 7, 22–24 (1992). For a discussion of the legal proceedings, see id. at 22–25.
Burr later became embroiled in a clash over documents in the possession of
President Jefferson. The third Vice President was out of office when he was put on
trial for treason for his part in an apparent filibustering campaign. Burr requested
the court issue a subpoena duces tecum to the President in order to introduce letters
Burr claimed would support his innocence. This touched off a constitutional
confrontation over whether Jefferson could be compelled to produce such documents.
For a discussion, see, for example, BERGER, supra note 6, at 187–94; John C. Yoo,
The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential Power, 83
MINN. L. REV. 1435 (1999); see also LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL
SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 212–21
(2006).
In the resulting case, United States v. Burr, Chief Justice John Marshall, riding
circuit, concluded that the President needed to turn over the materials. See F. Cas.
30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). Jefferson wound up largely complying, providing
partially redacted materials. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 191 n.157. With respect to
VPP, there does not appear to have been any consideration of vice presidential
prerogatives since the documents in question were drafted following Burr’s
departure from office. Moreover, Burr was advocating for the documents to be
released, not withheld. Nonetheless, the Burr-Jefferson episode does provide a
unique example of a President and his former Vice President taking conflicting
positions about disclosure of information.
344
See, e.g., Gaspare J. Saladino, Daniel D. Tompkins, in VICE PRESIDENTS: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 52, 56 (L. Edward Purcell ed., 3d ed. 1998).
345
See id.
346
See id.
347
See RAY W. IRWIN, DANIEL D. TOMPKINS, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK AND VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 285–94 (1968).
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investigations conducted by both congressional and state
legislative committees. 348
In Tompkins’s first term as Vice President, the New York
legislature, led by then state Senator Martin Van Buren, began
an investigation into the accounts during Tompkins’s
governorship. 349 Ultimately, the legislature took action to resolve
Tompkins’s financial matters to the extent they involved state
monies. 350
In 1822, suit was brought in federal court against Tompkins
involving his financial situation. 351 The Vice President in fact
made a personal appearance in court to defend himself. 352 In the
end, he was vindicated and used his legal victory to try to secure
the federal funds he felt Congress owed him. 353 Both houses of
Congress established committees to look into the merits of the
Vice President’s claims. 354 There does not seem to be anything in
the historical record indicating that Tompkins failed to cooperate
with the two committees—indeed it was in his interest to do so.
The events surrounding the Tompkins litigation and
legislative investigations are instructive, but they yield little
affirmative evidence to indicate a Vice President possesses a
constitutional privilege. That said, it seems clear that it would
have been counterproductive for Tompkins to assert such a
privilege since he was actively encouraging all of these
investigations as part of a broader effort to redeem himself
financially.
Moreover, none of the materials provided by
Tompkins was tied to his official duties as Vice President, all of
348
See id. at 231, 250–53, 295–97. His financial situation grew so desperate
there is evidence he was jailed for his debts during his tenure as Vice President. See
id. at 297–98. John Quincy Adams noted at the time that he had heard rumors to
this effect. See 6 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS
DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 216–17 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1874–77, rep.
1969) (noting that a friend had passed “through the city of New York [and he had]
heard that [Vice President Tompkins] was in prison for ten thousand dollars at the
suit of Peter Jay Munro. It was for money that Munro had been compelled to pay as
bondsman or endorser for Tompkins; but he understood it was probable the affair
would be adjusted.”). If this rumor was true, then perhaps the Vice President would
not enjoy the protections from civil arrest that lawmakers enjoy.
349
See IRWIN, supra note 347, at 250–53.
350
See id. at 262–63.
351
See id. at 286–87.
352
See id. at 287–88.
353
See id. at 293–94.
354
See id. at 295–97; see also 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 253, 259–60, 543, 906–10
(1823).
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them predating his tenure. Thus, the Tompkins precedent sheds
only a little light on the question of VPP.
B. John C. Calhoun
In 1826, while serving with President John Quincy Adams,
Vice President John C. Calhoun was accused of benefiting from a
contract awarded during his tenure as Secretary of War. 355 Not
only did Calhoun submit to a House Select Committee
investigation into the matter, 356 he requested the inquiry in the
first place. Hoping the investigation would clear his name,
Calhoun wrote:
[T]he conduct of public servants is a fair subject of the closest
scrutiny and the freest remarks . . . . [W]hen such attacks
assume the character of impeachable offense and become, in
some degree, official by being placed among the public records,
an officer thus assailed . . . can look for refuge only to the hall of
the immediate Representatives of the People. 357

During the investigation, Calhoun refused to sit in the
President’s chair. 358 He stated that a “sense of propriety forbids
me from resuming my station till the House has disposed of this
subject.” 359
In its proceedings, the committee does not appear to
have subpoenaed Calhoun or materials directly from him. 360
The
committee
members
“immediately
after
they
assembled . . . informed the Vice President of their being
organized, and of their readiness to receive any communication
which he might see fit to make.” 361 Instead of appearing in
person, Calhoun sent a personal representative, George
McDuffie. The committee noted that “Mr. McDuffie, as the friend
and representative of the Vice President, was admitted before the
committee, and attended throughout the examination which

See, e.g., RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY: THE
INVESTIGATION AND RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW 255 (1974).
356
See id.
357
Id.
358
See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 93.
359
Id.
360
In fact, the committee permitted witnesses to be subpoenaed at the request of
Calhoun’s representative. See 3 REG. DEB. 1127–29 (1827).
361
See id. at 1123.
355
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followed.” 362 In effect, McDuffie provided what amounted to
Calhoun’s testimony. 363
Through McDuffie, Calhoun registered a number of protests
as to how the committee proceedings were being conducted,
though his concerns did not involve matters of constitutional
privilege. 364 Calhoun was forthcoming to the committee and was
ultimately exculpated. 365
Thus, in this second instance of an investigation involving a
Vice President, there was no claim of privilege cited. Calhoun
did not appear before the committee in person, however, and the
panel does not seem to have insisted upon it. This apparent
deference could have been a reflection of his status as Vice
President. As with the example of Tompkins, the question
underlying the Calhoun investigation did not involve his vice
presidential duties, therefore, this precedent carries less weight
than it might appear at first blush.
C. Schuyler Colfax
Toward the end of his term as Ulysses Grant’s first Vice
President, Schuyler Colfax became embroiled in the infamous
Credit Mobilier financial scandal, which shook the nation in the
early 1870s. 366 A House Select Committee was established to
investigate the matter and, on December 16, 1872, Colfax
voluntarily made an appearance before the committee. 367 A few
months later, on January 6, 1873, Colfax appeared again on his
own volition, but this time he testified under oath about his
involvement in the affair. 368 Nor was that his last appearance
before the committee. 369 The Vice President returned repeatedly
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 1127–35.
364
See, e.g., id. at 1127–32.
365
See COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note 355, at 255–56.
366
See Sitting Presidents and Vice Presidents Who Have Testified, supra note
339. Vice President elect Henry Wilson was also investigated by the committee for
his role in the scandal. See, e.g., RICHARD H. ABBOTT, COBBLER IN CONGRESS: THE
LIFE OF HENRY WILSON, 1812–1875, at 247–48 (1972); ERNEST MCKAY, HENRY
WILSON: PRACTICAL RADICAL, A PORTRAIT OF A POLITICIAN 232–33 (1971).
Obviously, this investigation had nothing to do with his impending official duties.
367
See 1 REP. OF COMMS. OF HOUSE OF REP. 42d Cong. 81 (1873) [hereinafter
HOUSE REPORT].
368
See id.
369
See id. at 481 (characterizing Colfax’s appearance on February 11, 1873 as
his being “recalled at his own instance”).
362
363
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in an attempt to clear his name after evidence came to light
about his apparently inappropriate financial ties to Credit
Mobilier prior to his vice presidency. 370
While it does not appear that Colfax raised an issue of
privilege during his testimony, it has been contended by his
biographer that the committee investigating the scandal
recognized that it could not compel his appearance. 371 Colfax,
however, seemed to implicitly concede that the committee might
have been able to force his attendance. He stated during his
testimony that “I wish to say that, if any further testimony
should be desired of me, I shall be ready to respond to the
invitation of the committee at any time, without the formality of
a summons.” 372
Colfax later addressed the upper chamber on the matter and
then requested that a Senate committee be established
specifically to look into his conduct. 373 The Senate, however,
declined Colfax’s request. 374 Meanwhile, the House considered
impeachment proceedings, but ultimately chose not to pursue
them, 375 perhaps in part because the alleged malfeasance took
place prior to his vice presidency. 376 If Colfax’s biographer is
correct—that the House committee believed it lacked the
authority to compel the attendance of the Vice President—then
the Colfax example could be read to provide support for VPP.
The historical record on this question seems less clear cut,
however; in fact, Colfax himself raised the possibility of being
formally summoned to the committee. As with the Tompkins and
Calhoun examples, the action for which Colfax was being
investigated did not involve either his duties as Vice President or
his actions while serving in the position; therefore, again, the
precedential value of the episode should not be overstated.

See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: FORD, ROCKEFELLER & THE 25TH
AMENDMENT 36 n.** (Lester A. Sobel ed., 1975) [hereinafter SOBEL].
371
See WILLARD H. SMITH, SCHUYLER COLFAX: THE CHANGING FORTUNES OF A
POLITICAL IDOL 376 (1952) (“[A]s Vice-President, the . . . committee had no
jurisdiction over him, [so] he appeared voluntarily . . . on January 7.”). There is no
citation supporting the author’s assertion to this effect.
372
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 367, at 84 (emphasis added).
373
See SMITH, supra note 371, at 398.
374
See id.
375
See e.g., id. at 398–99.
376
See id.
370
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D. Henry Wallace
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s second Vice President was Henry
Wallace, who served in the post from 1941 to 1945. During this
period, Roosevelt delegated hitherto unprecedented authority to
his Vice President. The most prominent of these delegations was
for Wallace to serve as the head of the BEW. In this vein,
Wallace was entrusted with policymaking authority to secure the
necessary goods from abroad to support the American war
effort. 377 Two problems existed with this delegation: (1) it
conflicted with existing authority enjoyed by the Departments of
State and Commerce, both of which had strong allies on Capitol
Hill; 378 and (2) it involved Wallace who, as one of the most
prominent liberals in the Roosevelt administration, was widely
distrusted by conservatives in Congress. 379 Because of these
concerns, one FBI investigation was undertaken that involved
Wallace’s personnel at the BEW and two congressional
investigations directly involving Wallace were only narrowly
averted.
Martin Dies was a conservative Democratic congressman
from Texas who chaired the HUAC in the 1940s. Dies detested
Wallace and the liberals that the Vice President used to staff the
BEW. 380 In March 1942, in an open letter addressed to Wallace,
Dies accused thirty-five BEW staffers of links to Communist-run
Dies focused in particular on Maurice
organizations. 381
Parmalee, who had written a book on nudism. “[T]here is no
place in such an agency for an outstanding advocate of nudism,”
Dies thundered. 382 Wallace counterattacked Dies in the press 383
but nonetheless agreed to have the FBI look into the officials
cited in Dies’s letter. 384 Every one of the BEW staffers was later
377
See, e.g., EDWARD L. SCHAPSMEIER & FREDERICK H. SCHAPSMEIER, PROPHET
IN POLITICS: HENRY A. WALLACE AND THE WAR YEARS, 1940–1965, at 20 (1970).
378
See, e.g., NORMAN D. MARKOWITZ, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PEOPLE’S
CENTURY: HENRY A. WALLACE AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1941–1948, at 66–74

(1973).

See e.g., SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 50–52, 55–71.
See, e.g., HOWARD B. SCHONBERGER, AFTERMATH OF WAR: AMERICANS AND
THE REMAKING OF JAPAN, 1945–1952, at 94 (Lawrence S. Kaplan ed., 1989).
381
See WALTER GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 131 (1968); see also
SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 51–52.
382
See GOODMAN, supra note 381, at 132.
383
See Wallace Hits Dies as Aiding the Axis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1942, at 1.
384
See GOODMAN, supra note 381, at 132.
379
380
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vindicated by the Bureau; 385 yet, at least one other BEW
employee was subpoenaed to appear before the HUAC. 386 While
this investigation involved staff under Wallace, it never involved
the Vice President himself.
Wallace’s bureaucratic tensions within the Roosevelt
administration were played out in Congress in another context as
the Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones and his allies combated
the BEW’s undertakings. 387 Wallace and Jones exchanged angry
accusations in the media over the alleged inefficiency of the
other’s agency, leading committee chairmen sympathetic to the
conservative secretary to begin to inquire during hearings into
the executive branch discord. 388 One such hearing of the Joint
Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures
involved the voluntary testimony of Milo Perkins, the BEW’s
executive secretary and a close aide to Wallace. 389 Another
involved Perkins’s appearance before the Senate Appropriations
Committee. 390
During the latter hearing, the committee requested of
Perkins complete lists of participants in the meetings of the
BEW, all of which were chaired by the Vice President. 391 These
materials were provided to the committee. 392 Perkins was asked
about who had the authority at the BEW to issue certain
directives.
He answered, “[i]n the last analysis, the Vice
President has power to issue a directive to the R.F.C. on the
programming and developing of foreign materials and he has
power to delegate that authority to key men within B.E.W.” 393
The subsequent criticism directed at Perkins during the
See id. at 133.
See SCHONBERGER, supra note 380, at 94; see also, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 282
Before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of
Representatives, 78th Cong. 3467–80 (1943) (testimony of the BEW’s Thomas
Bisson).
387
See SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 55–71.
388
See id. at 67.
389
See id. at 62–65; see also Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Reduction of
Nonessential Federal Expenditures, 78th Cong. 2341–66 (1943).
390
See, e.g., National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for 1944: Hearings on
H.R. 2968 Before the S. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 78th Cong. 27–
44 (1943) (involving a close questioning of the BEW’s executive director about the
composition of board meetings and the role of the Vice President in board
decisionmaking).
391
See id. at 28–38.
392
See id.
393
Id. at 41.
385
386
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Appropriations Committee hearing prompted Wallace to submit
a statement for placement in the committee record. 394 At no time
in the hearing, however, did Perkins raise the issue of privilege.
The Wallace-Jones accusations reached such a fevered pitch
there were serious discussions in both houses about
congressional committee investigations devoted solely to the
allegations. 395 Republican Senator Styles Bridges thought that
the Vice President and the Secretary should testify in front of a
Senate committee in tandem due to the “very serious charges
regarding the conduct of the war.” 396 Bridges argued that
we have just witnessed the picture of two outstanding figures in
this country, one the Vice President of the United States, head
of the B.E.W., and the other the Secretary of Commerce . . . each
one directing accusations against the other and challenging the
other . . . . I think the American public is entitled to know, who
is right and who is wrong, and when the investigation shall
have been completed, steps should be taken to correct the
condition. 397

Bridges noted that both men “indicated a desire to have a
congressional investigation of those very serious charges which
concern the successful conduct of the war.” 398 The GOP Senator
pursued an inquiry by urging adoption of a resolution. 399
Interestingly, Bridges’s resolution made no special allowances for
the Vice President’s stature. 400 The resolution was referred to
the Senate Banking Committee, where it never reemerged. 401
The Wallace-Jones tension aroused a similar reaction from
House Republicans. Representative Richard Wigglesworth also
pursued an investigation, but his effort was defeated in the
House Rules Committee on a party-line vote. 402 During the
See id. at 359–62.
See SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 66–67.
396
Id. at 6.
397
89 CONG. REC. 7254–55 (1943) (statement of Sen. Bridges).
398
Id. at 6934.
399
See id.
400
See id. at 6934–35 (referring S. Res. 165 to committee).
401
The White House busily worked behind the scenes to scuttle the investigation
and the relevant Senate committee chairman evinced little enthusiasm for such an
effort. See, e.g., C.P. Trussell, Won’t Investigate BEW-RFC Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 1943, at 10; see also Arthur Krock, In the Nation: Sometimes “Easy Does It,” But
Not in Wartime, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1943, at 20.
402
See 89 CONG. REC. 7357 (1943) (statement of Rep. Wigglesworth); see also id.
at 7398 (statement of Rep. Fish); id. at 7400 (statements of Reps. Hoffman and
Wadsworth). Jones testified before the Rules Committee in favor of an inquiry. See
394
395
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hearing, constitutional concerns were apparently raised about
the House investigating the Vice President due to his role as
President of the Senate. 403 This line of argumentation is
noteworthy with respect to VPP in that it reflects an appreciation
that the Vice President qua President of the Senate is likely
immune from investigation by the House, at least outside of an
impeachment inquiry.
By this point, the conflict had caused Roosevelt sufficient
embarrassment that he felt compelled to resolve the matter once
and for all. 404 He dissolved the BEW and reassigned its
responsibilities and employees to a new entity not under
Wallace’s control. 405 At the same time he removed authority from
Jones as well. 406 This reorganization and White House pressure
assured no congressional investigation was undertaken. 407
Wallace’s run-ins with Congress reflect the tensions that
occur when a Vice President assumes an active policymaking role
within the executive branch. As would later prove to be the case
with Vice Presidents Humphrey, Rockefeller, Bush, Quayle, and
Cheney, Congress will take an interest in the activities of the
Vice President if he becomes a major player in policy decisions.
In the case of Wallace, the agency under his care came under
scrutiny from the Congress, and despite his status as a
constitutional officer there was even talk of his appearing before
a congressional committee to answer questions.
Wallace’s
actions, of course, involved authority delegated to him by
Roosevelt and not his own constitutional power.
E. Hubert Humphrey
In early 1966, following a tour of Asia, Vice President
Humphrey was asked to testify publicly before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to discuss his trip. 408 Humphrey
refused, stating that “I do not believe it is desirable for the Vice
Inquiry “Welcome,” Jones Tells Fish, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1943, at 26. As with the
Bridges resolution, the Wigglesworth measure made no allowances for or references
to the Vice President’s status. See H.R. Res. 277, 78th Cong. (1945).
403
See Trussell, supra note 401.
404
See SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 68–71.
405
See id. at 71.
406
See Mr. Wallace and Mr. Jones, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1943, at 12.
407
See MARKOWITZ, supra note 378, at 72–73; Krock, supra note 401.
408
See Fulbright Is “Surprised” Humphrey Won’t Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1966, at 11 [hereinafter Humphrey Won’t Testify].
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President of the United States to testify.” 409 Humphrey defended
his position by using a familiar structural argument: “The
President does not testify and the Vice President has a role in
government that I think precludes his formal testimony before a
committee.” 410 The Vice President expressed concern that doing
The
so would “violate a long-established precedent.” 411
Committee Chairman, J. William Fulbright, feigned surprise at
Humphrey’s stance. 412
Meanwhile, another Committee member, Senator Wayne
Morse, thought it would have been politically wise for Humphrey
to have appeared before the Committee but defended the Vice
Morse
President’s decision on constitutional grounds. 413
contended that Humphrey could exercise an “executive privilege”
akin to that of the President, which permitted the Vice President
to refuse to appear. 414 Undeterred, on February 25, Fulbright
409
Id.; see also Robert C. Albright & Bryce Nelson, Fulbright Sees Continued
Viet Probe; Hartke, Church Hit Johnson Policy, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1966, at A1.
Years later, Fulbright attempted to get Vice President Agnew to testify before his
panel following the latter’s completion of an Asian tour. See SEYMOUR K. FREIDIN, A
SENSE OF THE SENATE 197 (1972). Noted constitutional authority Senator Sam Ervin
questioned the legality of such a gambit, however. See id. Fulbright’s efforts in
regard to Agnew’s testifying seem to have been less serious than with respect to
Humphrey as there do not appear to be any references to the invitation in the major
newspapers at the time.
410
Humphrey Will Refuse Testimony at Hearing, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1966, at
A9.
411
Id. A Vice President voluntarily testifying before a congressional committee
was not without precedent, however. As noted above, Vice President Colfax testified
before a House select committee. See supra Part VI.C. Vice President Lyndon
Johnson appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session
to brief members on a trip to Asia he had taken in 1961. See The Proceedings in
Washington, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1961, at 13. Johnson also appeared before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs under similar circumstances. See Washington
Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1961, at 12. The Johnson precedent regarding the
Senate panel was cited by Fulbright during his committee’s conflict with Humphrey
as a way to convince the Vice President to make an appearance. See Robert C.
Albright, Humphrey Declines New Bid To Testify, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1966, at A8.
Johnson’s appearance had been characterized at the time as “informal and private,”
however, and did not involve Johnson appearing against his will. See Humphrey
Agrees to Private Session, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1966, at A7 [hereinafter Humphrey
Agrees]. To the contrary, it had been undertaken at Vice President Johnson’s behest.
See Albright & Nelson, supra note 409, at A9. Interestingly, during the Humphrey
controversy, President Johnson declined to release the testimony he had delivered to
the committee five years before as Vice President. See Humphrey Agrees, supra.
412
See Humphrey Will Refuse Testimony at Hearing, supra note 410.
413
See id.
414
See id.
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pressed ahead, sending Humphrey a formal “invitation” to
appear before his committee, this time in closed session. 415 When
asked why he would not testify before the committee when
Lyndon Johnson as Vice President had made an informal
appearance a few years before, Humphrey remarked, “That’s his
privilege. My name is Hubert Humphrey.” 416 He further noted,
“as Vice President, I ought to examine the precedents. You can’t
tell where this will start—or stop.” 417 A compromise was finally
reached whereby Humphrey briefed committee members in the
Senate Majority Leader’s office—as opposed to the committee
room; he did so in a private setting, not in an open hearing, and
the meeting included Senators who were not on the committee. 418
Humphrey’s refusal to appear formally before the committee
in open session is one of the most compelling political precedents
for VPP prior to the Cheney vice presidency. At a minimum, he
seemed to believe that his status as a constitutional officer
precluded his being forced to appear before the committee. In
this context, he also equated his office with the presidency.
Thus, he raised constitutional concerns about testifying,
although he did not fully develop them or at least did not express
them publicly. The Vice President’s arguments also seem to have
been grudgingly accepted by Fulbright since the latter made
serious concessions to coax Humphrey to appear before his panel.
Moreover, Senator Morse spelled out even more explicitly than
Humphrey that the Vice President holds a constitutional
privilege similar to the President’s and could therefore decline to
appear. That said, Humphrey never made a formal claim of
privilege and later appeared before the committee as part of a
compromise. In addition, Humphrey testified about a diplomatic
mission he had carried out under the President’s authority, 419 not

415
See Letter from Sen. J.W. Fulbright to Vice President Hubert Humphrey
(Feb. 25, 1966) (on file with author); see also Albright, supra note 411, at A1.
416
Don Irwin, Humphrey Balks at Bid by Fulbright Group: But Vice President
Doesn’t Flatly Reject Request To Discuss Recent Far East Tour, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26,
1966, at 10.
417
Id.
418
See E.W. Kenworthy, Senators Hear Vice President Defend War Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1966, at 16; see also Bryce Nelson, Humphrey Faces Fulbright Unit—
And Can Smile, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1966, at A15; Humphrey Agrees, supra note
411.
419
Told of Asia Loans, Fulbright Aide Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1966, at A18
(noting that the President granted authority to the Vice President on the trip).
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his own. So while the precedent provides a useful parallel to
VPP, it is not completely “on all fours.”
F.

Spiro Agnew

President Nixon’s Vice President, Spiro Agnew, became
embroiled in a scandal that forced him to resign from office. In
1973, Agnew left the vice presidency after pleading no contest to
income tax evasion. 420 During the investigation surrounding the
charges, which stemmed from his acceptance of bribes prior to
and during his vice presidency, Agnew offered mixed signals
regarding a potential constitutional privilege but ultimately did
not formally make an assertion. Interestingly, the President’s
office and the DOJ appeared to doubt the legitimacy of such an
invocation.
In early August 1973, federal officials approached Agnew
and told him he was under investigation. Officials requested
personal documents from him, 421 the lion’s share of which
involved actions prior to his vice presidency. 422 Initially, Agnew’s
attorneys raised the question of whether the Vice President had
to provide the materials, which consisted of his financial
records. 423 It was thought at the time that his lawyers would
urge Agnew to claim a constitutional privilege to withhold these
papers. 424 When asked whether he would release the materials,
Agnew conceded that he was not a “profound constitutional
scholar”; 425 however, he made clear that he would not “blindly
follow” the recommendation of his attorneys either. 426
Agnew’s potential assertion of a constitutional privilege with
regard to his financial records was met with skepticism among
opinion makers.
A contributor to the New York Times
commented:

See, e.g., KYVIG, supra note 12, at 137–38.
See A Chronology of Events in Agnew Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1973, at 34.
422
See Warren Weaver, Jr., Agnew Suddenly Shares in Nixon Legal Dilemma,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1973, at 1, 20. The documents requested were from 1967, two
years before his vice presidency, to August 1973. See Ben A. Franklin, Agnew
Granted Extension on Turning over Records, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1973, at 1.
423
See Edward Walsh & Richard M. Cohen, Agnew Lawyers Study Stand on
Executive Privilege, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1973, at B1.
424
See id.
425
Weaver, supra note 422.
426
Walsh & Cohen, supra note 423.
420
421
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[F]or Mr. Agnew to contend in court that he was entitled to
invoke the doctrine of executive privilege to keep confidential
his personal records, he would presumably have to demonstrate
that he was inextricably involved at the highest level in
executive branch decisions . . . . The Vice President’s position is
considerably different from the President’s, however, in that the
grand jury inquiry in which he is involved deals largely with
events during his service [in state government]. 427

Not long afterward, Agnew wrote the U.S. Attorney in
charge of his case. In the letter, the Vice President indicated he
would turn over all his financial records to investigators. 428 He
declined, however, to turn over any official, vice presidential
papers to the DOJ, asserting that
[i]n your letter . . . you request that I make certain of my
personal records available to you. I am prepared to do so
immediately. . . . You understand that, by making these records
available to you, I do not acknowledge that you or any grand
jury have any right to records of the Vice President. Nor do I
acknowledge the propriety of any grand jury investigation of
possible wrongdoing on the part of the Vice President so long as
he occupies that office. These are difficult Constitutional
questions which need not at this moment be confronted. 429

Agnew’s statement in this regard clearly reflects the view that
the Vice President does possess a constitutional privilege of some
sort. That said, his pronouncement is somewhat less than meets
the eye since investigators were in fact not seeking his official
records.
At the time, one observer raised the question of whether a
precedent was actually being set:
There were several important sidelights on questions that have
held the center stage during the Watergate case and have
reappeared in the Vice President’s case. One is the question of
executive privilige [sic] . . . .
Mr. Agnew’s aides said his
records—financial and tax papers—are personal and not Vice
See Weaver, supra note 422, at 20.
See Agnew Reply to Letter from Beall, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1973, at A8
[hereinafter Agnew Reply].
429
Id. (emphasis added). Agnew’s decision to cooperate with prosecutors and not
invoke a privilege was applauded at the time, in large part because it was a
departure from Nixon’s aggressive use of executive privilege. See The Vice President
and the Investigation, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1973, at A18 (“It appears that [Agnew]
does not choose to wrap himself in dubious interpretations of the Constitution, or in
privileges questionably extracted from it.”).
427
428
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Presidential, thus avoiding a constitutional confrontation over
the question. Because there is so much unplowed legal ground
in the matter, it was not clear if any precedents were being set
by the Vice President’s action. 430

Even though Nixon thought Agnew should not turn over his
records, 431 it became clear that the President’s lawyers were not
prepared to go so far as to assist Agnew with respect to claiming
executive privilege. They declined “to let Agnew share the legal
shelter [the President] had constructed for himself” 432 for
Watergate. Apparently an attempt at a “joint legal strategy”
between the President and the Vice President as to executive
privilege was shot down by the White House. 433
Contemporary DOJ analysis about whether the Vice
President enjoyed immunity from the criminal justice process
while in office was equally unhelpful to Agnew. An internal
memorandum on the question of immunity briefly touched on the
Vice President and executive privilege.
The memorandum
concluded that
[w]e based the President’s immunity from criminal proceedings
essentially on two grounds. First, that the person who controls
criminal prosecutions as the head of the Executive branch,
controls part of the evidence as holder of the power of Executive
privilege, and is vested with the pardoning power under Article
II, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution . . . . This set of
considerations obviously is not applicable to the Vice
President. 434
Anthony Ripley, Agnew; Waiting To See If the Shoe Drops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 1973, at 178.
431
Apparently, Nixon vigorously opposed Agnew’s compliance with the
document request because it differed from his own less accommodating legal position
during the Watergate investigations. See Christopher Lydon, Aides Hint Agnew Will
Cooperate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1973, at 1, 21.
432
COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note 355, at 204.
433
See id. at 203–04; see also Christopher Lydon, Nixon’s Support of Agnew
Falls Short, In View of Vice President’s Associates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1973, at 13.
434
Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Regarding the Amenability of the President, Vice
President and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office
34 (Sept. 24, 1973) [hereinafter Dixon Memo] (emphasis added). The Solicitor
General filed a memorandum with the court consistent with the OLC opinion. See
CRS, supra note 12, at 603. The DOJ’s position in 1973 regarding a Vice President’s
immunity from criminal process was reaffirmed a quarter century later. See
Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution (Oct. 16,
2000) (“[W]e conclude that the determinations made by the Department in
430
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Thus, in part because the Vice President is not the holder of
executive privilege, the DOJ reasoned he should not be shielded
with criminal immunity. The Department also concluded in the
context of the investigation that
[t]he prosecution . . . would be severely hampered by the
withholding from the grand jury of those elements of the alleged
conspiracy linked to the Vice President. As a result the
activities of the alleged co-conspirators could not be fully
disclosed and evaluated, which might redound unfairly to their
benefit. At the same time, the Vice President might be unfairly
linked by innuendo or incomplete disclosure of facts to the
alleged conspiracy.
In short any resultant delay in the
proceedings would benefit the co-conspirators, hamper the
prosecution, and postpone a possible exoneration of the Vice
President. 435

Clearly, the Department was not of the view that the Vice
President had recourse to executive privilege, at least in a
criminal proceeding. Even if the DOJ’s reasoning is accepted as
valid, such a conclusion would not preclude the Vice President
from exercising a privilege pursuant to his own constitutional
duties in the context of a civil lawsuit or a congressional
investigation.
Of perhaps even more interest was that the White House
offered to help the DOJ secure logs of meetings Agnew had
conducted and to help determine whether the Vice President had
his own internal taping system. 436 If Agnew believed he had his
own recognized constitutional privilege, at least with regard to
his executive branch duties as delegated by the President or by
statute, President Nixon’s lawyers seemed to disagree since they
presumably would have felt constrained from making the DOJ
such an offer.
In late September, following the surrender of his personal
records, Agnew pursued a new gambit. He attempted to mimic
1973 . . . remain sound and that subsequent developments in the law validate both
the analytical framework applied and the conclusions reached at that time.”); cf.
Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same Offenses for
Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate (Aug. 18,
2000). For an argument in favor of a sitting Vice President having immunity from
the criminal justice process prior to impeachment, see Alexander M. Bickel, The
Constitutional Tangle, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1973, at 14–15.
435
Dixon Memo, supra note 434, at 41.
436
See COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note 355, at 177–78.
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the Calhoun precedent and asked Speaker Carl Albert that a
House committee look into the matter. 437 In so doing, he acted
without seeking the approval of the President, reflecting in no
small part the constitutional independence of the Vice
President. 438 Agnew’s letter to Speaker Albert seeking an
investigation gave little hint that he might possess a
constitutional privilege, at least in this context. The Vice
President quoted Calhoun: “ ‘In claiming the investigation of the
House, I am sensible that, under our free and happy institutions,
the conduct of public servants is a fair subject of the closest
scrutiny . . . .’ ” 439 In fact, he acknowledged the House’s authority
to investigate his conduct and to have access to his personal
records, writing, “the House [is] the only proper agency to
investigate the conduct of a president or vice president.” 440 He
promised he would “of course, cooperate fully [with the
House] . . . . I have directed my counsel to deliver forthwith to
the clerk of the House all of my original records of which copies
have previously been furnished to the United States attorney.” 441
The House leadership, however, declined to permit such an
investigation. 442
In sum, Agnew’s example provides further support for VPP,
but that support is not unqualified. While his private lawyers
wrote to the U.S. attorney hinting at a vice presidential privilege
of some sort, and while Agnew expressly reserved the right to
control his own official papers, the Vice President never actually
invoked the privilege because no official records were ever
implicated in the investigation. At the same time, the DOJ in its
analysis of the related question of immunity expressed
skepticism about a vice presidential executive privilege claim, at
least in the context of a criminal probe. Similarly, White House
See id. at 255.
See id. at 253. See generally infra notes 652–97 and accompanying text
(regarding the Vice President’s constitutional independence). Underscoring this
point, Agnew during a press conference noted that “I think the Vice President of the
United States should stand on his own two feet . . . . It really isn’t that important
what a President says.” See Lou Cannon, Offers To Let Prosecutors Interview Him,
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1973, at A1. Lou Cannon analyzed the situation as such:
“Agnew[ ] . . . continued a policy of newly asserted vice presidential independence
from the White House . . . .” See id.
439
SOBEL, supra note 370, at 37.
440
Id.
441
Id.
442
See, e.g., COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note 355, at 256–57.
437
438
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lawyers offered to help secure vice presidential records for the
prosecutors. Agnew even indicated he would subject himself to a
House investigation. Finally, the Vice President volunteered to
be interviewed by the DOJ and hinted he might appear before a
grand jury. 443 None of these factors would seem to be wholly
consistent with the Vice President possessing a constitutional
privilege.
G. Gerald Ford
A few weeks after his elevation from the vice presidency to
the Oval Office in 1974, Gerald Ford pardoned his predecessor,
Richard Nixon. This prompted an outcry, as many suspected
Ford had cut a deal whereby, in exchange for the presidency,
Ford had agreed to grant clemency to his predecessor.
Resolutions of inquiry were introduced in the House of
Representatives. 444 To quell the torrent of criticism, Ford hit
upon the idea of testifying before a House Judiciary
subcommittee. As Representative Wiley Mayne confirmed with
the President during the hearing:
[T]he Chairman and others in their questioning have
established very clearly that [your] appearance here today is an
entirely voluntary one on your part, that it was your idea, that
you had not been requested by the committee to come in person,
that we had indicated that it would be entirely satisfactory as
far as we were concerned, if some assistant appeared instead. 445

Instead of claiming executive privilege or VPP and qualifying the
scope of his examination, Ford freely testified in open session
regarding specific conversations he had had while Vice
President. 446
President Ford stated in his testimony before the
subcommittee that “I shall proceed to explain as fully as I can in
See id. at 172. The former Vice President ultimately became embroiled in
litigation over privilege, but it was attorney-client privilege and not a constitutional
claim. See Agnew v. State, 446 A.2d 425 (Md. 1982).
444
Two resolutions were introduced in the House in an attempt to establish a
House investigatory committee but neither was adopted. See SOBEL, supra note 370,
at 36.
445
Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and Related Matters: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 105
(1974) [hereinafter Pardon Hearings].
446
For what it is worth, Ford asserted that no precedent should attach to his
appearance. Of course, like it or not, a precedent is a precedent.
443
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my present answers the facts and the circumstances covered by
the present resolutions of inquiry.
I shall start with an
explanation of these events which were the first to
occur . . . before I became President.” 447 Ford noted that one of
the House resolutions sought “information about certain
conversations that may have occurred over a period that includes
when I was a Member of Congress or the Vice President. In that
entire period no references or discussions on a possible pardon for
then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.” 448 In
his statement, the President proceeded to go into detail about
conversations he had had with Nixon’s Chief of Staff, Alexander
Haig, while Ford had served as Vice President. During these
talks the two men discussed a number of issues related to a
potential presidential succession, one of the central components
of VPP. 449
Ford told the committee:
[General Haig] came to my office about 3:30 p.m. [on August 1]
for a meeting that was to last for approximately three-quarters
of an hour.
....
Based on what he had learned of the conversation on the [soonto-be released Nixon] tape, he wanted to know whether I was
prepared to assume the Presidency within a very short period of
time, and whether I would be willing to make recommendations
to the President as to what course he should now follow.
....
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation.
He wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation, if
that decision were to be made, and about how to do it and
accomplish an orderly change of the administration. We
discussed what scheduling problems there might be and what
the early organizational problems would be.
....
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of
options which General Haig reviewed with me. As I recall his
conversation, various possible options being considered
included: (1) The President temporarily step aside under the
Pardon Hearings, supra note 445, at 93.
Id.
449
See id. at 93–95. For more on these conversations and related deliberations,
see BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 325–27, 332–35, 399–401
(1976); BOB WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF
WATERGATE 3–14 (1999); FEERICK, supra note 18, at 156–60.
447
448
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25th Amendment. (2) Delaying resignation until further along
the impeachment process. (3) Trying first to settle for a censure
vote as a means of avoiding either impeachment or a need to
resign. (4) The question of whether the President could pardon
himself. (5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then
himself, followed by resignation. (6) A pardon to the President
himself, should he resign. I told General Haig I had to have
some time to think.
....
[The next day I called] General Haig . . . and told him I wanted
him to understand that I had no intention of recommending
what President Nixon should do about resigning or not
resigning, and that nothing we had talked about the previous
afternoon should be given any consideration in whatever
decision the President might make. General Haig told me he
was in full agreement with this position. 450

Following his opening statement, Ford then answered
questions from members on an assortment of conversations he
had had, including two that had taken place while he was still
Vice President. From a strictly legal standpoint, if there ever
was a golden opportunity to assert VPP it would have been
here. 451 A former Vice President was getting asked about highly
sensitive conversations he had had involving his constitutional
duty to prepare for succession, and Ford answered the questions
without invoking VPP—or traditional executive privilege for that
matter. 452
President Ford’s exchange with Representative Don
Edwards is instructive in this vein:
Mr. EDWARDS. . . . you indicate that there were some general
discussions with General Haig and [Nixon’s attorney] before the
resignation about the pardon power in general.
Did they have any reason to carry a message to then President
Nixon that this pardon power could possibly be used on his
behalf if he resigned?
President FORD. None whatsoever. Categorically no.

Pardon Hearings, supra note 445, at 93–95.
Of course, as a political matter, it would have been exceedingly difficult for
Ford to make such a claim because of the political pressure he faced following the
pardon and because of the defeat of Nixon’s Watergate-related claim of executive
privilege just weeks before in the Supreme Court.
452
See supra Part VII.A.2 (discussing the constitutional basis for invocation of
VPP in the context of succession and presidential inability).
450
451
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Mr. EDWARDS. Then why, Mr. President, were there those
general discussions about [sic] pardon?
President FORD. Well, as I indicated in my prepared statement,
General Haig came to me first to apprise me of the dramatic
change in the situation. And as I indicated in the prepared
statement, he told me that I should be prepared to assume the
Presidency very quickly, and wanted to know whether I was
ready to do that.
Second, he indicated that in the White House, among the
President’s advisors, there were many options being discussed
as to what course of action the President should take . . . . 453

Ford’s exchange with Representative David Dennis also
delved into the details of his vice presidential conversations:
Mr. DENNIS. . . . Mr. President, on page 7 of your statement
where you were talking about your first or your second
interview with General Haig on the afternoon of August 1, you
stated that “I describe this meeting because at one point it did
include references to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon.” I take it
that you have spelled out what those references were over on
pages 9, where the options are spelled out, and 10, where you
state that you inquired as to what was the President’s
pardoning power, is that correct?
President FORD. Yes. It is spelled out in the itemed instances, 1
through 6, eight various options involving a pardon.
Mr. DENNIS. And does that include everything that was said at
that time on the subject of pardon, substantially?
President FORD. Yes, sir. 454

While most of the questioning by the subcommittee involved
issues related to the Nixon pardon which took place after Ford
had become President, as Ford’s exchanges with Representatives
Edwards and Dennis reflect, he was asked about preparation for
succession while Vice President as well. Even though Ford
appeared voluntarily before the subcommittee, it is difficult to
maintain that this episode does not weigh against VPP’s
existence. 455

Pardon Hearings, supra note 445, at 102.
Id. at 103.
455
At the same time, Ford’s appearance argues against the existence of
executive privilege as well, but few would doubt that doctrine’s legitimacy and the
authority of the President to decline to appear before a congressional committee.
453
454
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H. Nelson Rockefeller
The vice presidency of Nelson Rockefeller provides three
episodes that inform notions of VPP. The first instance involved
his role as head of an executive branch body investigating the
intelligence community. The second and third instances involved
the Vice President providing testimony in court and to state
investigative panels about actions he took while Governor of New
York.
1.

The Rockefeller Commission

In late 1974, following media disclosure of controversial
intelligence activities carried out within the U.S. by the federal
government, there was a great hue and cry for a thorough review
of how the intelligence community had conducted itself. 456 In
response, in early 1975, President Ford appointed a commission
led by Vice President Rockefeller to investigate the intelligence
community’s activities.
The Rockefeller Commission was established by executive
order pursuant to the President’s power under the Constitution
and various unspecified federal statutes.
President Ford
declared that “by virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, and as President
of the United States, I hereby order” establishment of the
There is no reference to vice presidential
Commission. 457
authority in the directive. 458 The order clearly reflects that Vice
President Rockefeller was acting pursuant to a delegation from
the President.
Not long after the Commission began its work, committees in
both houses of Congress undertook similar investigations. In the
Senate, this effort was led by a select committee chaired by
Senator Frank Church. During the Senate inquiry, the Church
Committee requested information that had come into the
possession of the Rockefeller Commission. The leadership of the
Committee met with the Vice President in May 1975, 459 urging
him to provide the committee with the necessary documents.
Rockefeller politely declined, stating that “of course, I can’t—not
See, e.g., LOCH K. JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION 9 (1985).
457
Exec. Order No. 11,828, 40 Fed. Reg. 1219 (Jan. 4, 1975).
458
See id.
459
See JOHNSON, supra note 456, at 41.
456
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until we’ve finished our work and the president approves it.” 460
It appeared to the author of the history of the Church Committee
that the Vice President believed that “[s]ince the president had
appointed the commission in the first place, he ultimately would
have to decide which of its materials could be transferred to
Congress.” 461
While Rockefeller did not explicitly claim a privilege over the
materials, he did refuse to produce the documents. If the Vice
President enjoyed his own constitutional privilege over executive
branch functions delegated to him by the President, Rockefeller
certainly could have asserted such a power at this time. Instead,
the Vice President made clear that the ultimate authority over
the materials in question lay with the President and not with
him. Rockefeller’s failure to invoke a privilege is of only modest
precedential value, however, because the authority being
exercised by the Vice President was not his own.
2.

Testifying as to Actions While Governor

Despite his status as Vice President, Rockefeller testified on
several occasions before state entities as to actions he had taken
while Governor. 462 One instance involved matters stemming
from Rockefeller’s role in the Attica prison riot of 1971. 463 In a
1975 murder trial stemming from the riot, the defendants
attempted to subpoena Rockefeller, who had since become Vice
President. 464 Notably, during his argument to try to convince the
court that Rockefeller should be compelled to appear, defense
counsel contended that any assertion of “executive privilege” by
the Vice President would be illegitimate. 465 Rockefeller’s lawyer,
however, specifically declined to invoke a constitutional
privilege. 466 The court was informed by Rockefeller’s counsel that

Id. at 41–42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 42; see also Mary Perot Nichols, Frank Church: The Hottest Liberal
Dark Horse, VILLAGE VOICE, June 2, 1975, at 7.
462
As noted earlier, Vice President Tompkins also cooperated with a state
Senate investigative body looking into activities during his term as New York
Governor. See IRWIN, supra note 347, at 231, 250–53.
463
See Michael T. Kaufman, Defense in Attica Trial Moves To Subpoena
Rockefeller as Witness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1975, at 15.
464
See id.
465
See Michael T. Kaufman, Lawyer Defends Rockefeller Against Testifying on
Attica, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1975, at 19.
466
Id.
460
461
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“what is not at issue is any claim of privilege or immunity.” 467
Counsel for the Vice President contended that no subpoena was
necessary because the Vice President’s testimony would have
constituted inadmissible hearsay. 468 The state court judge ruled
against subpoenaing Rockefeller, but he did not base his ruling
on constitutional privilege; instead, the judge accepted the view
of Rockefeller’s lawyers that his testimony would have amounted
to inadmissible hearsay. 469 The judge explained that “the present
or former governmental position of the prospective witness
matters not one whit.” 470 While a vice presidential privilege was
not invoked by Rockefeller, what stands out is that defense
counsel anticipated that the Vice President might claim such a
privilege and therefore the attorney prepared accordingly.
Clearly, a vice presidential privilege was viewed as very much
within the realm of possible legal arguments.
Although excused from testifying in this particular instance,
Rockefeller did in fact testify in other fora that same year to
discuss his role in the Attica riot. For instance, Rockefeller
appeared in front of a grand jury on the matter. 471 In so doing,
Rockefeller testified voluntarily. 472 His spokesperson said, “they
asked if he would help out and cooperate, and he said yes.” 473 In
addition, the Vice President testified before a state investigative
body looking into the affair. 474
Also in 1975, two New York investigative commissions
requested that Rockefeller appear and discuss matters relating to
the administration of state nursing homes and urban
development financing during his tenure as Governor. 475 The
question was immediately raised whether Rockefeller could be
compelled to testify if he declined their requests. For his part,
Id.
See id.
469
See Michael T. Kaufman, Attica Defense Loses on Rockefeller, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1975, at 63.
470
Id.
471
See Tom Goldstein, Rockefeller Due at Attica Hearing: Vice President To
Testify Before Jury Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1975, at 39 [hereinafter
Rockefeller Due].
472
See Tom Goldstein, Rockefeller Testifies on Attica for 3 Hours Before Grand
Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1975, at 16.
473
Rockefeller Due, supra note 471.
474
See id.
475
See e.g., Edith Evans Asbury, Moreland Panel Seeks Rockefeller, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1975, at 1.
467
468
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the nursing home commission chairman replied that the panel
would “cross that bridge when we come to it.” 476 The chairman
indicated that the panel’s legal analysis had concluded that it
could indeed subpoena the Vice President for information
relating to his time as Governor but could not take the same
steps regarding his actions as Vice President. 477 The conclusion
of the nursing home commission chairman—that his panel could
not force Rockefeller to appear to discuss his actions as Vice
President—dovetails with the prevailing view that congressional
committees may not compel a Vice President’s attendance. 478 As
in the Attica criminal proceedings, the party trying to require
Rockefeller’s attendance recognized his status as a constitutional
officer and conducted research to determine if, in fact, he could be
forced to appear. If a vice presidential privilege were an absurd
notion—truly beyond the pale as a legal matter—the commission
presumably would not have even thought to conduct such
research. In the end, Rockefeller testified voluntarily before both
commissions about his actions while Governor. 479
At first blush, these episodes involving Vice President
Rockefeller testifying before state bodies could be seen to counsel
against VPP. After all, if a Vice President can appear before a
state panel, it could be argued that a fortiori he can be brought
before a federal entity. Four important caveats must be kept in
mind, however, when considering Rockefeller’s testimony before
these state bodies. First, these appearances dealt with matters
that occurred prior to his tenure as Vice President and were
therefore unrelated to his duties in that capacity. Second, the
matters involved state, not federal, issues. Under the American
system of federalism, national and state authorities are often
viewed as separate and distinct sovereigns. Because the Vice
President’s legal status falls under the federal government,
theoretically he might not benefit from a privilege under state
law. Third, Rockefeller seems to have testified voluntarily in
Id.
See id.
478
Issues of federalism almost certainly also came into play in the commission’s
conclusion that it, as a state body, could not force the Vice President to discuss
national issues.
479
See Frank J. Prial, Rockefeller Knew of Nursing Abuse: Tells Inquiry State
Budget Restrictions Hampered Audits and Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1975, at
1; Edith Evans Asbury, Rockefeller Backs U.D.C.: Says Audit Will Praise It, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1975, at 45.
476
477
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these instances and was not forced to appear. Finally, as
outlined above, the underlying assumptions by both defense
counsel in the Attica case and by the state investigative
commission were that there was at least a chance Rockefeller
might claim a vice presidential privilege of some sort. Had the
prospect of such a privilege been wholly novel or outlandish
neither party would presumably have bothered to pursue the
matter or even thought to look into it.
I.

George H.W. Bush

During his vice presidency, George H.W. Bush was asked to
provide information to Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh
and a congressional investigative committee about his alleged
role in the Iran-Contra affair. 480 Apparently, at no time did Bush
assert his own constitutional privilege. 481
480
Two congressional investigations looked into the 1980 “October Surprise”
controversy. These panels examined, among other things, whether in 1980 then vice
presidential candidate George H.W. Bush tried to convince the revolutionary Iranian
regime to continue to hold the U.S. hostages until the American election had taken
place, thus, precluding the Carter administration from unveiling an “October
Surprise.” See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 343, at 8–9 n.3. The Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations reviewed the matter. See SPECIAL COUNSEL TO SENATOR TERRY
SANFORD AND SENATOR JAMES M. JEFFORDS OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
102D CONG., THE “OCTOBER SURPRISE” ALLEGATIONS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES HELD IN IRAN (Comm.
Print 1992). While the investigation interviewed members of the secret service
detailed to then vice presidential candidate Bush, it did not interview Bush himself
who was President at the time. See id. at 10, 78. The House looked into the matter
more thoroughly, but it did not discuss the matter with Bush either. See H.R. REP.
No. 102-1102, at 172–73, 180 n.278 (1993). Bush flatly rejected these charges. See,
e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Panel Rejects Theory Bush Met With Iranians in Paris in ‘80, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 1992, at A16. These investigations obviously implicated the actions of
a vice presidential candidate and not a sitting Vice President or even a Vice
President elect.
481
See Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE: J. INTERDISC. LEGAL. STUD. 143, 171 n.134 (1998). See generally
MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 30 (2007)
(making no reference to such an invocation).
In United States v. Poindexter, a criminal proceeding stemming from the IranContra affair, the court held that there was no compelling need for the defendant to
review Bush’s vice presidential records. See 725 F. Supp. 13, 21, 30 (D.D.C. 1989).
The court’s rationale did not go to the question of the Vice President’s constitutional
status, but instead centered around: (1) the defendant’s inability to “point to a Vice
Presidential authorization of his activities as a defense”; (2) the Vice President’s
records providing no new evidence; and (3) deference to Bush in his capacity at the
time as President. See id. at 30.
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The Vice President was not at the center of the congressional
Iran-Contra hearings. 482 Perhaps for this reason during the
course of the congressional investigation, in the words of one of
the senior committee counsels, Bush “never submitted to
interviewing or questioning by the” committee. 483 Bush aides,
however, did testify before the joint investigative panel. 484
During their testimony, Bush staff members shared with the
committee their recollection of discussions they had had with the
Vice President. 485 Far from claiming a constitutional privilege,
the Office of the Counsel to the Vice President issued the
following statement: “The Office of the Vice President has
completed a comprehensive review of its files and records and
has transmitted or made available all documents related to the
Iran-Contra investigations to the Independent Counsel and the
Congressional Committees investigating the Iran-Contra
matter.” 486
As the Vice President’s counsel noted, information related to
presidential and vice presidential communications were also
made available to the independent counsel. 487 In fact, Vice
President Bush was deposed by the independent counsel’s office
on January 11, 1988 488 and interviewed by the FBI on December
12, 1986. 489 Instead of trying to limit the scope of inquiry
through a claim of constitutional privilege, the Vice President
told his staff to “just give them everything.” 490 While White
House counsel did invoke attorney-client privilege on behalf of
See WILLIAM S. COHEN & GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MEN OF ZEAL: A CANDID
INSIDE STORY OF THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS 264 (1988) (“The Committee did not
focus on the role of Vice President George Bush.”). The chairman of the Iran-Contra
Committee, Senator Dan Inouye, did not support subpoenaing the Vice President
and trying to compel him to appear before the panel. See Steven V. Roberts, Reagan
Would Turn over “Excerpts” from Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1987, at A14.
483
CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 170 n.12 (1994).
484
See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, THE IRAN-CONTRA PUZZLE 143–44 (1988).
485
See id.
486
Id. at D-20.
487
See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. WALSH, IRAN-CONTRA: THE FINAL REPORT 443 (1994).
488
See id. at 473.
489
Id. After his 1992 pardons of Iran-Contra figures, Bush declined an
additional interview unless it was restricted to questions of document production.
See id. at 474. The independent counsel decided against pursuing a grand jury
subpoena since Walsh “did not believe there was an appropriate likelihood of a
criminal prosecution.” Id.
490
Id. at 476.
482
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Bush regarding some Iran-Contra matters, 491 that is of course a
nonconstitutional privilege. Moreover, the privilege was not
asserted by the Vice President himself, but by the President’s
aides. 492
In sum, there seems to be little indication that Bush believed
he enjoyed a vice presidential privilege. 493 It should nevertheless
be remembered that Bush’s role in the Iran-Contra affair
involved delegated responsibilities and not his own constitutional
duties.
J.

Dan Quayle

During the George H.W. Bush administration, Vice
President Dan Quayle was charged by the President with
heading up the Council on Competitiveness, which reviewed
agency regulations before they were issued. 494 This undertaking
raised hackles from many in Congress who felt that this was an
effort to evade legislative oversight. 495 The Council was involved
in a number of controversial regulatory decisions that prompted
several congressional inquiries. 496 Many members believed the
Council was watering down the effect of federal statutes by
promulgating rules that lowered environmental, safety, and
health standards. 497
At one point, seven different committees were looking into
the Council’s efforts. 498 The House Subcommittee on Health and
the Environment held a series of such proceedings involving the

491
See id. at 479 n.65; Tiefer, supra note 481. Bush invoked attorney-client
privilege over some materials while former President but not apparently as Vice
President. See WALSH, supra note 487, at 477.
492
See id.
493
Interestingly, Vice President Bush did on at least one occasion make a
statement about the privileged nature of his conversations; he stated that “who I
talk to about what, again is privileged.” Dick Kirschten, George Bush—Keeping His
Profile Low So He Can Keep His Influence High, NAT. J., June 20, 1981, at 1096,
1097. Presumably, given the context of the interview, Bush was referring to the
privacy of his conversations being governed by presidential communications
privilege since Bush, as Vice President, would have been considered a presidential
adviser. But it is at least conceivable he could have been alluding to his own
privilege.
494
See TIEFER, supra note 483, at 61–88.
495
See id.
496
See, e.g., id. at 61.
497
See, e.g., id. at 68–85.
498
See id. at 61.
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Council. 499 For a hearing in March 1991, the subcommittee
invited the Council’s staff to appear. 500 This request was
denied. 501 At another hearing in May, the same panel requested
that Quayle himself appear, but the Vice President declined the
offer. Chairman Henry Waxman explained that “[w]e asked Mr.
Quayle to come . . . or to send a representative to today’s hearing
to tell the subcommittee about the Council . . . but he declined to
do so.” 502 In November, the panel again unsuccessfully sought to
have Quayle testify. 503 During the hearing Waxman observed
that
[t]he subcommittee invited Vice President Quayle to appear this
morning and to discuss the activities of the council. In
particular, we seek his testimony on the council’s procedures
and how they are consistent [with federal statutes] . . . .
Unfortunately, the Vice President has once again refused to
publicly answer questions regarding the council and its
activities. 504

At the time there was little reason to think that Waxman
actually expected Quayle would attend. A Washington Post
reporter opined that the “request was an empty one, as the White
House has a policy of allowing only administration employees
subject to Senate confirmation to appear before Capitol Hill
committees, a category Quayle does not fall into.” 505
Efforts by Representative David Skaggs, the chairman of a
House Appropriations subcommittee, to secure similar
information from the Vice President’s group were equally
unavailing. In response to his request for certain documents, the
counsel for the Vice President, John Howard, contended that “our
initial response [to congressional inquiries about communication
499
See generally Clean Air Act Implementation: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce (pt. 1), 102d
Cong. (1991) [hereinafter Clean Air Hearings].
500
See id. at 2 (“We asked Mr. Quayle to send a representative to today’s
hearing to tell the subcommittee about the council and its actions, but he refused to
do so.” (quoting subcommittee chairman Waxman)).
501
See id.; see also TIEFER, supra note 483, at 69–70.
502
Clean Air Hearings, supra note 499, at 203; see also TIEFER, supra note 483,
at 74–76.
503
See Clean Air Act Implementation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce (pt. 2), 102d Cong. 2 (1992).
504
Id.
505
Dana Priest, Competitiveness Council Under Scrutiny; Critics Charge Panel
Lets Industry Exert Back-Door Influence on Implementing Laws, WASH. POST, Nov.
26, 1991, at A19.
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between the Council and outside parties] indicated Executive
Branch confidentiality interests . . . [such as those that] are
protected by separation of powers principles.” 506 He emphasized
that “[r]equiring disclosure of all communications received by the
Council . . . would substantially impair the ability of the
President and his principal advisors to receive confidential advice
from private citizens.” 507 With regard to communication among
the Council and various regulatory agencies, Howard argued that
“[r]equiring disclosure of all written communication by the
Council or its staff would severely encroach upon the President’s
constitutional authority to protect the confidentiality of
Executive Branch deliberations.” 508 Notably, Howard made no
reference to vice presidential power in his correspondence. The
Quayle Council’s approach was summarized by Skaggs: “The
Council refuses to testify before Congress. The Council refuses to
provide Congress with requested information on its
activities . . . . [It] won’t even answer questions submitted to it
by congressional committees . . . .” 509
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs also tried to
have Quayle testify at a hearing that fall. The panel contacted
the Vice President to request his appearance at an October
hearing and was denied. 510 Chairman John Glenn discussed his
efforts to get the Vice President to appear: “[W]e did invite the
administration to testify today. We asked the Vice President,
[and] the Council staff . . . .” 511 Glenn, however, realized that the
Vice President would not attend. 512 Moreover, the chairman
acknowledged the Vice President’s authority to receive advice in
confidence even if he did not believe the circumstances were
warranted in the case at hand, stating “I . . . believe the
President and the Vice President require some protection so that
advice and the development of administration policy can take
place free of public scrutiny . . . . [Nonetheless,] I do not believe
506
138 CONG. REC. H8014, H8016–17 (1992) (statement of Rep. Skaggs) (quoting
Letter from John L. Howard, Counsel to the Vice President, to Rep. David Skaggs
(Aug. 3, 1992)).
507
Id. at H8017.
508
Id.
509
TIEFER, supra note 483, at 86.
510
See Council Hearings, supra note 7, at 4 (opening statement of Sen. John
Glenn).
511
Id.
512
Id.
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that either executive privilege or respect for the deliberative
process should be used [in this situation].” 513 In this regard,
Glenn seemed to echo Senator Morse’s views from a quarter
century earlier about the Vice President enjoying some measure
of his own privilege.
Glenn tried again to get the Vice President to appear at a
hearing that next month. 514 The head of White House legislative
affairs responded to Glenn’s request:
Thank you for your letter to the Vice President dated November
12 requesting that he or his designee testify before your
committee tomorrow on the subject of regulatory review.
Unfortunately, due to longstanding tradition, and in accordance
with the doctrine of separation of powers, neither the Vice
President nor his staff will be able to testify, because they
participate in the deliberative process through which Executive
policy is developed. 515

Again, even as the committee request was denied, no
reference was made to the Vice President holding his own
privilege.
Senator Glenn appeared resigned to the Vice
President’s refusal to testify. “We asked the Vice President, the
Council staff [and] Council members . . . [to appear but
they] . . . declined to attend today . . . .”516
During its tenure, the Council put forward a number of
proposals involving the manner in which the Food and Drug
As a
Administration (“FDA”) reviewed pharmaceuticals. 517
result, a House Government Operations subcommittee looked
into the Council’s interaction with the FDA. 518 The FDA,
however, declined to give the panel the information it desired. 519
At the behest of the Vice President’s Council staff, the FDA
declined to hand over certain materials. 520 In so doing, the FDA

Id.
See id. at 341.
515
Id. (Letter from Frederick C. McClure, Assistant to the President for
Legislative Affairs, to John Glenn, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs (Nov. 14, 1991)).
516
Id. at 4.
517
See ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 116.
518
See id.
519
See id.
520
See TIEFER, supra note 483, at 81–83.
513
514
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cited the importance of protecting internal communications. 521
The subcommittee responded by subpoenaing the materials. 522
In the midst of this conflict, with an eye toward the FDA
potentially invoking executive privilege, the subcommittee noted
that the President alone had the authority to make such an
assertion. 523 Once the issue came to a head, the administration
refused to formally invoke executive privilege and the
information was provided to the committee. 524
For purposes of VPP, the Quayle Council experience is
notable in two ways. First, it reflects a tacit appreciation by
congressional committees that they could not compel the
attendance of the Vice President at their hearings. Senator
Glenn himself conceded that the Vice President seemed to enjoy
some measure of privilege. Second, in its dispute over access to
documents, the Vice President’s office made no independent
assertion of privilege, relying instead on the President to
determine whether such invocation was warranted. 525 This was
done presumably because the actions taken by the Vice President
were not part of his own constitutional duties.
K. Al Gore
Vice President Al Gore became embroiled in a controversy
over whether he had committed violations of federal campaign
finance laws. Several investigations ensued, two of which
involved questions of whether the Vice President would testify in
person: one inquiry was conducted by the FBI and the other
undertaken by a Senate committee. 526
See ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 116.
See id.
523
See id.
524
See id.; see also TIEFER, supra note 483, at 82.
525
During the Clinton administration, a similar episode took place, although
Vice President Gore was less directly involved. See Memorandum to the President
from Janet Reno, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assertion of Executive Privilege
for Documents Concerning Conduct of Foreign Affairs With Respect to Haiti (Sept.
20, 1996) (“The Counsel to the President and the National Security Adviser
recommend that you assert executive privilege with respect to . . . documents
[that] . . . constitute confidential communications from NSC or State Department
officials to the President or the Vice President.” (emphasis added)). What stands out
for purposes of this Article is that the Attorney General’s memorandum to President
Clinton recommended that he claim executive privilege for the documents even
though some of them involved the Vice President.
526
A House committee looked into the Clinton administration’s campaign
finance activity as well but does not appear to have pursued having Vice President
521
522
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As part of its investigation into campaign finance activity,
the FBI in November 1997 527 and in April 2000 interviewed Gore
at length. 528 If the Vice President raised any concerns about
constitutional privilege, there appears to be no public record of
them. His attorney certainly did not indicate as much. 529
In 1997, a special panel of the Senate Committee on
Government Affairs also pursued an investigation into, among
other matters, Gore’s fundraising activities. 530 Over the course of
its inquiry, the idea of Gore appearing before the committee was
broached by at least two Senators on the committee, one of whom
twice raised the question in public. In July 1997, Senator Arlen
Specter suggested that “the Vice President ought to give
consideration to coming in himself [to appear before the
committee], and the President.” 531 The White House responded
to this request in ambiguous fashion: “Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the White House will
continue . . . to respond to requests from the committee for
information necessary for it to complete its investigation.” 532
In September 1997, Specter again noted that “it really may
well be [Gore] has to come before the committee.” 533 He proposed
that the Vice President might want to appear voluntarily: “I
think Vice President Gore may be able to save his own political
standing if he does that . . . [although the committee is not]

Gore testify. See Francis X. Clines, House Ready To Step in on Fund-Raising Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, SEP. 16, 1997, at A20.
527
See John M. Broder, Justice Dept. Investigators Question Clinton and Gore on
‘96 Fund-Raising, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, at A20.
528
See David Johnston & Don Van Natta, Jr., The 2000 Campaign: The
Overview; an Angered Gore Defended ‘96 Role to Investigator, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2000, at A1.
529
See Broder, supra note 527 (“The F.B.I. asked all the questions they wanted
to ask, and the Vice President answered every one of them.” (quoting James Neal,
Gore’s attorney) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Gore, along with Clinton, also
provided transcripts of his FBI interview to the House Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight. See infra note 612 and accompanying text.
530
In the interest of full disclosure, the author worked as a law clerk on the
Senate committee at the time but did not work on issues directly involving the Vice
President.
531
Eric Schmitt, Clinton and Gore are Urged To Testify on Fund-Raising, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 1997, at B8.
532
Id.
533
Thomas B. Edsall, Senator Calls on Gore To Offer Hill Testimony; Specter
Suggests Vice President Respond to “Mounting Evidence,” WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1997,
at A4.
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prepared to call Vice President Gore at this stage.” 534 The Vice
President’s spokesperson indicated that Gore was not considering
an appearance in front of the committee and had not been asked
When questioned if Gore would accept the
to testify. 535
committee’s offer if asked, the spokesperson indicated she would
not speculate on the matter. 536
That next month, Senator Bob Smith proved to be even more
adamant than Specter, arguing that both the President and Vice
President should be subpoenaed by the committee. 537 Smith
continued, if “they say that’s a separation of powers issue, then
so be it.” 538 The committee did not wind up calling the Vice
President to testify although it did subpoena Gore’s former Chief
of Staff, Jack Quinn. 539 Former Deputy Chief of Staff David
Strauss also appeared before the panel. 540
The Gore episode reinforces the notion that the Vice
President may not be compelled to appear before a congressional
committee. While other Vice Presidents, such as Tompkins,
Calhoun, Colfax, Humphrey, and Agnew found it in their political
interests to attempt to cooperate with congressional panels—and
in Colfax’s case appear in person—there is little to indicate they
could have been forced to testify against their will. The Gore
example, like several before it, is not quite on “all fours” with
regard to VPP because the question at issue did not involve the
Vice President’s official duties and the committee never formally
tried to compel him to appear. Nonetheless, like many of the
other examples, the outcome reflects a healthy appreciation of
the status of the Vice President as a constitutional officer.

Id.
See id.
536
See id.
537
See David Johnston, Campaign Finance: The Overview; Clinton Lawyer Is
Subpoenaed on Tape Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at A1.
538
Id.
539
Quinn also testified in front of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate
the Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters. See RELYEA &
TATELMAN, supra note 11, at 16–17.
540
See Eric Schmitt, Former Aide and Republicans Debate What Gore Knew,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1997, at 12.
534
535
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Richard B. Cheney

It is generally accepted that Cheney was the nation’s most
powerful Vice President. 541 Therefore, it is not surprising that he
became embroiled in more disputes over information than any of
his predecessors. 542 The incidents involved: (1) two lawsuits over
access to materials from an energy task force headed by Cheney;
(2) an executive order that alluded to the possibility of a vice
presidential privilege; (3) three congressional committee
subpoenas issued to the Vice President’s office; and (4) the 9/11
Commission.

See, e.g., Nather, supra note 342, at 1734 (“[H]is status as the most powerful
vice president in history isn’t seriously debated anymore.”); supra note 1. Prior to
Cheney, Gore had generally been considered the most influential occupant of the
office. See, e.g., KENGOR, supra note 136, at 214–15, 224.
542
In addition to the conflicts discussed in this section, suit was brought against
Vice President Cheney to compel his office to maintain its internal records. The
litigation involved statutory interpretation of the Presidential Records Act and did
not allege the withholding of information by the Vice President. Hence, a
substantive discussion of the decision is outside the scope of this article. See Citizens
for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198–99 (D.D.C.
2009).
Cheney’s staff also was involved in at least one internal, executive branch clash over
information. Cheney’s office and the National Archives crossed swords over whether
the Vice President had to comply with an executive order purporting to give the
Archives authority to review the way the Vice President’s office dealt with classified
materials. See Scott Shane, Agency Is Target in Cheney Fight on Secrecy Data, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A1; Letter from J. William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec.
Oversight Office, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., to Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 9, 2007) (on file with author); Letter from J. William
Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., to David
S. Addington, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President
(Aug. 23, 2006) (on file with author); Letter from J. William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec.
Oversight Office, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., to David S. Addington, Assistant
to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President (June 8, 2006) (on file with
author). Cheney’s office refused to comply with the Archives’ interpretation of the
executive order that governs classified material, arguing—among other things—that
the Vice President was not part of the executive branch. See Shane, supra.
In yet another vein, Cheney received criticism for keeping confidential his travel
expenses. See Christopher Lee, Vice President’s Office Keeps Travel Expenses Under
Wraps, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2005, at A19.
Nonetheless, Cheney indicated his willingness to testify during the criminal trial of
his former Chief of Staff, I. Lewis Libby, Jr. See David Johnston, Defense in C.I.A.
Leak Case Will Call Cheney To Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006, at A23.
Ultimately, he did not have to appear. See Neil A. Lewis & Scott Shane, Libby and
Cheney Will Not Testify, Says the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at A1.
541
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Walker v. Cheney

In 2001, President Bush created the National Energy Policy
Development Group (“NEPDG”) to assemble data and put
forward policy options regarding national energy policy. 543 In so
doing, he delegated authority to Cheney to lead the task force. 544
After questions arose about meetings of the NEPDG, two strands
of litigation followed. First, a pair of House members requested
that GAO investigate the NEPDG, which resulted in a lawsuit. 545
Second, several private parties brought suit demanding similar
information. Although neither suit was decided on constitutional
grounds, neither of the resulting decisions repudiated the
executive branch’s legal position either; both were concluded in
favor of Cheney as a practical matter. In this limited regard, the
results of Cheney’s conflicts over information do provide support
for the notion of VPP since they reflect judicial deference to the
asserted needs of the Vice President for confidentiality.
In its investigation of NEPDG, the GAO requested a number
of documents from the Vice President’s office, many of which the
Vice President refused to turn over 546 based on arguments that
smacked of executive privilege. After being rebuffed in its
requests for documents by the Vice President, the GAO filed suit
in federal court 547 to acquire some of the materials in question.
In making its argument before the court, the GAO argued that
the “Vice President’s constitutional arguments . . . are an illfounded proxy for an assertion of privilege that the Executive has
declined to make.” 548 GAO claimed further that Cheney’s stance
involved “the same language and reasoning as assertions of

See Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53–55 (D.D.C. 2002).
See id. at 53, 55.
545
Neither lawmaker thought that the Vice President had the authority to
exercise executive privilege, believing the power to be the President’s alone. See
FISHER, supra note 6, at 187.
546
President Bush himself ultimately made the decision to continue to contest
the GAO’s efforts to secure the documents in question. See STEPHEN F. HAYES,
CHENEY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL AND CONTROVERSIAL
VICE PRESIDENT 324 (2007); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKOVER: THE RETURN OF THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 99–100
(2007).
547
David Walker was Comptroller General and the head of GAO. See Walker,
230 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
548
Id. at 61.
543
544

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010)

540

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:423

Executive Privilege.” 549 Professor Rozell agreed with GAO when
he described the Vice President’s position as an
exercise of a form of executive privilege by a sitting vice
president, even though the common standard for years has been
that presidents alone have the authority to either assert
executive privilege or direct an administration official to do so.
Although Cheney did not use the words executive privilege in
refusing access to information, he used legal language and
justifications identical to an actual claim of executive
privilege. 550

The administration, countered that an “intent to allow suit
against a unique constitutional officer should not be lightly
inferred.” 551 It elaborated by contending that the “President and
Vice President are constitutionally created officials with unique
statuses, responsibilities, and positions in our constitutional
structure.” 552 In this way, the administration seemed to blend
the offices and powers of the President and the Vice President
together, focusing more on the status of the Vice President than
his actual constitutional authority. Yet, the administration and
Cheney stopped short of claiming executive privilege or a vice
presidential privilege outright. 553

Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege in the Bush Administration, in
CONSIDERING THE BUSH PRESIDENCY 125, 131 & n.35 (Gary L. Gregg II & Mark J.
Rozell eds., 2004) [hereinafter Gregg II & Rozell] (quoting Letter from David M.
Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to J. Dennis
Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Aug. 17, 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Eric Weiner, What Is Executive Privilege, Anyway?, NPR,
June 22, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11527747
(“[T]he Bush Administration invoked the spirit, if the not [sic] letter, of executive
privilege when it argued that Vice President Dick Cheney need not disclose what
was discussed during his Taskforce on Energy meetings.”).
550
ROZELL II, supra note 7. For similar commentary on the administration’s
legal posture in this respect, see MONTGOMERY, supra note 143, at 75 (observing
that in the GAO litigation, “the White House carefully refrained from invoking a
claim of executive privilege in the case, its lawyers contended that Cheney was
covered under the same executive privilege as the president. This assertion was a
highly questionable, if not revealing, supposition since the Constitution does not vest
executive authority in the vice president, but rather relegates his office to legislative
matters.”); see also id. at 84.
551
Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Reply to Plaintiff’s
Opposition to Motion To Dismiss at 13, Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (No.
1:02cv340JDB) [hereinafter Cheney GAO Brief].
552
Id.
553
See generally id.
549
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed the GAO’s suit for lack of standing and the GAO
declined to appeal. Relying heavily on Raines v. Byrd, 554 the
court through Judge John Bates concluded that Congress had not
fully exercised its own powers in trying to acquire the disputed
materials. 555 The court placed emphasis on the fact that not a
single committee had asserted its need for the information, let
alone both houses of Congress. 556 The court, therefore, did not
believe it needed to reach the constitutional or statutory merits
of the dispute. 557 Interestingly, Judge Bates did make an
allusion to the President and Vice President being somewhat
interchangeable, seeming to accept in some measure the
executive branch’s formulation of the two offices. 558 Judge Bates
wrote that “no court has ever before granted [what is sought
here] . . . an order that the President (or Vice President) must
produce information to Congress.” 559 The parenthetical reference
to the Vice President could be read to imply that his and the
President’s respective powers in this realm are closely related
and perhaps coextensive.
That language would not prove anomalous as it would be
echoed later in Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, involving
whether White House aides could be compelled to appear before a
congressional committee. 560 It would appear again to a lesser
extent in Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v.

521 U.S. 811 (1997).
See Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 63–65, 68.
556
See id. at 68.
557
See id. at 74–75.
558
Judicial precedent involving the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) has
also treated the Vice President like the President. See Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, 131 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Offices within the White House
whose functions are limited to advising and assisting the President do not come
within the definition of an ‘agency’ within the meaning of FOIA or the Privacy Act.
This includes the Office of the President (and by analogy the Office of the Vice
President) and undoubtedly the President and Vice President themselves.”).
559
Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 53; see also id. at 74–75 (stating that the
decision’s outcome “may seem overly protective of the Vice President, and hence of
the Executive Branch”).
560
See 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). The court concluded that White House
staff must respond to the committee subpoena; however, it qualified its holding. See
id. at 55, 99. Speaking again through Judge Bates, the court cautioned that it “has
no occasion to address whether the President can be subject to compelled
congressional process. Similarly there is no need to address here whether the Vice
President could be subject to compelled congressional process.” Id. at 106.
554
555
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U.S. Department of Justice 561 and Citizens for Responsibility &
Ethics in Washington v. Department of Homeland Security. 562
Dicta in each of these opinions treat the President and Vice
President in similar fashion, thus reaffirming the structural
reasoning undergirding VPP. If the President and Vice President
are on the same constitutional plane, then it would make sense
for the Vice President to enjoy his own constitutional privilege
when carrying out his own constitutional powers.
Though not decided on the merits, as a practical matter, the
Vice President “won” and the GAO and Congress “lost” the
case. 563 The result of the decision, if not the legal holding, was
that the Vice President was permitted to withhold the documents
from the GAO and preserve the President’s and his
confidentiality.
Moreover, the court tacitly embraced the
executive branch’s assertions that vice presidential authority is
somewhat analogous to that of the President in the context of
withholding information.
Thus, the overall thrust of the
decision—when coupled with its practical result—lends a fair
measure of support for the notion of VPP. Such support, of
course, should not be overstated because the facts of the case did
not entail the Vice President exercising his own constitutional
power, but delegated presidential authority—not unlike earlier
examples involving Vice Presidents Wallace, Humphrey,
Rockefeller, and Quayle. Thus, the case’s bearing on the Vice
President’s constitutional authority to withhold documents is not
entirely on point.

561
See 658 F. Supp. 2d 217, 238 (D.D.C. 2009) (regarding whether Vice
President Cheney’s interview with the FBI in the Valerie Plame Wilson matter
constituted a waiver of privilege, the court wrote that “Vice President Cheney’s
statements [to the FBI] qualified as an inter-agency disclosure, his failure to
formally invoke any executive privileges did not preclude the White House’s future
reliance on those privileges.” (emphasis added)).
562
See 532 F.3d 860, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Moreover, a profound difference
exists between subpoenas and discovery requests in civil or criminal cases against
the President or Vice President and routine FOIA cases involving records that may
or may not touch on presidential or vice presidential activities.”).
563
See, e.g., DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 338, at 14 (concluding that
Walker v. Cheney “was a decisive win for the vice president. He never revealed his
list of contacts, and his constitutional power was expanded.”); MONTGOMERY, supra
note 143, at 86 (concluding that the GAO decision “marked a significant legal
triumph for the Bush White House”).
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Cheney v. U.S. District Court

In Cheney v. U.S. District Court, a number of private
litigants sued for access to many of the same materials as the
GAO. 564 Unlike the GAO litigation, which did not proceed beyond
the district court level, Cheney was decided by the Supreme
Court.
In this case, the federal trial court issued discovery orders
to the Vice President instructing him to turn over materials
related to the NEPDG. 565 The question before the Supreme
Court was to what extent a federal appeals court may, through a
“writ of mandamus . . . modify or dissolve the orders
when . . . enforcement might . . . impinge upon the President’s
constitutional prerogatives.” 566 At another juncture, the Court
emphasized its concern not to “impinge upon the President’s
constitutional prerogatives.” 567 Notably, there is no mention in
the opinion of the Vice President’s constitutional powers. In fact,
during oral argument, Solicitor General Ted Olson was quick to
point out that the authority at issue was in fact the President’s
alone. 568
The Supreme Court held in favor of the Bush administration.
Although not a success regarding the Vice President’s
constitutional powers per se, the decision was a victory
nonetheless in that again Cheney, as the President’s proxy, did
not have to surrender the information in question, once more
preserving the President’s and Vice President’s confidentiality. 569
542 U.S. 367 (2004).
See id. at 372.
566
Id. at 372–73 (emphasis added).
567
Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
568
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, Cheney, 542 U.S. 367 (No. 03-472)
(“[T]he Vice President is acting as the subordinate and surrogate for the President
here. This is the President’s authority.” (quoting Solicitor General Olson)); see also
Cheney Supreme Court Brief, supra note 27, at 44 (“[T]he President is in many
respects the real party in interest.”); cf. id. at 43 (“[[I]t serves no purpose to require
the President or Vice President to assert privilege claims before permitting an
interlocutory appeal.” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, the government did
emphasize the status of the Vice President. See id. at 38–39 (“The decisions below
impose intrusive and distracting discovery obligations on the Vice President himself.”
(emphasis added)).
569
See, e.g., Shannen W. Coffin, An Examination of Cheney v. U.S. District
Court—A Win for Executive Authority, FEDERALIST SOCIETY WHITE PAPERS,
June 2004, http://fedsoc.server326.com/Publications/White%20Papers/cheney.pdf
(contending that “the decision of the Supreme Court . . . is a major victory for the
Executive”).
564
565
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It merits mention that Sierra Club, one of the chief litigants
seeking the NEPDG documents, conceded in its brief before the
Supreme Court that significant hurdles stood in the way of
deposing the Vice President himself in a civil suit. The group
acknowledged that “the Vice President . . . could not be deposed,
either as a party or as a third party witness, unless respondents
made a substantial showing of need to the district court.” 570 The
Court itself also recognized the Vice President’s unique status,
reasoning that “[w]ere the Vice President not a party in the case,
the argument that the Court of Appeals [erred] . . . might present
Quoting the Court’s immunity
different considerations.” 571
decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, it reasoned that Cheney’s
“ ‘constitutional responsibilities and status [were] . . . factors
counseling judicial deference and restraint.’ ” 572 Adoption of the
“constitutional responsibilities” language by the Court seemed
once again to hearken back to Nixon I’s embrace of the
“enumerated powers” formula.
At other junctures, the decision seemed to eliminate any
distinction between the President and Vice President, not unlike
the district court’s treatment of the two offices in Walker v.
Cheney. 573 For instance, the Court stated that “separation-ofBrief of Respondent Sierra Club at 39, Cheney, 542 U.S. 364 (No. 03-475).
Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381; cf. id. at 385 (“This is not a routine discovery
dispute. The discovery requests are directed to the Vice President and other senior
Government officials . . . .”).
572
Id. at 385 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 (1982)); Myers,
supra note 45, at 910.
573
See Amar, supra note 7 (“The Cheney Court repeatedly and reflexively lumps
the vice presidency together with the presidency, and talks as if executive privilege
concepts necessarily play out identically for both offices.”); Myers, supra note 45, at
911 (“By explicitly linking the President and Vice President and suggesting that the
involvement of either office in the lawsuit raised similar separation of powers
questions, the Court . . . demonstrated its willingness to view the two offices in
similar terms.”); see also Klarevas, supra note 7.
In public discourse, Vice President Cheney often blended the two offices himself.
Regarding the outcome of the GAO litigation, Cheney stated that “I think it restored
some of the legitimate authority of the executive branch, the president and the vice
president, to be able to conduct their business.” Keith Koffler, Cheney’s Words Show
He Counts Self Part of Government’s Executive Branch, CONGRESS DAILY, June 29,
2007 (emphasis added); see SAVAGE, supra note 546, at 100 (“What’s at stake here is
whether a member of Congress can demand that I give him notes of all my meetings
and a list of everybody I met with. We don’t think that he has that authority.”
(quoting Vice President Cheney) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Shane Harris, Legacy of Strength, or Weakness?, NAT’L J., Jan. 28, 2008,
at 34, available at http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/bush/legacy.htm (“The
president is bound and determined to defend those principles and to pass on this
570
571
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powers considerations should inform a court of appeals’
evaluation of a mandamus petition involving the President or the
Vice President.” 574 Elsewhere, the Court commented that
[t]he discovery requests are directed to the Vice President . . . .
The Executive Branch, at its highest level, is seeking the aid of

office, his and mine, to future generations in better shape than we found it.” (quoting
Vice President Cheney) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bruce
P. Montgomery, Congressional Oversight: Vice President Richard B. Cheney’s
Executive Branch Triumph, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 581, 592 (2006) (“[The issue] at stake
here is the ability of the president and vice president to solicit advice from anybody
they want in confidence . . . without having to make it available to a member of
Congress.” (quoting Vice President Cheney) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
What I object to . . . and what the president’s [sic] objected to, and what
we’ve told the GAO we don’t do, is make it impossible for me or future vice
presidents to ever have a conversation in confidence with anybody without
having, ultimately, to tell a member of Congress what we talked about and
what was said. You just cannot accept that proposition without putting a
chill over the ability of the president and the vice president to receive
unvarnished advice.
DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 338, at 12 (quoting Vice President Cheney)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The important thing here, Campbell, to understand is what we’re focused
on are those things that relate to my role as Vice President; that as Vice
President I’m the constitutional officer provided for in the Constitution.
And the General Accounting Office has authority over statutory agencies,
but not over constitutional officers. That’s not the way their statute is set
up. And that it’s important here to protect the ability of the President and
the Vice President to get unvarnished advice from any source we want.
....
You have an obligation, I believe, in these offices to defend the office
against the unlawful or unconstitutional or unreasonable encroachment by
the other branches of government. The way the Constitution is set up
specifically provides for separation of powers. And to create a precedent
where future vice presidents, for example, would be in a situation where
anytime they meet with somebody, they have to call Henry Waxman and
tell them who they met with, what the subject was that was discussed,
giving him notes of the meetings that were taken—now, the Congressman
does not have the constitutional right to insist that the President or the
Vice President provide him with that information, any more than I can
demand of the Congressman, look, you’ve got to tell me everybody you
talked to before you cast that vote. That’s silly. That’s not the way the
government works.
Interview by Campbell Brown with Richard B. Cheney, 46th Vice President of the
United States, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 28, 2002), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020128.html.
President Bush at times did the same. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 143, at 77
(“[W]hen the GAO overstepped its bounds to try to get advice given to the vice
president and me, we resisted.” (emphasis added) (quoting President Bush) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
574
Cheney, 542 U.S. at 382.
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the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives. As we have
already noted, special considerations control when the
Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its
office
and
safeguarding
the
confidentiality
of
its
communications are implicated. 575

In yet another part of the opinion, the majority noted “that all
courts should be mindful of the burdens imposed on the
Executive Branch in any future proceedings.
Special
considerations applicable to the President and the Vice President
suggest” the need for judicial awareness of these concerns. 576
The Court’s equation of the Vice President with the
President clearly underscores the structural argument that is a
central feature of VPP. If the President lawfully may exercise a
constitutional privilege, and if the Vice President should be
treated the same as the President as the Supreme Court
repeatedly implies—in the context of withholding documents no
less—then it stands to reason that the Vice President should
benefit from his own constitutional privilege. That is certainly
more logical than the other potential corollary, which is that if
the President and Vice President are conjoined, then the Vice
President should be able to exercise a constitutional privilege
that is automatically part of the President’s authority. 577
While not deciding any constitutional questions, Cheney left
behind notable dicta that recognized the constitutional
importance of the Vice President and at the same time protected
his asserted confidentiality interests.
In the context of
nondisclosure of documents, this judicial acknowledgement of the
Vice President’s constitutional role supports the existence of
VPP. Thus, the undeniable tenor of the decision, if not its exact
holding, favors the Vice President possessing authority to shield
materials and communications from outside parties.

Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
Id. at 391–92. In ruling in favor of the Vice President, the Court justified its
decision in part by citing case law involving questions of presidential civil immunity.
See id. at 385–86, 388 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) and Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)); Myers, supra note 45, at 910–11 (discussing the
Court’s expansion of the case law on presidential civil immunity to include the Vice
President).
577
This argument will be examined and dismissed below. See infra Part VII.B.
575
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Executive Order 13,233 Regarding Presidential and Vice
Presidential Records

On November 1, 2001, the Bush administration issued
Executive Order No. 13,233. 578 This directive, which addressed
implementation of the Presidential Records Act, 579 referred at
some length to privileges held by sitting Presidents and former
Presidents.
Included among these privileges was that of
executive privilege. The order stated that it “shall also apply
with respect to any such records that are subject to any
constitutionally based privilege that the former Vice President
may be entitled to invoke . . . references in this order to a former
President shall be deemed also to be references to the relevant
It appeared to qualify that
former Vice President.” 580
authorization, however, by declining to permit a Vice President
or a former Vice President to assert “any constitutional privilege
of a President or former President except as authorized by that
President or former President.” 581
During a hearing on the executive order before the House
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management
and Intergovernmental Relations, Professor Peter Shane
discussed this aspect of the executive order. Shane, one of the
leading authorities on separation of powers, expressed skepticism
about the rule:
[The order states that] the Vice President shall be treated as the
President. And if I may ask rhetorically, why in heaven’s name
would that be?
The Vice President’s privileges, such as they are, could only be
part and parcel of the privilege that protects the Presidency. I
don’t read into the Constitution—I know of no authority that
suggests there’s independent executive privilege to protect the
Office of the Vice Presidency. As a Presidential advisor, Vice
Presidents are undoubtedly protected in their communications
Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001), revoked by Exec.
Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Executive Order].
At least one other executive order provided Vice President Cheney with enhanced
authority in the area of information control: the power to declassify documents. See
Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003), revoked by Exec. Order
No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). For discussion, see Byron York, The
Little-Noticed Order that Gave Dick Cheney New Power, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 16,
2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york200602160841.asp.
579
See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2006).
580
Executive Order, supra note 578, § 11(a) (emphasis added).
581
Id. § 11(b); see also SHANE, supra note 323, at 131.
578
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in order to protect the Presidency, but I would imagine that
huge quantities of what Vice Presidents read and deliberate
upon are no more protected by executive privilege than, say, the
records of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . .
....
Constitutionally, my intuition is—and I use the word “intuition”
because there’s not a lot of law on this subject, but my intuition
is that only a President can assert executive privilege. 582

Although the subcommittee did not devote significant
attention to the specific question of whether the Vice President
enjoyed his own privilege, Shane’s doubt as to the constitutional
privilege alluded to in the order seemed to be shared by some
committee members and other witnesses at the hearing. 583 In
particular, the view that the President and Vice President should
be treated the same with respect to executive privilege was
challenged with some vigor. This concern was warranted since
the order appeared to be based on a muddled concept of vice
presidential executive privilege rather than a constitutional
privilege belonging entirely to the Vice President.
This
represents a crucial internal flaw with the order. It seemed to
allow for a vice presidential privilege subject to the President’s
approval. A true constitutional privilege for the Vice President
would need to be exercised independently from the President. In
fact, if a Vice President has recourse to his own constitutional
privilege, he would need to prevail over the President in case of a
conflict or in effect the privilege would not be his own.
The committee subsequently marked up legislation to
overturn the executive order, 584 including a provision taking aim
582
PRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 105. The administration contended that the
order did not break any new ground as to privileges. See Mike Allen & George
Lardner Jr., A Veto over Presidential Papers; Order Lets Sitting or Former President
Block Release, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2001, at A1 (quoting the White House Counsel:
the directive “simply implemented an orderly process to deal with this information”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
583
See PRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 396 (“President Bush’s Executive order
even appears to establish a process for extending executive privilege to former Vice
Presidents . . . . No court has ever recognized such a right for Vice Presidents.”
(statement of Rep. Waxman)); see also id. at 449 (statement of Morton Rosenberg).
584
See H.R. 4187, 107th Cong. (2002). H.R. 1255 in the 110th Congress reflected
a similar attempt to rescind the executive order. See H.R. REP. No. 110-44, at 4–5
(2007) (“[T]he bill clarifies that the incumbent and former presidents must make
privilege claims personally. The bill would make clear that the right to claim
executive privilege is personal to current and former presidents and cannot be
bequeathed to assistants, relatives, or descendants. And finally, the bill . . . restores
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specifically at the vice presidential provision. The bill purported
to “clarif[y] that authority to claim executive privilege is personal
to a former or incumbent President and cannot be delegated to
their representatives . . . .
[It] clarifies that a former or
incumbent
Vice
President
cannot
claim
presidential
privileges . . . . [T]hese provisions are consistent with current
theory and practice concerning executive privilege.”585
The bill, however, was never enacted. Moreover, the drafters
of the legislation seemed trapped in the same preconception that
whatever “constitutionally based privilege” the Vice President
might invoke must be executive privilege.
While the executive order rightly noted the possibility of a
constitutional privilege for the Vice President, the rationale
behind it was confused. Moreover, the privilege was never
asserted under the directive. It merely laid down a marker for
future invocation. 586 The directive seemed to build in part on the
holding of Nixon II, which recognized a privilege for former
Presidents. As it did in the two lawsuits involving efforts to
claim documents from Vice President Cheney, the executive
order appeared to treat the President and Vice President in a
similar fashion. 587 To that end the executive order reaffirmed the
structural argument made in this Article. In early 2009,
however, the issue was rendered moot when the Obama

the long-standing understanding that the right to assert executive privilege over
presidential records is a right held only by presidents.” (emphasis added)).
585
H.R. REP. No. 107-790, at 10 (2002). The committee’s bill was not
inconsistent with VPP. It will be recalled that VPP is not a presidential privilege or
executive privilege but one rooted in the Vice President’s own constitutional powers.
586
In litigation over the order, a federal court noted without comment that these
provisions had yet to be exercised. See Am. Historical Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives &
Records Admin., 516 F. Supp. 2d 90, 104 (D.D.C. 2007). In this court challenge to the
executive order, plaintiffs questioned the constitutionality of a vice presidential
constitutional privilege as alluded to in the order. See id. at 99 (noting the argument
that “there is no constitutional basis for a vice presidential executive privilege”). The
court declined the opportunity to discuss the constitutional question and decided the
case on statutory grounds. See id. at 107 n.11 (“[T]he Court need not reach the
question of whether assertion of privilege by representatives of former presidents or
former vice presidents is a constitutionally-based privilege . . . .”); id. at 110 (“[T]he
Court shall assume without deciding that a former president . . . and a former vice
president have some authority to invoke executive privilege.”). It is perhaps worth
noting that the concept of a vice presidential privilege was not dismissed out of hand
by the court.
587
See infra Part VII.B for discussion on this topic.
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administration repealed the order, presumably reflecting
skepticism of the vice presidential provision, among others. 588
4.

Senate Judiciary Committee Subpoena Issued to the Vice
President

In an attempt to gain information about the Bush
administration’s warrantless electronic surveillance program, the
Senate Judiciary Committee issued a subpoena duces tecum to
the Vice President’s office on June 27, 2007. 589 The Vice
President’s office responded to the Judiciary Committee on
August 20, 2007. In its letter, the Vice President’s counsel wrote,
[t]he Office of the Vice President reserves all legal privileges
applicable to the vice presidency, such as the attorney-client
privilege and the deliberative process privilege.
....
In the performance of executive functions in support of the
President, the Vice President respects the legal privileges
afforded by the Constitution to the presidency, such as the
Executive Privilege protecting among other things national
security secrets and policy deliberations. Similarly, in the
performance of legislative functions, the Vice President respects
the legal privileges afforded by the Constitution to the Senate,
such as preservation of the confidentiality of a session of the
Senate with closed doors over which a Vice President may
preside.
....
[The Vice President does not interpret the subpoena to involve
records created] in the performance of his legislative
functions. 590

Notably, the letter does not formally assert that the Vice
President has his own constitutional privilege. It actually seems
to abjure such a power, observing that the Vice President
respects both executive privilege as “afforded by the Constitution
to the presidency” and legislative privileges “afforded by the
588
See Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 21, 2009). The 2001
order was controversial for a host of reasons unrelated to the vice presidency. See
generally Rosenberg Statement, supra note 7.
589
An attempt to have the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs issue a subpoena to Vice President Cheney was undertaken, but
without success. See Alexander Bolton, For Collins, Forgiveness May Be Tough, THE
HILL, Nov. 24, 2008, http://thehill.com/homenews/news/17169-for-collins-forgivenessmay-be-tough.
590
See August 20, 2007 Letter, supra note 13.
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Thus, a constitutional
Constitution to the Senate.” 591
presidential privilege and a Senate privilege are recognized but
not VPP. In this vein, the letter only comments that the Vice
President may benefit from the deliberative process privilege.
That, of course, is a common-law privilege involving
communication for the benefit of the President; it is not a
constitutional privilege tied to the Vice President’s unique
powers.
The end result was that the White House appeared to ignore
the subpoenas, and the Senate did not pursue contempt
proceedings against the Vice President or his staff. 592
5.

House Judiciary Committee Subpoena Issued to Vice
President Cheney’s Chief of Staff

In April 2008, Vice President Cheney’s office and the House
Judiciary Committee became embroiled in a controversy over
whether Cheney’s Chief of Staff, David Addington, should appear
before the panel to testify as to his role in the formulation of the
Bush administration’s legal policy during the War on Terror. 593
In a letter dated April 18, 2008, the counsel to the Vice President
argued against Addington having to appear before the body. In
the letter, the Vice President’s office made three assertions that
have some bearing on VPP. First, unlike the communication the
year before to the Senate Judiciary Committee, this letter could
be read to imply a vice presidential privilege:
[S]eparate from any question of immunity from testimony
[are] . . . questions of privilege [that] may arise with respect to
information sought by questions, such as with respect to
privileges
protecting
state
secrets,
attorney-client
communications, deliberations, and communications among
Presidents, Vice Presidents, and their advisers . . . .
[A]
principal function of [the Chief of Staff to the Vice

Id.
See Elana Schor, White House Lets Leahy’s Deadline Pass, THE HILL, Aug. 20,
2007,
http://thehill.com/homenews/news/12845-white-house-lets-leahys-deadlinepass.
593
See, e.g., Keith Perine, House Judiciary Asks Former Administration
Advisors To Testify on Torture, CQ TODAY, May 6, 2008, http://www.cqpolitics.com/
wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002717900.
591
592
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President] . . . is engaging in privileged communications, such as
the giving of privileged advice. 594

It is unclear from the letter whether the privilege alluded to
involves the Vice President himself enjoying a constitutional
privilege or merely that his conversations with his Chief of Staff
are covered by the President’s communications privilege since the
Vice President provides confidential advice to the President. If
the Vice President’s office meant to include only the latter, the
correspondence needed only to state that “deliberations, and
communications among Presidents and their advisers” are
protected. Inclusion of “Vice Presidents” in that phrase would
seem redundant since Vice Presidents would almost certainly be
categorized as presidential advisers 595 and covered by
presidential communications privilege.
Inclusion of “Vice
Presidents” in that passage of the letter could, therefore, be read
to reflect subtle advocacy of a constitutional vice presidential
privilege.
Second, the Vice President’s counsel asserted the
independence of the Vice President’s staff from that of the
President. She noted that the “Chief of Staff to the Vice
President is an employee of the Vice President, and not the
President, and therefore is not in a position to speak on behalf of
This assertion properly reflects the
the President.” 596
constitutional independence of the Vice President. 597 Moreover,
taken together with the aforementioned reference to privilege,
the letter would seem to reinforce that Cheney’s office was
advocating that the Vice President holds his own privilege. If “a
principal function” of the Vice President’s Chief of Staff is to
engage in privileged communication and if the “Chief of Staff to
the Vice President is an employee of the Vice President, and not
the President,” then it would seem to follow that the Chief of
594
April 18, 2008 Letter, supra note 13, at 2 (emphasis added). The Vice
President’s office also questioned the authority of Congress to investigate the Vice
President since “Congress lacks the constitutional power to regulate by a law what a
Vice President communicates in the performance of the Vice President’s official
duties, or what a Vice President recommends that a President communicate in the
President’s performance of official duties.” Id. at 1.
595
See Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 131 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 (D.D.C.
2000); Executive Order, supra note 578, § 11(b); LIGHT, supra note 306, at 1
(contending that “Vice-Presidents have finally joined that small group of White
House aides who act as senior advisers to the President”).
596
April 18, 2008 Letter, supra note 13, at 1.
597
See infra notes 652–97 and accompanying text.
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Staff’s advice is privileged because that communication is itself
given to the Chief of Staff’s employer, the Vice President, a
constitutional officer who is not legally answerable to the
President. 598
Finally, the letter separates the Vice President’s role in the
Senate from that of the executive branch. The letter notes that
an “inquiry by a House Committee concerning the Senate
functions of the Vice President would not, in any event, be
appropriate.” 599 While not asserting privilege outright with
respect to the House committee, this reference seems to lay down
a marker for future invocation of VPP if a House request were
ever made for Senate-related documents involving the Vice
President.
The House Judiciary Committee responded to the April 18
letter first with a letter of its own dated April 28 600 and a few
days later with a subpoena ad testificum. 601 In the committee’s
letter, the chairman challenged some of the assertions made in
the Vice President’s correspondence but avoided the privilege
An alternate reading could be that the Chief of Staff’s advice to the Vice
President is privileged because the Vice President’s advice to the President is
protected; such presidential conversations are privileged even if they are with the
constitutionally independent Vice President. This interpretation seems somewhat
less likely given the emphasis placed on to whom the Chief of Staff is answerable,
the manner in which the Vice President is mentioned in the letter and the fact the
Vice President is not removable by the President.
599
April 18, 2008 Letter, supra note 13, at 2. Presumably the Constitution’s
grant of rulemaking authority to each house would prevent the respective chambers
from compelling the production of documents from each other. For example, if the
Senate conducted business in secret session pursuant to Senate rule, it would seem
that a House investigation could not compel the Senate to produce the materials if
the upper chamber resisted. Similarly, it would appear unlikely that one body could
compel materials from the other if those documents fell within the latter chamber’s
exclusive constitutional responsibilities. For instance, it would appear doubtful that
the Senate could investigate and compel material from a House impeachment
inquiry since the House has the exclusive authority to impeach officials. Similarly, it
is questionable whether a House investigation could compel material from the
Senate as it involves the Senate’s advice and consent function in considering
executive branch or judicial nominations. See supra notes 402–03 (noting the House
Rules Committee members’ concern about a House committee investigating the
President of the Senate); cf. Hooper, supra note 13 (quoting Rep. Young). But cf. 3
HINDS’, supra note 13, § 2665, at 1115–16.
600
See Letter from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, to David S. Addington, Chief of Staff to the Vice President (Apr. 28, 2008)
[hereinafter April 28, 2008 Letter].
601
See Letter and Subpoena from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, to David S. Addington, Chief of Staff to the Vice President
(May 7, 2008).
598
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question. The Committee noted that “many relevant questions
exist that do not implicate executive privilege.” 602 The letter
focused instead on the closely related question of immunity.
Chairman Conyers noted that:
Vice Presidential staff have previously testified before Congress
and I am aware of no authority—and counsel’s letter cites
none—for the proposition that such staff could be immune from
testimony before Congress. While the issue of the immunity of
senior advisors to the President is currently under litigation,
there has been no suggestion that such immunity, even if
recognized, would reach to the Vice President’s office, an entity
that, as you well know, is constitutionally quite different from
the Office of the President. 603

Similarly, Conyers dismissed as a canard the assertion made
about the Vice President’s Senate duties. He stated that
“concern that ‘inquiry by a House Committee concerning the
Senate functions of the Vice President would not, in any event, be
appropriate’ seems especially out of place given the subject
matter of the proposed hearing and the nature of the invitation
to you.” 604 Thus, if the committee read the Vice President’s letter
as advocating a constitutional privilege, it chose to ignore it.
Instead, the committee focused on how the Vice President is
constitutionally distinct from the President with regard to the
related issue of immunity and whether Cheney’s staff could
appear before the committee.
At the end of the day, in response to the subpoena, the Vice
President’s office agreed that Addington could appear before the
committee subject to certain stipulations. These included that
“the Committee does not seek information relating to Vice
Presidential
communications
or
to
Vice
Presidential
recommendations to the President,” 605 that “the Committee does
See April 28, 2008 Letter, supra note 600, at 4.
Id. As noted by Conyers, vice presidential staff members have testified before
committees of Congress on several occasions. For example, Vice President Bush had
several aides testify before the Iran-Contra Committee. See supra notes 484–85 and
accompanying text. Vice President Gore’s former Chief of Staff and former Deputy
Chief of Staff both testified before a Senate investigative committee. See supra notes
539–40 and accompanying text. Finally, Gore’s Chief of Staff appeared before a
Senate panel looking into the Whitewater matter and Vice President Wallace’s BEW
staff testified at several hearings. See supra notes 389–95 and 539.
604
April 28, 2008 Letter, supra note 600, at 4 n.11.
605
Letter from Kathryn L. Wheelbarger, Counsel to the Vice President, to Perry
Apelbaum, Chief of Staff and Counsel, Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (May 1, 2008).
602
603
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not seek information relating to the Senate functions of the Vice
Presidency . . . [, and that] applicable legal privileges may be
Again, the separate
invoked in response to questions.” 606
references to “Vice Presidential communications” and “Vice
Presidential recommendations to the President” seem to reflect
the Cheney office’s awareness that communications made to the
Vice President himself as an independent constitutional officer
might themselves be privileged, not merely communications from
the Vice President to the President. The latter’s use of the
disjunctive “or” to separate “Vice Presidential communications”
and “Vice Presidential recommendations to the President” seems
to bear this out.
The Vice President’s counsel was also careful to note that
[t]he Office of the Vice President remains of the view that the
courts, to protect the institution of the Vice Presidency under
the Constitution from encroachment by committees of Congress,
would recognize that a chief of staff or counsel to the Vice
President is immune from compulsion to appear before
committees of Congress to testify concerning official duties
performed for the Vice President. 607

Yet again, Cheney’s counsel asserted concern over the vice
presidency being undermined by the committee’s actions.
Clearly, the Vice President’s counsel viewed the vice presidency
as a separate institution with equities distinct from those of the
President. Despite these concerns, Addington appeared before
the committee on June 26, 2008. 608
6.

The Valerie Plame Wilson Matter

Valerie Plame Wilson was a Central Intelligence Agency
officer whose identity was leaked to the press. The ensuing
investigation over the circumstances involving the disclosure of
her identity was conducted by a DOJ special counsel. During
this inquiry, Vice President Cheney was questioned under
oath. 609 Cheney did not seem to oppose his being questioned by

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1–2.
608
See Dan Eggen, Bush Policy Authors Defend Their Actions, WASH. POST, June
27, 2008, at A2; Dana Milbank, When Anonymity Fails, Be Nasty, Brutish and Short,
WASH. POST, June 27, 2008, at A3.
609
See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 45, at 945 n.25.
606
607
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the FBI. 610 His agreeing to this interview was in keeping with
Nixon I, which held that broad claims of executive privilege must
defer to the particularized need of the criminal justice process. 611
The fallout from this investigation embroiled Vice President
Cheney in yet another conflict over information with a
congressional panel, this time with the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform. The Committee sought
copies of reports of the FBI interviews with President Bush and
the Vice President that had been compiled during the special
counsel’s investigation. 612 For over a year, the committee and the
DOJ—including the special counsel’s office—exchanged letters
over whether the executive branch would comply with the
Committee’s request. 613 The matter was followed by a Committee
See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 658
F. Supp. 2d 217, 221–22 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting the “voluntary” nature of the
interview).
611
See United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (“The
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial.”); see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 45,
at 945–60 (discussing presidential cooperation—compelled or otherwise—in other
criminal contexts).
612
See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice (July 16, 2007) [hereinafter Waxman, July 16, 2007 Letter] (on file with
author); Letter from Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform (Aug. 16,
2007) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Aug. 16, 2007 Letter] (on file with author).
Chairman Waxman noted that FBI interviews with President Clinton and Vice
President Gore had been turned over to the Committee. See Letter from Rep. Henry
A. Waxman, Chairman, the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to
Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter
Waxman, Dec. 3, 2007 Letter] (on file with author).
Following the inauguration of President Barack Obama, private parties secured
much of this information through FOIA litigation. See Citizens for Responsibility &
Ethics in Wash., 658 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
613
See, e.g., Waxman, July 16, 2007 Letter, supra note 612; Fitzgerald, Aug. 16,
2007 Letter, supra note 612; Waxman, Dec. 3, 2007 Letter, supra note 612; Letter
from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, to Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 18, 2007) (on file
with author); Letter from Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform (Jan. 18, 2008) (on file with author); Benczkowski Letter, supra note 24;
Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform, to Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen. (June 3, 2008) (on file with author);
Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform (June 11, 2008) [hereinafter Nelson, June 11, 2008 Letter] (on file with
author); Letter from Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Office of Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of
610
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subpoena duces tecum and culminated in an assertion of
executive privilege, a claim made by the President. For purposes
of this Article, the exchange of letters includes important
references by the executive branch to vice presidential authority;
in the end, however, it was the President and not the Vice
President who invoked the constitutional privilege.
Throughout the correspondence, the DOJ combined the
President and Vice President together as had been done in the
NEPDG litigation. In a letter dated January 18, 2008, the
Department offered reports of the FBI interviews in redacted
form. 614 In explaining its decision to omit portions of the report,
the Department noted the status of “the President and the
Vice President, the two constitutional officers of the
executive branch, [which] raises serious separation of powers
and heightened confidentiality concerns . . . .
The limited
redactions concern . . . presidential and vice presidential
communications . . . .” 615 As noted earlier, reference to both the
President and Vice President together implies an equal
constitutional status. Similarly, inclusion of “vice presidential
communications” is of note since “presidential communications”
would seem to subsume the former and render it redundant, at
least to the extent such exchanges involve executive branch
communication—excepting those made pursuant to the TwentyFifth Amendment. 616

Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform (June 18, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform (June 24, 2008)
[hereinafter Nelson, June 24, 2008 Letter] (on file with author); Letter from Rep.
Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to
Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 27, 2008) (on file
with author); Letter from Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform (July 3, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Michael B. Mukasey,
Att’y Gen. (July 8, 2008) [hereinafter Waxman, July 8, 2008 Letter] (on file with
author).
614
Benczkowski Letter, supra note 24, at 1.
615
Id. (emphasis added). The phrase “the President and Vice President, the two
constitutional officers of the Executive Branch, raises serious separation of powers
and heightened confidentiality concerns,” appears more than once in the
correspondence. See Nelson June 11, 2008 Letter, supra note 613, at 1.
616
See infra Part VII.A.2.
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In a June 24, 2008 letter, the Department maintained its
position that it would not provide unredacted FBI reports to the
Committee but elaborated on its reasoning:
[With respect to] the President and Vice President[,] . . . the
confidentiality interests relating to those documents are of a
greater constitutional magnitude. The President and the Vice
President are the two nationally elected constitutional officers
under our Government. The President heads the Executive
Branch and, as the Congress has by law recognized, the Vice
President often advises and assists the President in the
President’s performance of his executive duties. It is settled as
a matter of constitutional law, reflected in court decisions, and
congressional and Executive Branch practice, that the
communications of the President and the Vice President with
their staffs relating to official Executive Branch activities lie at
the absolute core of executive privilege. . . . Congressional
access to those reports would intrude into . . . areas of
presidential decision-making. 617

On July 8, 2008, the Committee responded to the June 24
letter from the Department. The panel relented on pursuing the
President’s FBI report and instead honed in on the Vice
President’s. 618 The Committee also focused on the implied
reference in the Department’s letter to the Vice President
enjoying his own privilege.
Vice President Cheney’s attorneys have consistently maintained
that he is not an “entity within the executive branch.” Whether
this unusual claim is accurate or not, I am aware of no
freestanding vice presidential communications privilege, let
alone one that covers voluntary and unrestricted conversations
with a special counsel investigating wrongdoing.
There
certainly was no such understanding when our Committee
sought the FBI interview report of an interview with Vice
President Gore.
The Justice Department produced the
interview to the Committee despite the fact that it contained
discussion of official White House business. 619

Nelson, June 24, 2008 Letter, supra note 613, at 2 (emphasis added).
Waxman, July 8, 2008 Letter, supra note 613, at 1.
619
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). For coverage of Cheney’s assertion that he was not
part of the executive branch, see, for example, Dana Milbank, The Cheese Stands
Alone, WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at A2 (quoting a letter from Cheney staff
asserting that, in the context of an executive order, the Vice President should not be
considered “an entity within the executive branch”).
617
618
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The Committee maintained that it was “seeking information
which the President and Vice President previously disclosed to
the FBI without asserting privilege of any kind—executive or
otherwise.” 620 Moreover, the committee asserted that it was
not aware of any precedent in which executive privilege has
been asserted over communications between a vice president
and his staff about vice presidential decisionmaking. Courts
have carved out a presidential communications privilege, but
they have limited it quite narrowly to communications had
directly with the President or certain advisers directly on his
behalf about presidential decisionmaking. . . .
If the Vice
President is indeed outside the executive branch, as he seems to
contend, it is hard to understand what basis there could be for
asserting executive branch confidentiality interests in his
communications. 621

The panel, therefore, aimed squarely at whether the Vice
President possessed his own privilege, seizing on the apparent
inconsistency of the Office of the Vice President’s previous
statement that he was outside the executive branch and the
implications of the DOJ’s letter, which seemed to state that the
Vice President holds his own executive privilege. 622 In so doing,
the Committee raised a legitimate criticism of the DOJ’s legal
position. But the answer to the panel’s question should not have
been that the Vice President does not benefit from his own
constitutional privilege. 623 A fuller exploration of the legal
questions would have concluded that the Vice President may
claim his own constitutional privilege to the degree the activity
falls within his own areas of constitutional authority. On the
other hand, his communications involving issues of presidential
decisionmaking would be covered by the President’s executive
privilege, more specifically by presidential communications
privilege should the President assert it.
Once the matter was brought to a head, the President
responded by invoking executive privilege. In a letter to the
Committee, the DOJ indicated it was
disappointed that the Committee has not been satisfied by our
substantial accommodations of the Committee’s needs and has

620
621
622
623

Id. at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
See Milbank, supra note 619.
See infra Part VII.A.
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scheduled a meeting to consider citing the Attorney General for
contempt of Congress if the Department does not produce the
Vice President’s interview report . . . .
Accordingly, the
Attorney General has requested that the President assert
executive privilege with respect to these documents, and the
President has done so. 624

What stands out is that Bush—not Cheney—asserted the
privilege over records involving the Vice President.
7.

The 9/11 Commission

The example of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission” or
“Commission”) and its interaction with Vice President Cheney
provides a somewhat ambiguous precedent.
The 9/11
Commission was a body established by statute 625 and was
granted subpoena power. By its own terms it was “established in
the legislative branch” of the government. 626 Of course, such a
legislative assertion is not dispositive; that no members of
Congress served on the Commission could lead one to conclude
that the body was more akin to an independent agency or an
executive branch body in which members are prohibited from
serving. 627 Nonetheless, it could be persuasively argued that

Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform 1 (July 16, 2008); see also Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the President 1 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter Mukasey
Recommendation Letter] (“I am writing to request that you assert executive privilege
with respect to Department of Justice documents subpoenaed by the Committee on
Government Reform of the House of Representatives . . . . The documents include
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) reports of the Special Counsel’s interviews
with the Vice President . . . [and] notes taken by the Deputy National Security
Advisor during conversations with the Vice President and senior White House
officials . . . . Many of the subpoenaed materials reflect frank and candid
deliberations among senior presidential advisers, including the Vice
President . . . .”); id. at 2 (“The only reports the Department has not expressed a
willingness to make available for review are those for the interviews of you and the
Vice President, because of heightened separation of powers concerns.”); id. (“[I]t is
my considered legal judgment that it would be legally permissible for you to assert
executive privilege with respect to the subpoenaed documents . . . .” (emphasis
added)). For similar action taken by President Clinton to protect communications
involving Vice President Gore, see supra note 525.
625
See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306,
116 Stat. 2383 (2002).
626
Id. § 601.
627
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
624
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since the Commission was created by statute and Senate and
House leaders placed all but one Commission member on the
panel, the entity was more like a congressional committee than
an independent outside body. 628
One of the major questions confronting the Commission was
the extent to which it could question the President and Vice
President. The two men ultimately agreed to appear jointly for
an interview before the body. In this regard, the panel got what
it wanted: to question the President and Vice President. Their
questioning, however, was subject to a number of significant
limitations: it was neither conducted under oath, 629 nor was it
recorded. 630
In light of past practice, 631 there is little reason to think that
the 9/11 Commission could have legally compelled the President
After all, neither was
and Vice President to testify. 632
subpoenaed; they both appeared voluntarily. Further, that the
President and Vice President appeared together would seem to
reflect the heightened status they both share as constitutional
officers. Notably, the Vice President was not treated with lesser
deference than the President. In addition, few would seriously
argue that because the President appeared before the 9/11
Commission that a congressional committee could compel his
attendance at a hearing. 633 Using the same precedent to try to
establish the principle that the Vice President must appear at a
congressional hearing is equally dubious. This is especially so in
light of Walker, Cheney, and related decisions, which essentially
equate the constitutional stature of the Vice President with that
of the President. Finally, even though the Vice President
appeared before the 9/11 Commission under restricted
circumstances, as will be demonstrated in the next Section,
members of Congress still seemed to recognize the futility of

See RELYEA & TATELMAN, supra note 11, at 28 n.139.
See David Gregory et al., 9/11 Commission Finishes Bush, Cheney Session;
Bush Chastises Ashcroft in Private Statements at the White House, Apr. 29, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4862296.
630
See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller & Philip Shenon, Bush-Cheney 9/11 Interview
Won’t Be Formally Recorded, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at A18.
631
See supra note 339.
632
See generally Part VI.
633
If in fact the Commission was part of the legislative branch, it seems doubtful
it could exercise authority that a congressional committee with its own subpoena
power could not.
628
629
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trying to force Cheney to appear before an actual congressional
committee.
8.

Congressional Committees and Vice President Cheney

An element of both executive privilege and judicial privilege
is the qualified right of constitutional officers to resist being
compelled to appear before congressional committees to discuss
their official duties. During the Cheney vice presidency, many
influential members of Congress with leadership roles on key
congressional oversight panels openly doubted whether the Vice
President himself could be forced to appear before them. 634 These
members were hardly apologists for Cheney. For example,
Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation,
stated “[w]e can’t get [Vice President Cheney] in front of us.” 635
Waxman, then Chairman of the House Government Reform
Committee, concluded that trying to compel the Vice President to
answer questions as to his official duties would be
“problematic.” 636
Other prominent members of Congress who share Levin’s
and Waxman’s views of aggressive congressional oversight,
expressed implicit agreement with their position. Regarding a
probe by a Senate panel into pre-Iraq War intelligence, Senator
John McCain stated:
In general, I think everyone should be interviewed that was
involved . . . . The president of the United States and the vice
president of the United States have a special status, and you’ve
got to be concerned about the executive-congressional
relationship. I think certainly Cabinet secretaries who are
confirmable by the Senate should be interviewed. 637

634
See Nather, supra note 306, at 1740–41 (“[T]here are limits on what Congress
can do. It can’t subpoena him, lawmakers say, because that would instantly set off a
constitutional struggle over separation of powers.”). For a brief argument to the
contrary, see Jonathan Strong, Letter to the Editor, Even if Cheney View Is Valid,
Congress Can Subpoena Him, THE HILL, Sept. 21, 2007, at 16.
635
Nather, supra note 306, at 1741.
636
See id.
637
Alexander Bolton, Dems Win McCain’s Backing, THE HILL, Nov. 22, 2005, at
7 (quoting Sen. McCain) (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted earlier, a
House impeachment investigation would likely be able to secure privileged
documents from the Vice President if not compel his attendance. Cf. FISHER, supra
note 6, at 49–50; supra note 262.
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Thus, it would appear that there is a grudging
acknowledgement that a congressional committee would be
unable to legally compel a Vice President to appear before it.
While Vice President Colfax made an appearance before a panel,
he did so voluntarily. Vice President Humphrey refused to
testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a public
hearing, forcing the committee to agree to a closed-door meeting
on neutral turf.
Vice President Quayle refused several
invitations to appear before committees to discuss the Council on
Competitiveness.
In 1997, members of a special Senate
investigative panel made rumblings about compelling Vice
President Gore to appear before it, but nothing came of the effort.
Recent opinion—from lawmakers with a strong record of
assertiveness in the area of congressional oversight—only
reinforces the view that the Vice President may not be forced to
testify before a congressional committee, underscoring the
legitimacy of VPP. 638
In short, events during the Cheney vice presidency provide
support for the notion of VPP. In two court decisions there are
dicta, particularly in the Supreme Court decision of Cheney v.
U.S. District Court, that indicate that because of his
“responsibilities and status[ ]” as a constitutional officer, the Vice
President has a healthy leeway when he attempts to withhold
information, even if he is only acting as the President’s proxy. 639
In the view of the Supreme Court, the Vice President’s authority
638
Part of congressional deference in this regard could be the recognition that
the Vice President is a presidential adviser and arguably beyond the compulsory
power of Congress. This reasoning is somewhat strained since numerous
presidential advisers who are not the Vice President have appeared before Congress
unwillingly. See generally RELYEA & TATELMAN, supra note 11, at 16–17. That has
not been the case, however, with the Vice President, who is after all a constitutional
officer.
639
In other contexts, courts have been similarly disinclined to force the Vice
President’s office to divulge documents. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, 310 F. Supp. 2d 271, 298 n.8 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
412 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(ruling that a task force chaired by the Vice President was not subject to FOIA);
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 55
(D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that the Vice President was not subject to FOIA), vacated,
542 U.S. 367 (2004). FOIA suits brought during the Cheney vice presidency were
successful, however, with respect to securing his visitor logs; those records being
kept by the secret service and not the Vice President’s office. See Citizens for
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 527 F. Supp. 2d 76,
93 (D.D.C. 2007); Wash. Post v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 459 F. Supp. 2d 61
(D.D.C. 2006).
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appears to be linked with and comparable to that of the
President. Moreover, Committee on Judiciary v. Miers left
behind a similar dictum, this time in a case explicitly involving
constitutional privilege. 640 Two other court decisions hinted
much the same. In the absence of any case law squarely on
point, these dicta provide useful guideposts. Since the courts
have indicated that the President and Vice President are of
similar constitutional stature, and since the President holds his
own constitutional privilege, it is all the more likely that the Vice
President does as well.
During Cheney’s tenure, an executive order involving
presidential records also seemed to offer the potential for a
constitutional privilege for the Vice President and former Vice
Presidents. This directive stirred a fair amount of controversy
and such a privilege was never asserted. While the order was not
overturned by either the judiciary or by Congress, the Obama
administration quickly rescinded it upon assuming office.
In its second-term struggles with congressional committees,
the Vice President’s office put forward positions that hinted at a
constitutional vice presidential privilege.
During these
exchanges, one House committee explicitly called into question
whether the Vice President holds such authority. Regarding the
matter in question, ultimately it was the President, not the Vice
President, who invoked a constitutional privilege to protect the
disputed materials. Moreover, Cheney did permit his Chief of
Staff to comply with a House committee subpoena and testify at
an open hearing subject to a host of conditions. On the Senate
side of the ledger, Cheney—under the aegis of the White House
Counsel—appeared to ignore a Senate Judiciary Committee
subpoena for documents.
Despite his unprecedented power and the unprecedented
legal challenges facing him and his staff over access to
information, Cheney never formally invoked a constitutional
privilege. By litigating closely related issues, he did, however, go
further than either Humphrey or Agnew, both of whom made
public references to the Vice President possessing his own
privilege. Taken in sum, the Cheney vice presidency provides
more support for VPP than any other, even if the example of his
vice presidency is not wholly dispositive.
640

558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008).
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M. Conclusion
History reflects that Vice Presidents have increasingly
become the target of investigations, many of which have led to
conflicts over access to information. Several of these disputes,
particularly those in the nineteenth century, entailed actions
taken by Vice Presidents prior to their terms of office: Tompkins,
Calhoun, Colfax, Agnew, and Rockefeller—the latter regarding
his gubernatorial activities. Others involved a sitting Vice
President that did not involve his official duties—Gore. Within
the grouping of investigations involving pre-vice-presidential or
nonofficial duties, Agnew stands out in that he indicated he did
not believe prosecutors had a right to his vice presidential
records. The Rockefeller vice presidency is also noteworthy. In
Rockefeller’s case, efforts were made to force him to testify at a
criminal trial and before New York State investigative
commissions. Those pursuing these efforts against Rockefeller
were mindful of the Vice President raising his own constitutional
privilege, reflecting that such an assertion was hardly
outlandish. Other Vice Presidents have been investigated for
their official acts. These include Wallace, Humphrey, Ford,
Rockefeller—in his role as Commission chairman—Bush, Quayle,
and Cheney. Of these vice presidential episodes, Humphrey and
Cheney both implied that the Vice President may enjoy a
constitutional privilege. While these near assertions of a vice
presidential privilege reflect an appreciation of the growing
stature of the Vice President in American political life, there
appears never to have been a Vice President who has formally
invoked such a doctrine. That said, as the Vice President
continues to play a significant role in national governance, an
assertion of privilege is increasingly likely.
That Vice Presidents have never invoked a privilege, despite
their having had opportunities to have done so, certainly would
seem to go a long way toward disproving the existence of VPP.
As the Supreme Court noted in another separation of powers
context, such “prolonged reticence would be amazing if such
[action] were not understood to be constitutionally proscribed.” 641
That said, none of the examples discussed above involved the
Vice President’s role as presiding officer of the Senate and only
one involved his preparation for succession to the presidency—
641

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 212 (1995).
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Ford. Furthermore, no Vice President has ever appeared before a
congressional committee against his will. Calhoun asked to be
investigated by the House but never appeared in person before
the relevant committee. Colfax raised the issue of his being
subpoenaed by a congressional panel but appeared voluntarily.
Moreover, Colfax’s biographer asserts that the committee in
question concluded it lacked authority to force his attendance.
Humphrey declined to appear in an open session of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Fulbright, the
committee chairman, had to make major concessions before
Humphrey agreed to appear behind closed doors. Vice President
Bush’s aides testified before a congressional committee but not
Bush himself. Vice President Quayle declined to appear in front
of several congressional panels. Similarly, efforts to bring Gore
before a comparable Senate investigative panel were never
vigorously pursued.
Cheney’s disputes over information spilled over into the
courts where, as a practical matter, his position was vindicated
and his confidentiality interests preserved even though the
matters at hand involved presidentially delegated authority. An
executive order and conflicts with several congressional
committees also highlighted questions as to the Vice President’s
authority to withhold information. Even seasoned members of
Congress wound up publicly conceding that they could not compel
Cheney to appear before their committees. 642 At the end of the
day, while an outright assertion of VPP would be without
precedent, such an invocation would not be without pedigree.

642

See supra Part VI.L.8.
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ARGUMENTATION: DOES A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE EXIST
FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT?
VII. POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL
PRIVILEGE (VPP)
The previous discussion of past practice and case law offers a
fair measure of support for the notion of VPP. Nonetheless, there
remain much more compelling theoretical arguments in its favor.
One could imagine some of the positions discussed below being
asserted by a future Vice President were he to invoke such a
privilege. 643
A.

The Vice President as a Constitutional Officer Enjoys an
Implied Privilege

As a constitutional officer, a strong argument can be made
that the Vice President may lawfully claim his own privilege.
The logic should be familiar: Since the President enjoys his own
privilege under Article II, 644 since members of Congress have a
legislative privilege under Article I, 645 and since members of the
federal judiciary possess a privilege under Article III, 646 the Vice
President should also be entitled to his own constitutional
privilege because he, like his colleagues, needs to receive candid
advice from his aides to encourage effective decisionmaking.
Otherwise, the Vice President would be the only one of the
approximately 1,400 constitutional officers not to benefit from
such a privilege when carrying out his duties. His deliberations
would be uniquely lacking in confidentiality, his decisionmaking
uniquely vulnerable to compromise. This singular omission
would appear particularly striking given the exalted status the
Vice President has come to enjoy in American government. 647
The focus of this Article has been on whether the Vice President enjoys a
constitutionally based privilege to withhold certain material from the public, the
Congress, and the courts. As such, it has focused on whether he enjoys an analogue
to the constitutionally based presidential communications privilege and not whether
he enjoys a vice presidential equivalent of the common law deliberative process
privilege.
644
See supra Part II.
645
See supra Part III.
646
See supra Part IV.
647
See, e.g., JODY BAUMGARTNER, THE AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY
RECONSIDERED ix (2006); Albert, supra note 315.
643
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To the extent the Vice President is carrying out his own
constitutional responsibilities, his deliberations would be cloaked
in privilege, and he could prevent certain conversations and
documents from facing outside scrutiny. The scope would no
doubt be narrow since the Vice President has no meaningful 648
constitutional duties other than presiding over the Senate,
breaking tie votes, 649 preparing for and helping to make
determinations about presidential inability, and preparing for
succession. 650 His bifurcated privilege, involving both legislative
and executive branch activities, would thus reflect that the “VicePresiden[t’s] . . . prestige [is] derived from two entirely different
sources.” 651
1.

President of the Senate

a.

The Vice President Has His Own Generalized Legislative
Privilege as a Constitutional Officer Presiding over the Senate

In exercising his constitutional duties in the Senate, the Vice
President is, as a strictly legal matter, independent from the
President. 652 Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution provides that
648
As noted earlier, the Vice President’s role in counting electors has come to be
essentially a ministerial duty. See supra text accompanying note 320.
649
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
650
See id. amend. XXV, §§ 3–4.
651
Cf. 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 229; LIGHT, supra note 306, at 7 (“In theory,
the Vice-President’s position as the only constitutional officer with both legislative
and executive roots could be a source of power.”).
652
See, e.g., Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Kenneth A. Lazarus, Assoc. Counsel to the
President, Regarding the Applicability of 3 C.F.R. Part 100 to the President and Vice
President 3 (Dec. 16, 1974) (“With regard to the Vice President there is even a
constitutional question whether the President can direct him to abide by prescribed
standards of conduct. The Vice Presidential Office is an independent constitutional
office, and the Vice President is independently elected. Just as the President cannot
remove the Vice President, it would seem he may not dictate his standards of
conduct.”); LOUIS CLINTON HATCH & EARL L. SHOUP, A HISTORY OF THE VICEPRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (Earl L. Shoup ed., Greenwood Press 1970)
(1934)) (“there is attached to the Vice-Presidency another office by nature wholly
independent, that of President of the Senate”); cf. CURRIE, supra note 140, at 240 n.9
(“The nation has chosen Jefferson [to be Vice President], and commanded him to a
certain station. The President, therefore, has no right to command him to another or
to take him off from that.” (quoting President John Adams)); TASK FORCE, supra
note 318, at 64 (“The vice president . . . is constitutionally independent. . . . [T]he
president cannot command the vice president to do or not do anything, nor can the
president fire the vice president.”); HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 328 (quoting Vice
President James Sherman’s refusal to assist President Taft in his legislative efforts:
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the “Vice President of the United States shall be President of the
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.” 653
This is a grant of power to the Vice President. 654 That the Vice
President’s role as President of the Senate appears in Article I
would seem to reflect that in this capacity, he acts as a

“You will have to act on your own account. I am to be Vice President and acting as a
messenger boy is not part of the duties as Vice President.”); JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM
FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 220 (1965) (contending
that the “Vice President, not being technically in the Executive branch of
government, was not subject to presidential orders” (quoting President
Eisenhower)); LIGHT, supra note 306, at 119 (“the President cannot compel activity”
out of the Vice President); SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1776–1993, at 420 (1994) (“[T]he vice
president is a constitutionally independent official whom the president cannot
command or remove, at least not in the usual sense . . . .”); Thomas E. Cronin,
Rethinking the Vice-Presidency, in RETHINKING THE PRESIDENCY 324, 324 (Thomas
E. Cronin ed., 1982) (“[T]echnically a vice-president is neither a part of the executive
branch nor subject to the direction of the president.”); ALLAN P. SINDLER, UNCHOSEN
PRESIDENTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT AND OTHER FRUSTRATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION 29 (1976) (“The formal position of the vice-president, who technically is
neither a part of the executive branch nor subject to the direction of the president,
underscores the anomaly of that office.”); Onslow to Patrick Henry, in REPORTS AND
PUBLIC LETTERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 322, 336 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1855)
(quoting Vice President Calhoun discussing the possibility of “the Vice-President [as
presiding officer] choos[ing] to pursue a course independent of the will of the
Executive”); Tench Coxe, An American Citizen I, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Phila.),
Sept. 26, 1787, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST,
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER
RATIFICATION 20, 23 (1993) (“[O]ur vice-president, who is chosen by the people
through the electors and the senate, is not at all dependent on the president, but may
exercise equal powers on some occasions.”). As a practical matter, of course, the
modern Vice President is politically reliant on the President for the duties he is
assigned. Until President Roosevelt broke the tradition in 1940, vice presidential
candidates were generally selected by party conventions and not by presidential
candidates. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 178–79. As presidential candidates
have come to select vice presidential candidates largely by themselves, Vice
Presidents have become more beholden politically to the President. See id. at 179. In
large part because of this reason, in the modern era there have been fewer public
breaks between Presidents and Vice Presidents.
653
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
654
See J. Michael Medina, The American Vice-Presidency: Toward a More
Utilized Institution, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 77, 94 (1990) (“The one constitutional
power accorded the Vice-President was and is the tie-breaking vote.”); cf. Danforth v.
Cason, 507 S.W.2d 405, 411–13 (Mo. 1974) (“The position of the lieutenant governor
[of Missouri] is in many ways similar to that of the vice president of the United
States. . . . [T]he designation of the lieutenant governor as president of the
senate . . . is a . . . grant of authority . . . .”).
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participant in the legislative branch and not the executive
branch 655 and that in this regard he is his own man.
Vice presidential independence manifested itself early on. In
1794, Vice President Adams refused a request by President
Washington to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain regarding
commercial affairs. Adams declined because he asserted that
under the Constitution he was duty bound to serve as President
of the Senate. 656 Jefferson, as Vice President elect, rebuffed a
similar overture by President elect Adams in 1797, this time over
a potential diplomatic mission to France. 657 Jefferson argued
that the proposed mission was beyond the scope of his
constitutional responsibilities. 658
These rebuffs of the President occurred in part because
under the original text of the Constitution there was little
indication that the Vice President should comply with the
President’s wishes even as a political matter. 659 Prior to the
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, the Vice President was
simply the runner-up to the President in electoral votes. This led
to Adams serving as President with his opponent in the 1796
presidential race, Jefferson, holding office as Vice President.
Jefferson, therefore, was in no way beholden to Adams for his
position, either legally or politically. By having electors vote
separately for President and Vice President, 660 thus permitting
655
See supra note 323; cf. Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310 (Wash. 2009) (“While
serving as the presiding officer of the senate, the lieutenant governor is an officer of
the legislative branch.”). The question could be raised: when the President exercises
his veto power under Article I, why would he not be considered part of the legislative
branch as well? Cf. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193–94 (5th Cir.
1981) (concluding that a mayor exercising veto power is entitled to legislative
immunity). The major difference is that the Vice President is explicitly placed within
the legislative branch as President of the Senate. While reviewing bills for approval,
the President is exercising legislative power under Article I but is not part of the
legislative branch. This is like the Senate’s role in considering treaties and
appointments. The Senate is exercising executive power under Article II, but the
upper chamber is not part of the executive branch while doing so. The Vice
President, while presiding over the Senate or breaking ties, is both exercising
legislative power and is in the legislative branch while taking such action. This
distinction is reflected by the Vice President’s ability to participate in debate and
vote on measures that are not presented to the President. See infra note 673.
656
See WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 24.
657
See id.
658
See, e.g., DONALD YOUNG, AMERICAN ROULETTE: THE HISTORY AND DILEMMA
OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY 12 (1966).
659
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 7.
660
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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party tickets to get elected instead of two potentially opposing
candidates, the Twelfth Amendment essentially acknowledged
the existence of political parties. 661 The amendment, however,
changed nothing as far as the Vice President’s legal
independence from the President.
This independence is illustrated by the President’s inability
to remove the Vice President from office. 662 This is unlike
Cabinet-level officials, who serve at the pleasure of the chief
executive. If they defy the President, they face the specter of
removal from office. 663 The authority to remove officials is, of
course, pivotal in the President’s responsibility over the executive
branch. It is self evident that the basis for the independence of
independent agencies is that limitations can be placed on
presidential removal of the heads of these entities. 664
Underscoring the Vice President’s status as an independent
constitutional actor is that, until well into the twentieth century,
officeholders largely viewed themselves as part of the legislative
branch, 665 rather than the executive branch. As has been
outlined by the Senate Historical Office, the vice presidency
“[d]uring the nineteenth century . . . remained essentially a

See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 6–7.
See, e.g., Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Amar, supra
note 7 (“[T]he Constitution’s text does not give the president the power to remove a
vice president . . . .”); Clinton Rossiter, The Reform of the Vice–Presidency, 63 POL.
SCI. Q. 383, 401 (1948) (“For four years, at least, the Vice–President is as
irremovable as the Chief Justice . . . .”). He may be removed only through the
impeachment process, which takes place outside of the executive branch.
663
See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); see also Rossiter, supra
note 663 (contrasting a Cabinet office with the vice presidency, which is “in no way
subject to . . . presidential supervision and dominance which the power of removal
logically engenders”).
664
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 739 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“In upholding the congressional limitations on the President’s power of removal [in
Humphrey’s Executor], the Court stressed the independence of the [Federal Trade]
Commission from the President.”); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 89–95 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
665
See, e.g., RELYEA, supra note 307, at 1 (following adoption of the Constitution
“the Vice President soon came to be regarded as a legislative branch official”);
FEERICK, supra note 18, at 32 (“Vice Presidents in the nineteenth century rarely
were given any executive responsibilities.”); Manu Raju, Quiet End to Cheney’s
Senate Era, THE HILL, Nov. 19, 2008, http://thehill.com/homenews/news/17119quiet-end-to-cheneys-senate-era (quoting Senate historian Don Ritchie who noted
that in the nineteenth century “99 percent” of a Vice President’s work involved his
presiding over the Senate); WAUGH, supra note 296, at 151 (writing in 1956 that “the
Vice President is only a potential executive officer”).
661
662
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legislative position.” 666 As Vice President, Adams wrote in 1790
that his position was “totally detached from the executive
authority and confined to the legislative.” 667 With respect to the
foreign policy charted by the Washington administration, Adams
asserted he had “no constitutional vote.” 668 The second Vice
President concurred. Jefferson wrote that while Vice President
he viewed the “office as constitutionally confined to legislative
functions, and that [he] could not take any part whatever in
This
executive consultations, even were it proposed.” 669
interpretation of the Vice President as a participant in the
legislative branch almost certainly contributed to the officeholder
being largely excluded from regular attendance at Cabinet
proceedings until the third decade of the twentieth century. 670
Indeed, even midway through the twentieth century Vice

HATFIELD, supra note 318, at xix.
Id. at 7.
668
Id. at 10.
669
Charles O. Paullin, The Vice-President and the Cabinet, 29 AM. HIST. REV.
496, 497 (1924) (citation omitted).
670
Not until Coolidge did Vice Presidents attend Cabinet sessions as a matter of
course, see, e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 352, and even afterward his successor
balked at doing so. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 136. In 1791,
Washington undertook a tour of the southern states. He instructed his cabinet that
while he was away they should consult with Adams if any major developments
occurred. In this respect, Adams may have been the only Vice President to attend
such meetings before Marshall in the late 1910s. See H. B. Learned, Some Aspects of
the Vice-Presidency, 7 POL. SCI. REV. 162, 174–75 (1913) (“I can discover no evidence
that reveals a single instance of the vice-president in attendance at cabinet
sessions . . . . It is possible that instances of admitting the vice-president on
occasions to a gathering of the cabinet may have occurred, and may some day appear
in stray records. But it is certain that from 1789 to 1912 no custom in the matter has
been established.”); see also AUGUSTUS B. WOODWARD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1825) (“Perhaps [the Vice President’s] constitutional function of
being prolocutor of the Senate was deemed incompatible with his being a member of
the Cabinet. His attendance would frequently be inconvenient, and his possessing a
voice in the deliberations of the Senate might render it indelicate. That any
dissatisfaction arose from this course being pursued, either at the time of its
adoption, or subsequently, has never been manifested.”); Memorandum from
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel on the
Constitutionality of the Vice President’s Service as Chairman of the Nat’l
Aeronautics & Space Council to the Vice President 1–2 (Apr. 18, 1961), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/041861.pdf. As late as 1916, one lawmaker
thought a constitutional amendment necessary for the Vice President to participate
in such gatherings. See Lucius Wilmerding, The Vice Presidency, 68 POL. SCI. Q. 17,
33 (1953).
666
667
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President Alben Barkley viewed himself as a legislative
official. 671
History confirms that, when the Vice President is acting in
his legislative branch capacity, the President does not have the
legal authority to instruct him how to do his job. For instance,
Presidents cannot order Vice Presidents to cast their vote a
certain way. 672 After all, in this capacity, Vice Presidents are
acting as part of the legislative branch, not the executive
branch. 673 For example, Vice President Aaron Burr’s deciding
vote kept the Jefferson-led Republicans from rescinding the
Judiciary Act of 1801. 674 Vice President George Clinton broke a
tie that stymied reauthorization of the U.S. National Bank, a
position distinctly at odds with the views of President James
Madison. 675 Vice President Calhoun voted against legislation
President John Quincy Adams supported to build a canal
between the Illinois River and Lake Michigan. 676 Calhoun also
voted against a tariff bill the Adams administration favored. 677
See, e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 423, 427.
See, e.g., Cronin, supra note 652, at 329 (contending that “participation by
the Vice-President in Senate voting [may be], either in support of his own views or
the President’s” (quoting James F. Byrnes, former Supreme Court Justice and
Senator) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
673
This is further reflected in that the Vice President’s role in breaking tie votes
appears to extend to consideration of constitutional amendments. See HATFIELD,
supra note 318, at 391; WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 40–41; cf. Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 446–47 (1939). This is unlike the role of the President, who plays no
formal role in the adoption of constitutional amendments. See Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 382 (1798); see also Henry Barrett Learned, Casting Votes of the
Vice-Presidents, 1789–1915, 20 AM. HIST. REV. 571, 575–76 (1915); cf. 47 CONG. REC.
1949–59 (1911). Similarly, the Vice President can vote on matters involving internal
Senate organization that are also not presented to the President for his
consideration. See Learned, supra, at 572 (discussing Vice President Calhoun’s and
Vice President Fillmore’s votes to confirm Senate officers); id. at 572–73 (noting Vice
President Wheeler’s vote related to whether an individual could be seated as a
Senator); infra notes 872–73 and accompanying text (noting Vice President Arthur’s
and Vice President Cheney’s votes to decide which party would be in the Senate
majority).
674
See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 37–38; YOUNG, supra note 658, at 14. It
should be remembered that, with the exception of Burr’s episode regarding the
Judiciary Act, all of the examples discussed in this segment entail actions following
the Twelfth Amendment, which tied the Vice President’s political fortunes more
closely to those of the President.
675
See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 57; IRVING G. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF THE
VICE PRESIDENCY 34 (1956).
676
See MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND
CALHOUN 157 (1987).
677
See id. at 153–54 (labeling Calhoun’s action as “an anti-administration vote”).
671
672

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010)

574

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:423

As Andrew Jackson’s Vice President, Calhoun 678 voted against
one of the President’s most highly prized nominees, Martin Van
Buren, to be minister to Great Britain. 679 Vice President Millard
Fillmore informed President Zachary Taylor that he would be
supportive of the Compromise of 1850 if he had to break a tie;
this was counter to the President’s stance. 680 President Taylor
died before Fillmore could take such action.
Vice Presidents can also use their legislative perch as
presiding officer to undercut presidential priorities in ways other
than through tie breaking votes. Jefferson worked to frustrate
the Adams administration in a number of areas. 681 As John
Quincy Adams’s Vice President, Calhoun worked to defeat U.S.
participation in the Panama Congress. 682 He also purposely
placed anti-administration Senators on a key committee. 683
Chester Arthur publicly opposed President James Garfield’s
nominee for Secretary of the Treasury. 684 In 1891, Levi Morton
proved unhelpful to President Benjamin Harrison during
While debating
consideration of civil rights legislation. 685
whether to rescind the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in 1893,
Adlai Stevenson likewise did no favors for President Grover
Cleveland. 686 Charles Fairbanks worked to scuttle President
Theodore Roosevelt’s Square Deal legislative agenda in the
James Sherman was brazenly insubordinate to
Senate. 687
President William Howard Taft about a request the President
made of him. 688 Charles Dawes undercut President Calvin

Calhoun is one of only two men to have served as Vice President for two
different Presidents. The other is George Clinton, who served under both Presidents
Jefferson and Madison.
679
See, e.g., WAUGH, supra note 296, at 66.
680
See HATCH & SHOUP, supra note 652, at 35.
681
See, e.g., SWANSTROM, supra note 144, at 256–57.
682
See PETERSON, supra note 676, at 138–39.
683
See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 89; see also PETERSON, supra note 676, at
136. In addition, Calhoun stymied President Jackson’s nomination of Henry Baldwin
to be Secretary of the Treasury. See ABRAHAM, supra note 273, at 79. The Vice
President tried to do the same with respect to his appointment to serve on the
Supreme Court but ultimately fell short. See id.
684
See, e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 254.
685
See id. at 273.
686
See id. at 281–82.
687
See DORMAN, supra note 312, at 96; HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 320.
688
See e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 325.
678
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Coolidge’s Senate strategy on a pivotal farm bill 689 and on
banking legislation. 690 John Nance Garner did much the same
during the late 1930s with respect to New Deal policies
advocated by President Franklin Roosevelt. 691
Even today—though the office is “a predominantly executive
post” 692—Vice Presidents at times still stake out public positions
independent from the President based on their legislative role.
For instance, Vice President Cheney broke with the Bush
administration on litigation involving the Second Amendment. 693
Taking an approach different from that of the Bush Justice
Department, Cheney signed an amicus curiae brief submitted to
the Supreme Court by members of Congress. 694 He did so solely
in his capacity as “President of the United States Senate.” 695
Similarly, Cheney staked out his own position on changing
Senate rules to end the filibustering of judicial nominees, the socalled “nuclear option.” While President Bush had indicated he
would not get involved in internal Senate matters, Cheney stated
publicly that in his capacity as President of the Senate he would
interpret Senate rules to prohibit such filibustering. 696 When
Bush’s Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, was asked whether Cheney’s
views reflected the Bush administration’s policy in this regard,

689
See id. at 359, 366; Irving G. Williams, Senators, Rules, and Vice-Presidents,
in 5 THOUGHT PATTERNS 21, 26 (Arpad F. Kovacs ed., 1957).
690
See James R. Garner, Office of the Vice President of the United States 185–
86 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa) (June 1934) (on file with the
St. John’s Law Review).
691
See JAMES T. PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW
DEAL 135–37, 167–68, 231–32, 292, 295, 331 (1967).
692
HATFIELD, supra note 318, at xxi.
693
See Robert Barnes, Cheney Joins Congress in Opposing D.C. Gun Ban, WASH.
POST, Feb. 9, 2008, at A1 (stating that Cheney’s position “is at odds with the one put
forward by the administration”).
694
See id.
695
See Brief for Amici Curiae, 55 Members of United States Senate, the
President of the United States Senate and 250 Members of United States House of
Representatives in Support of Respondent, at App. 1a, District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07–290). Underscoring his legislative role,
Cheney not only presided over the Senate from time to time but also frequently
attended Senate Republican lunch meetings. See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note
338, at 192.
696
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Cheney Enters Filibuster Fight, Backing Change in
Senate Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at A1.
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he responded that Cheney was speaking in his capacity “as the
president of the Senate” and not on behalf of the President. 697
These examples all reflect the constitutional independence
enjoyed by the Vice President while serving in the Senate. Since
the Vice President is not answerable to the President as he
presides over the upper chamber—while carrying out his duties
in the chair the Vice President is by definition not acting as part
of the executive branch—he could not turn to the President to
exercise executive privilege on his behalf. 698 In his capacity as
Senate President, and to conform with the structural imperatives
of the Constitution providing each constitutional officer a
privilege when executing his or her enumerated duties, the Vice
President would need to invoke an Article I privilege: either the
generalized legislative privilege 699 or the Speech or Debate
privilege. 700
The question then is, what are the Vice President’s
legislative duties, the preparation and execution of which would
be shielded by the generalized legislative privilege or the Speech
or Debate privilege? In addition to voting, Vice Presidents carry
out a few other modest legislative responsibilities depending on
the state of Senate rules and practice. On occasion they have
spoken from the Chair. Riddick’s Senate Procedure indicates
that while the “Vice President should not participate in
debate[,] . . . on different occasions he has made long statements

Transcript of Meet the Press, May 1, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com
/id/7698687/print/1/displaymode/1098/. In another assertion of vice presidential
independence, Cheney openly broke with President Bush on the issue of gay rights.
See, e.g., Cheney at Odds with Bush on Gay Marriage, Aug. 25, 2004, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5817720/. In August 2004, the Vice President stated
that he did not agree with President Bush’s view about the need for a constitutional
amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage. See id. “[M]y own preference,” Cheney
indicated, “is as I’ve stated, but the president makes policy for the administration.
He’s made it clear that he does, in fact, support a constitutional amendment on this
issue.” See id. For more on vice presidential independence, see Garner, supra note
689, at 181 (the Vice President is “not unnaturally thrown into a sort of antagonism
with the Administration—an antagonism sure to be stimulated by the
coterie . . . disappointed in efforts to secure favor with the President” (quoting 2
JAMES BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 57 (1886)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
698
The Vice President, of course, cannot claim executive privilege on his own.
See supra Part II.
699
See supra Part III.B.
700
See supra Part III.A.
697
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from the chair.” 701 To do so today, the Vice President needs the
unanimous consent of the Senate. 702 In the 1790s, Vice President
Adams, however, was known to participate in debate with some
frequency. 703 At the end of his term, Vice President Burr gave
one of the most memorable addresses in the history of the
Senate. 704
As presiding officer, the Vice President must also ensure
that regular order and decorum are observed both on the floor
and in the Senate gallery, may make parliamentary rulings not
involving constitutional matters, and may recognize individual
members so they can address the Senate. 705 In addition, from
time to time Vice Presidents have exercised other powers under
Senate rules. Calhoun, for example, took full advantage of
Senate rules at the time to make committee assignments.706
Finally, from the outset, Vice Presidents have lobbied
lawmakers. 707
Thus, it seems clear that the Vice President qua presiding
officer is very much his own man from a constitutional
standpoint, and this is because in such a capacity the Vice
701
RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. NO.
101-28, at 1391 (1992) [hereinafter RIDDICK’S].
702
See id. at 1391–92.
703
See, e.g., DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 401–02, 407 (2001).
704
See ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE, 1789–1989, ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 48 (Mary Sharon Hall ed., 1988).
705
See RIDDICK’S, supra note 701, at 1025. The power to recognize speakers
carries with it some authority as it did when Vice President Rockefeller, in
attempting to defeat a filibuster, refused to recognize opponents of his effort. See,
e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 510–11. Before the rise of modern Senate party
leadership and the expansion of the office’s executive branch role, the Vice President
appears to have had even more authority in this vein. As Coolidge reflected on his
role as presiding officer: “the President of the Senate can and does exercise a good
deal of influence over its deliberations. The Constitution gives him the power to
preside, which is the power to recognize whom he will. That often means that he
decides what business is to be taken up and who is to have the floor for debate at
any specific time.” See CALVIN COOLIDGE, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CALVIN
COOLIDGE 162 (3d ed. 1984) (1929).
706
See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 87–89; Gerald Gamm & Steven S. Smith,
Last Among Equals: The Senate’s Presiding Officer, in ESTEEMED COLLEAGUES:
CIVILITY AND DELIBERATION IN THE U.S. SENATE 105, 112–13 (Burdett A. Loomis
ed., 2000) (noting that the presiding officer enjoyed the power to make committee
assignments from 1823 to 1825, 1829 to 1832, and 1837 to 1844).
707
See HATCH & SHOUP, supra note 652, 101–02; see also HATFIELD, supra note
318, at 389 (discussing how Vice President Garner would reach out to members on
the floor). For a discussion of vice presidential lobbying, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note
295, at 177–84.
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President is acting as a part of the legislative branch. In
carrying out his own independent legislative functions—which,
as discussed above, involve casting tie breaking votes, ruling on
parliamentary procedure, recognizing Senators to speak, and
occasionally speaking himself—the Vice President is in no way
interfering with the President’s Article II authority to administer
the executive branch. Nor would the Vice President be exercising
a legislative privilege in a manner inconsistent with Senate
practice if he acted on his own since that privilege may be
asserted by individual members of the body. 708
The Vice President’s consultations with aides on
parliamentary procedure and tactics would therefore have the
benefit of privilege. The same could be said to the extent he is
consulting with subordinates on any remarks he may make from
the chair or how to vote when the Senate is deadlocked. As is the
case with lawmakers, discussions of this kind are sensitive,
requiring candid exchanges between the Vice President and his
staff. Perhaps only slightly less compelling for purposes of
privilege would be any conversations and documents exchanged
between the Vice President and his aides on legislative strategy,
such as how to lobby Senators. These materials could be
privileged since they involve the Vice President in his legislative
role. 709 In this setting, the Vice President—at least in the
modern era—would tend to be fulfilling the President’s
legislative agenda, but that is not constitutionally prescribed. As
has been discussed earlier, Vice Presidents have actively worked
against presidential legislative agendas in the past, and as a
constitutional matter, are independent in this sphere.
Therefore, as a matter of constitutional structure and
symmetry, to the extent the Vice President is carrying out his
own independent constitutional duty to preside over the Senate
and break ties, he would seem likely to enjoy the generalized
legislative privilege based on structure and past practice. Of
course, given the limited amount of time the modern Vice

See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
Since the Vice President plays no constitutional role with respect to the
House, it is less certain if his internal communications regarding legislative strategy
involving the House of Representatives would be privileged. In such an instance, he
may be acting more as an agent of the President than a constitutional officer of the
Senate. Interestingly, Cheney maintained an office on the House side of the Capitol
as well as the traditional one on the Senate side.
708
709
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President spends presiding over the Senate, 710 such a privilege
would no doubt shield only a minor portion of the Vice
President’s conversations and only a small amount of the
material prepared for his review. But that does not mean the
privilege would not exist.
b.

The Vice President and the Speech or Debate Clause

Much as the Vice President qua presiding officer of the
Senate would seem to have recourse to the generalized legislative
privilege during the execution of his Senate responsibilities, so
too would it appear that the Vice President may enjoy similar
protection of his internal deliberations under the Speech or
Debate Clause of the Constitution. 711
To the extent the Vice President is fulfilling his duties under
Article I to preside over the Senate and break ties, he would be
considered part of the legislative branch 712 and fall within the
ambit of the Speech or Debate Clause. Accordingly, he could
exercise a privilege akin to that outlined in Rayburn. OLC has in
fact alluded to the Vice President benefitting from protection
under the Speech or Debate Clause. OLC has written that
“[w]ith respect to [the Vice President’s] responsibility as tie
breaker [in the Senate] his immunity from criminal prosecution
should be analogized to that of Members of Congress under
710
One has to go back to Barkley to find a Vice President devoting a significant
portion of his work day to his Senate duties. On average, the Kentuckian sat in the
chair about half of the time. See MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND
PRACTICE 13 (2d ed. 2004). Nixon estimated that he spent only five to ten percent of
his time presiding over the Senate. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 142.
Agnew devoted about the same amount of time to his legislative duties. See id. Vice
President Humphrey estimated that he dedicated approximately one third of his
schedule to Senate activities. See Paul T. David, The Vice Presidency: Its
Institutional Evolution and Contemporary Status, 29 J. POL. 721, 744 n.105 (1967).
Walter Mondale spent only eighteen hours in the chair during his initial twelve
months as Vice President. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 142.
711
Cf. Myers, supra note 45, at 936–40 (conceding that the Speech or Debate
Clause could provide the Vice President with some degree of civil immunity); Akhil
Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV.
1, 17 n.40 (1998).
712
See, e.g., Reis Letter, supra note 323, at 3 (“[The Vice President] is . . . made
an officer of the Senate and given a right to vote in certain circumstances. It would
reasonably follow that he is ‘in the legislative branch.’ . . . . [In fact], it seems
difficult to conceive that an officer whose only constitutional function, when the
President is capable of exercising the Executive power, is to preside over the Senate
and to vote . . . is not ‘in the legislative branch.”); cf. supra note 323 and
accompanying text.
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Article I, section 6, clause 1 of the Constitution.” 713 Such a
privilege, of course, would not extend beyond the confines of
legislative activity. 714
While largely convincing, such an argument is admittedly
not airtight. There are three concerns with the Vice President
being shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause that are less
apparent than with his invoking the generalized legislative
privilege, which is based on structure and past practice and not,
strictly speaking, constitutional text. First, Article I, Section 6
applies to “Senators and Representatives.” 715 It is by no means
assured that the Vice President would be considered a “Senator”
for purposes of this clause. 716 He is not elected from and does not
represent a state and serves on no committee. He cannot speak
on the floor without the Senate’s permission. Most significantly
perhaps, he cannot introduce legislation or amendments and
cannot vote in most circumstances. Finally, OLC has concluded
that he is not a lawmaker, observing that he is subject to
impeachment, as are other executive branch officials. 717 As such,
Dixon Memo, supra note 434, at 36; cf. Amar, supra note 711 (“[T]he Vice
President must obviously be immune from a libel suit for things he says in the
Senate, even though he is not, strictly speaking, a Senator covered by the words of
the Article I speech clause . . . .”).
714
The Speech or Debate Clause is only interpreted to include duties that relate
to legislative functions. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 126–36
(1979) (concluding that Speech or Debate Clause protection does not extend to press
releases and newsletters); see also Myers, supra note 45, at 938 n.315.
715
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. An argument could be made that if the Incompability
Clause does not apply to the Vice President because he is not a member of Congress,
cf. supra note 323, then why should he be treated as a member for legislative
privilege purposes? There are three reasons. First, the courts have long construed
the Speech or Debate Clause broadly, see infra notes 718–19 and accompanying text,
while they have let stand the political branches’ narrow interpretation of the
Incompatibility Clause. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974). Second, it reflects explicit text, which restricts only “Members” of
Congress from serving in the executive branch and which expressly provides that
the Vice President is President of the Senate. Finally, even were the Speech or
Debate Clause to be viewed as not providing support for VPP, the generalized
legislative privilege would still do so.
716
But cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 31 (“[T]he Vice President is, insofar as
he is able, a ‘Senator’ for his party.”); Garvey, supra note 323, at 582–83 (“It would
be logically inconsistent not to consider an individual with the authority to vote in a
legislative body a ‘member’ of that body . . . . Confined to a strictly textual analysis,
the Constitution clearly perceives the Vice President as a legislative officer.”).
717
See, e.g., Katzenbach Memo, supra note 318, at 10–11 (“Despite his position
as President of the Senate, he is certainly not one of its members. Nor can he be
convincingly described as a third member of the Legislative Branch alongside the
two Houses of Congress. His office was created by Article II of the Constitution
713
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the Vice President may not be expelled from the chamber like a
Senator.
However, the Court has not interpreted those covered by the
Speech or Debate Clause narrowly. The Supreme Court in
Gravel v. United States reasoned that “[i]t is true that the Clause
itself mentions only ‘Senators and Representatives,’ but prior
cases have plainly not taken a literalistic approach in applying
As a general matter, the courts have
the privilege.” 718
interpreted the Speech or Debate Clause to include congressional
staff. Staff members obviously are not constitutional officers.
They are not elected, they do not vote, they do not speak on the
floor, they do not preside over the body—as does the Vice
President—yet the Supreme Court in Gravel concluded they are
shielded by privilege as their members’ alter ego. 719 Since staff
members are afforded protection under the Speech or Debate
Clause—even if their privilege is derivative from the members
they serve—it would seem the Vice President as the
constitutional President of the Senate would enjoy no less a
privilege.
Moreover, from a textual standpoint, the use of the term “of”
in the President of the Senate Clause makes clear that the Vice
President is considered part of the Senate, even if he is not a

dealing with the Executive Branch, and section 4 of that Article makes him, just as
the President, subject to impeachment by the Legislative Branch.”).
718
408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 823
(1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“It is hardly an overstatement to say that [when
applying the Speech or Debate Clause to congressional aides] we thus avoided a
‘literalistic approach’ . . . and instead looked to the structure of the Constitution and
the evolution of the function of the Legislative Branch.”); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617
(“The Clause . . . speaks only of ‘Speech or Debate,’ but the Court’s consistent
approach has been that to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause to
words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably narrow view.”); id. at 624 (“Prior
cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause ‘broadly to effectuate its
purposes’ . . . .” (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966)); United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 509 (1972) (concluding that past precedent ensured
that “the Clause is to be read broadly to include anything ‘generally done in a
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it’ ”
(quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881)); United States v. Johnson, 383
U.S. 169, 180 (1966) (“Kilbourn and Tenney indicate that the legislative privilege
will be read broadly to effectuate its purposes . . . .”).
719
See 408 U.S. at 618 (“[T]he Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a
Member, but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a
protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself.”).
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Senator himself. 720 Thus, while the Vice President is not a
Senator, constitutional text and case law would seem to favor the
Vice President having a measure of protection under the Speech
or Debate Clause. The Vice President has also been treated as
part of the legislative branch in a number of statutory
It would be consistent with past legislative
schemes. 721
treatment of the Vice President for him to be shielded by the
Speech or Debate Clause.
720
In this context, the term “of” is typically interpreted to relate to an object that
is part of a larger entity. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
860 (11th ed. 2007) (defining “of” as “a function word to indicate the component
material, parts, or elements or the contents . . . used as a function word to indicate
belonging or a possessive relationship” (emphasis added)); RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1342 (2d ed. 1987) (“to indicate material,
component parts, substance, or contents . . . possession, connection, or association”).
Use of the term “of” in other areas of the Constitution clearly reflects the view that
the Vice President should be considered part of the Senate and therefore part of the
legislative branch. Cf. Amar, supra note 15, at 791–92 (discussing use of the
Constitution as a dictionary). He is “Vice President of the United States [and] shall
be President of the Senate.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. There is little doubt that
the first “of” in the clause denotes that the Vice President must be part of, and not
separate from, the United States. This is underscored by the constitutional
requirement that the President, and thus the Vice President, must have been born
in the United States and therefore be “of” the United States. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5
(“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the
time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of
President.”); id. amend. XII (“no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of
President shall be eligible to that of Vice President”).
Moreover, following Article I’s provision that the “Vice President of the United
States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be
equally divided,” the Constitution states that the “Senate shall chuse their other
Officers.” See id. § 3, cls. 4–5. The use of the term “other” is instructive. It clearly
demonstrates that the Vice President as the President of the Senate is himself a
Senate officer. It is difficult to argue that the Vice President is a Senate officer but is
not part of the Senate. After all, this constitutional language mimics that governing
the House. That language provides that the “House of Representatives shall chuse
their Speaker and other Officers.” Id. § 2, cl. 5.
On the other hand, it could be argued Article I provides that the “Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,” Id. art. I, § 3,
cl. 1, and that such a formulation leaves no room for the Vice President. However,
the context of that provision almost assuredly implies actual membership in the
body and not the issue of broader affiliation with the chamber. Senate staff members
who number in the thousands are certainly “of” the Senate even if they are not
senators. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616–18.
721
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006) (“For purposes of this title, ‘Member of
Congress’ means the Vice President, a member of the Senate or the House of
Representatives.”); An Act Making Appropriations for the Legislative Branch for the
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2010, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 111-68,
tit. I, 123 Stat. 2023, 2023–24 (2009) (providing funds for vice presidential expense
allowances and staff salaries); see also Cheney GAO Brief, supra note 551, at 16–17.
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Further, the Supreme Court in its jurisprudence involving
immunity from civil liability for official actions has concluded
that non-lawmakers still enjoy legislative immunity when they
are carrying out legislative functions. As noted above, immunity
from civil liability is closely linked to questions of constitutional
privilege as to both rationale and effect. 722 Both are key pillars in
the broad constitutional emphasis placed on encouraging
effective constitutional decisionmaking. The two concepts are
also tied in that both involve exceptions to “ordinary legal
Moreover, the Supreme Court itself utilized
processes.” 723
reasoning from its civil immunity cases when deciding Cheney v.
U.S. District Court, which of course involved matters related
closely to privilege. 724
In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 725 the
U.S. Supreme Court followed reasoning that provides additional
support for the Vice President possessing a Speech or Debate
privilege. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, when
carrying out legislative activities, the Virginia Supreme Court
should be granted legislative immunity. 726 The Vice President
could make a convincing parallel argument that, if the
judiciary—as a separate branch of state government—is entitled
to legislative immunity when acting legislatively, the Vice
President at the federal level should have the same treatment
The Vice
when he is acting in a legislative capacity. 727
President’s case would actually be on much firmer ground than
the state court’s in Consumers Union since, unlike the court, the
Vice President in fact is part of the legislative branch, at least
some of the time. 728
The Supreme Court has also concluded in other contexts that
certain actions are legislative by their very nature and are
See supra Part I.B.
See Amar, supra note 7, at 192; see also supra Part I.
724
542 U.S. 367, 385–86, 388 (2004). The Court cited both Clinton v. Jones and
Nixon v. Fitzgerald in arriving at its conclusion. See id.; see also Myers, supra note
45, at 910–12 & 912 n.104.
725
446 U.S. 719 (1980).
726
See id. at 731.
727
The author would like to thank a Senate staff colleague for directing him to
this case. See also Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391, 406 (1979) (concluding that “to the extent [a regional commission
is] . . . acting in a capacity comparable to that of members of a state legislature, they
are entitled to absolute immunity”).
728
See discussion supra note 323.
722
723
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therefore entitled to the absolute immunity that accompanies
such action. The Court in Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 729 which
centered around the question of immunity for local officials
involved in legislative actions, concluded that “acts of
voting . . . [are] quintessentially legislative.” 730 The Court was
unconcerned about which branch of government the local official
belonged to:
“Petitioner[’s] . . . signing into law an
ordinance . . . [is] formally legislative, even though he [is] . . . an
executive official. We have recognized that officials outside the
legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they
perform legislative functions.”731 The Court concluded that
“[w]hether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act.” 732
Since officials altogether outside of the legislative branch are
entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative
acts, 733 it would seem all but certain that the Vice President
would enjoy legislative immunity in his capacity as President of
the Senate 734 because he is performing legislative acts within the
legislative branch. Since the Vice President would seem to have
legislative immunity when acting in a lawmaking capacity, it
would stand to reason that he would also have legislative
privilege since the two concepts are so closely intertwined. 735

523 U.S. 44 (1998).
Id. at 55.
731
Id. (emphasis added).
732
Id. at 54.
733
See also Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“Legislative immunity protects officials fulfilling legislative functions even if they
are not ‘legislators.’ ”); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1194 (5th Cir.
1981).
734
See Myers, supra note 45, at 937–38 (“[T]he lack of an explicit textual basis
for the Vice President’s legislative immunity claim would not necessarily be fatal,
as . . . neither judicial nor executive immunity has a ‘specific textual basis.’ . . .
Bogan v. Scott-Harris . . . extended . . . legislative immunity to a city mayor for
participating in the budget process . . . . The willingness of the Court to blur the
distinction between executive and legislative roles in Bogan, coupled with the Vice
President’s constitutional function as President of the Senate, suggests that a grant
of limited legislative immunity might not be as farfetched as originally presumed.”).
The law in at least one state confirms this position. See Jubelirer v. Singel, 638 A.2d
352, 357 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (“[T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court [has]
indicated that the Lieutenant Governor, acting in his capacity as President of the
Senate, would also be immunized from suit under the Speech and [sic] Debate
Clause.” (internal citation omitted)).
735
See supra Part I; cf. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425,
522 n.19 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I see no distinction in Congress’ seeking
to compel the appearance and testimony of a former President and in, alternatively,
729
730
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As a further structural matter, it would seem anomalous for
the presiding officer of the House—the Speaker—to enjoy Speech
or Debate protection but not the presiding officer of the Senate. 736
It would appear all the more incongruous for the President of the
Senate’s replacement—the President pro tempore—to benefit
from a privilege but not the President of the Senate himself.
After all, they perform the exact same function. For these
reasons, the view that the Vice President should not hold a
Speech or Debate privilege because he is not a Senator is
unpersuasive.
The second concern is that, since the Speech or Debate
Clause was designed largely to defend the legislative branch from
overweening executive power, 737 the protective rationale might
not apply in the case of the Vice President who is a part of the
executive branch the majority of the time. 738 This criticism is not
without merit. Yet, under the Constitution, the Vice President is
legally independent from the President; this is especially
manifest regarding his Senate role. It could be argued, therefore,
that the integrity of the Vice President’s actions as presiding
officer of the Senate would require protection from undue
executive branch influence. The argument would be that not
only is the independence of the vice presidential office preserved,
but also the independence of the Senate’s proceedings as a whole.
To the extent the executive branch could, through its
prosecutorial or coercive authority, arrest, detain, and otherwise
harass lawmakers in an effort to get them to vote or act a certain
way, the same hypothetical—however unlikely—could also be
applied to the Vice President. In theory, the executive branch
could similarly harass the Vice President into voting a certain
way or carrying out his parliamentary duties in a particular
fashion, thus undercutting the constitutional independence the
clause was meant to preserve for the Senate and the legislative

seeking to compel the production of Presidential papers over the former President’s
objection.”).
736
There is no constitutional requirement that the Speaker be a House member.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. In theory, a non-House member—perhaps even the Vice
President—could serve as Speaker.
737
See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966) (“[T]he privilege has
been recognized as an important protection of the independence and integrity of the
legislature.”).
738
The author would like to thank Louis Fisher for raising this point.
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process as a whole. As a consequence, this second criticism also
appears to fall short.
Third, it might prove difficult for the Vice President to claim
the Speech or Debate Clause as protection from having to
produce materials to the Senate. This is because congressional
committees may thoroughly investigate their own membership
and the Clause holds no protection in this respect. The ethics
committees in both houses have the authority to subpoena
documents from their members. For example, Senator Bob
Packwood’s diaries were subpoenaed by the Senate Ethics
Committee, and such action was upheld by the Supreme Court. 739
Thus, the Vice President would have a difficult time relying on
the Speech or Debate Clause to thwart a Senate committee
demand for documents related to his Senate activities. 740 That
said, the clause could still very likely protect the Vice President
from having to submit legislative materials to a non-Senate
investigation or pursuant to a civil suit. In this respect, he could
assert Speech or Debate privilege in court against the executive
branch or against outside parties in civil litigation. Therefore,
this concern is less than meets the eye.
After weighing the arguments pro and con, the Vice
President would seem to enjoy some measure of protection under
the Speech or Debate Clause as well as under the generalized
legislative privilege, although the latter argument is more
persuasive. Such an assertion, however, would only shield the
Vice President to the extent he was carrying out his duties to
preside over the Senate and break ties—tasks that, as a practical
matter, take up very little of a modern Vice President’s time.
The vast majority of documents and communications the modern
Vice President has a hand in involve executive branch activity
delegated to him by the President or by statute and would not
seem to be covered. Thus, the opening for VPP to be exercised in
this realm would be narrow.

See Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319 (1994).
The Vice President could validly claim VPP to block materials sought by the
Senate related to his duties under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
739
740
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The Twenty-Fifth Amendment

Another component of VPP involves the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. 741 In this context, the Vice President possesses a
privilege while: (1) preparing to fill in for the President with
respect to presidential inability and when making an inability
determination if the President’s health is in question; 742 or
(2) preparing to assume office on a permanent basis due to
presidential death, resignation, removal, or vacancy. 743
Cf. Amar, supra note 7, at 207 (emphasis added) (“All these changes brought
by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might have important consequences for the issue of
executive privilege. By formalizing succession, by making the vice president part of
(and indeed a leader of) the cabinet for purposes of determining presidential
disability, and by making clear that the president gets to choose persons to fill vice
presidential vacancies . . . the amendment strongly suggests that, today at least, the
vice president is a full member of the president’s executive team. This
amendment . . . might provide a possible basis today for a somewhat broad claim of
executive privilege on the part of the vice president.” (emphasis added)); Goldstein,
supra note 2, at 167 (“[T]he [Twenty-Fifth] Amendment assigns the office certain
constitutional powers, duties, and privileges.” (emphasis added)); Myers, supra note
45, at 934 n.290 (arguing that the Vice President’s authority under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment might cloak him with absolute civil immunity for his official actions in
this context).
If the Vice President enjoyed the constitutional authority to decide questions of
inability prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as many maintained, see, e.g.,
Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 87–88, 94 (1961); RICHARD H. HANSEN,
THE YEAR WE HAD NO PRESIDENT 85 (1962); SILVA, supra note 297, at 102, then
presumably he would have enjoyed a constitutional privilege as well. There are
several examples of vice presidential communications about succession and inability
that might have been privileged if the Vice President indeed had this constitutional
authority before adoption of the amendment. These instances reflect Twenty-Fifth
Amendment-type discussions. While Vice President Arthur never met with
President Garfield following the shooting of the latter, see FEERICK, supra note 18, at
8, the Vice President did exchange letters with Secretary of State Blaine concerning
the President’s health. See FEERICK, supra note 652, at 122. The Garfield Cabinet
also appears to have presented Arthur with a way forward regarding Garfield’s
inability, but it was never acted upon. See also id. at 137–38. A staffer of Vice
President Marshall urged him to take steps to prepare himself to be President
following Wilson’s stroke in 1919, but Marshall took no action. See DORMAN, supra
note 312, at 109. After President Eisenhower’s heart attack in September 1955, Vice
President Nixon met with senior executive branch officials, such as the Secretary of
State, Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Attorney General, and White House
aides about how the executive branch would run during the President’s incapacity.
See FEERICK, supra note 18, at 17–18. Similar high-level discussions took place
following Eisenhower’s stroke two years later. See id. at 21–22.
742
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
743
In addition, a Vice President elect is likely to enjoy a modest privilege under
the Twentieth Amendment. This is based on the premise that there would seem to
be an executive privilege for incoming Presidents, cf. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.
(Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (recognizing executive privilege for former
741
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The Twenty-Fifth Amendment maps out the procedure for
determining presidential inability. It provides that
[w]henever the Vice President and a majority of either the
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of
the executive department or of such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within
Presidents), particularly following the vote of the electoral college. This would reflect
the same reasoning undergirding any other constitutional privilege: the premium
the Constitution places on encouraging effective decisionmaking.
Between election day and the inauguration, the President elect undertakes serious
deliberations as to policy options and personnel appointments, which require a high
degree of candid internal discussion. In this vein, it would also appear that there
would need to be a vice presidential transition privilege. Any deliberations held by
the Vice President elect about succession and presidential inability would need to be
protected for the same reason as VPP. A unique aspect of the vice presidential
transition privilege would seem to come into play during this period since the Vice
President elect would presumably have some deliberations involving the Twentieth
Amendment and how he might need to assume the presidency: (1) were tragedy to
befall the President elect prior to inauguration; (2) were the President elect to fail to
qualify as President; or (3) were the President elect not to secure sufficient electoral
votes. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the
President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become
President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed
for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to
qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a
President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the
case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have
qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in
which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act
accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
Id. The author would like to thank Joel Goldstein for raising this question.
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forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter
written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within
twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble,
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting
President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers
and duties of his office. 744

Thus, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment expressly lays out an
important role for the Vice President regarding whether a
presidential inability exists, a role that should be considered
among the Vice President’s enumerated powers under the
Constitution. 745 The Supreme Court has in fact noted in this
context that “the Twenty-fifth Amendment . . . empowers the Vice
President.” 746 Or as Dean John Feerick, the leading authority on
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, has written, the “Amendment
provides a broad grant of power and discretion to be used
appropriately by the President, Vice President, and Cabinet.” 747
In this respect, it is important to recall what the Supreme
Court stated in Nixon I: “Certain powers and privileges flow
Id. amend. XXV, § 4.
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 206 (“The text of the Amendment gives
the vice president certain powers and duties—it makes him a potential decisionmaker regarding presidential inability . . . .”).
746
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886–87 (1991) (emphasis added).
747
FEERICK, supra note 18, at xxiv (emphasis added); see also BIRCH BAYH, ONE
HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 188 (1968) (“[A]ll
that Congress can do [under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment] is to affirm a decision
that has already been made in the executive branch, because the majority of the
Cabinet have already supported the Vice President.” (quoting Attorney General
Katzenbach) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Paul B. Stephan III, History,
Background and Outstanding Problems, in 1 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY
AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 34, at 63, 78 (“Section Four at
least now settles th[e] question [as to who has the authority to initiate action
regarding a determination of inability]: The vice president does have the power.”
(quoting Paul Stephan)); TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 38 (characterizing the
inability provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as providing a “grant of power”
to the Vice President even if Vice Presidents are chary to use it); Amar, supra note 7,
at 207 (the Twenty-Fifth Amendment ensures that “the vice president [is] part of
(and indeed a leader of) the cabinet for purposes of determining presidential
disability”); Medina, supra note 654, at 95 n.97 (“One might also describe the VicePresident’s originating initiative under the [T]wenty-[F]ifth [A]mendment to declare
the President unable to fulfill his responsibilities as a constitutional power.”); cf.
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 192 (“The Amendment . . . mak[es] the vice president an
indispensable decision-maker.”).
744
745
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from the nature of enumerated powers.” 748 In carrying out the
inability provision, the Vice President and the Cabinet or a
separate body must “transmit . . . [a] written declaration” to
Congress as to the President’s inability. Before deciding whether
to make such a declaration, the mechanism for determining
presidential inability anticipates that the Vice President must
consult with others—most likely Cabinet officers, White House
staff, vice presidential staff, the First Lady, and medical
authorities. 749 As Feerick points out, “the Amendment gives the
Vice President and Cabinet (or such other body established by
law) the primary role in the process and implicitly requires them
to secure such information, medical and otherwise, as may be
necessary to make an informed decision.” 750 He adds that
“[t]hose closest to the President should be expected to cooperate
with any Twenty-Fifth Amendment inquiry made by the Cabinet
United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974).
See FEERICK, supra note 18, at 89–90 (“First, the President has to transmit
his own conviction that he is well. Then the Vice President has to say, ‘No, I do not
agree with you, you are not well.’ Then the Vice President has to have a talk with a
majority of the members of the Cabinet.” (quoting Martin Taylor, who testified
during consideration of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment)); see also S. REP. No. 84-66,
at 13 (1965) (“Section 4 . . . embraces the most difficult problem of inability—the
factual determination of whether or not inability exists. . . . [T]he Vice President, if
satisfied that the President is disabled shall, with the written approval of a majority
of the heads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of the powers and
duties of the Office as Acting President. . . . The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members . . . would enable prompt
action by the persons closest to the President. . . . It is assumed that such decision
would be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who were
intricately familiar with the President’s physical and mental condition.”); H. REP.
No. 89-203, at 13 (1965); REPORT, supra note 34, at 21 (recommending that, under
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, “[c]onstitutional decision-makers will generally
require medical advice from appropriate medical experts . . . regarding the
President’s condition in making decisions . . . as to whether the President is able to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. The legislative history surrounding the
adoption of the Twenty-fifth Amendment makes clear that its framers intended that
constitutional decision-makers would solicit appropriate medical advice.”); Bayh,
supra note 34 (quoting former Senator Bayh, the sponsor of the amendment, in the
context of what would be done if a president were suddenly incapacitated: “In the
real world . . . nothing [would be done] . . . until the vice president has a chance to
consult with a lot of folks as to whether something needs to be done.”); Caplin, supra
note 34 (hypothesizing about a first lady attesting to the President’s health in front
of the Vice President and Cabinet during an inability inquiry under the TwentyFifth Amendment); supra note 34; cf. Amar, supra note 7, at 207 (“In some ways, the
vice president is treated in this process [under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment] as the
head of the cabinet for assessing whether the president is disabled.”).
750
FEERICK, supra note 18, at xxiv.
748
749
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and Vice President.” 751
Keeping in mind the functional
considerations laid out by the Supreme Court in Nixon I—which
emphasize the need for candid exchanges among constitutional
officers and their aides when carrying out constitutionally
enumerated duties—it is difficult to imagine intra-governmental
communication much more sensitive or requiring much more
candor than questions as to the President’s ability to discharge
his responsibilities. 752 Such information leaking out could have
far-reaching ramifications for the nation.
It is generally acknowledged that the Vice President’s most
vital constitutional function is to be ready to step into the shoes
of the President if the latter is unable to fulfill his duties, if he is
deceased, if he is removed, or if the office is left vacant. One
could well imagine an instance where a sitting President was
gravely ill and questions arose as to his ability to carry out his
duties. Discussions about legal, logistical, public relations, or
medical issues involved with the Vice President assuming power
during an inability scenario—even if the inability were only
temporary or even if the Vice President never had to actually
assume power—would involve the Vice President fulfilling his
express constitutional duty and would, as a functional matter,
require great candor and secrecy. 753 In this context, advice and
Id. at xxv.
See, e.g., ROSE MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS, AND
DECISION MAKING 209 (2008) (“[I]t is absolutely necessary for the vice president and
Cabinet to obtain accurate and unbiased medical advice to determine whether the
president is able to perform his or her duties [pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment].” (quoting former President Carter) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also HERBERT L. ABRAMS, “THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT”:
CONFUSION, DISABILITY, AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF RONALD REAGAN 180 (1992) (quoting then
presidential aide Edwin Meese about certain actions taken immediately following
the assassination attempt on President Reagan: “The concern was that the press not
get wind of any actions that would raise questions as to whether the president was
capable of acting.”); cf. REPORT, supra note 34, at 13 (recommending that any
“contingency plan pertaining to presidential inability and continuity of government
will contain highly sensitive information and should be classified”). Any alternate
body created by Congress under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to replace the
Cabinet would similarly need to be taken into confidence by the Vice President. Cf.
MCDERMOTT, supra, at 217–18.
753
With respect to how the formal declaration of inability might be drawn up
under the amendment, Attorney General Herbert Brownell opined:
Undoubtedly the Justice Department would prepare the [inability
declaration] papers, and the action would be taken at a joint meeting of the
Vice President and the Cabinet members. It might not even be a matter of
751
752
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communications sought and given within the Vice President’s
office could legitimately be claimed by the Vice President as
covered by VPP. 754
As a practical matter, if the Vice President were to assume
power permanently under such a scenario, he could assert
executive privilege as President and would not need to assert
VPP. 755 If he merely served as acting President, however, he
might need to assert VPP upon his return to the vice presidency
if the President did not feel compelled to protect the Vice
President’s deliberations while acting as President or
immediately beforehand. 756 The possibility of strained relations
between the President and Vice President under a contested
inability situation is likely to be fairly high. 757 It is therefore all
the more important for the Vice President to be able to protect
his own deliberations in this vein to ensure maximum candor
from his advisers and those within the executive branch. He may
public knowledge as to who signed first [the inability declaration]. That
particular point would fade into insignificance in getting the group action.
FEERICK, supra note 18, at 203 (emphasis added).
754
Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, it could be argued that the Vice
President would be unable to keep information from Congress in the context of an
inability scenario since Congress is integral to the process of making a binding
determination. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. Of course, the President may
claim executive privilege over deliberations involving domestic policy even though
Congress has primary constitutional authority in that realm. Nonetheless, if one
accepts the premise as true, then the question could arise is there really much of a
vice presidential privilege left? The answer is yes. First, VPP would certainly apply
in any private civil suit that could be brought against the Vice President or others
requesting materials about the inability determination process. Second, the initial
determination of inability is made by the Vice President and the Cabinet and not
Congress. The facts relied on by the Vice President and the Cabinet in this vein
would surely need to be made available to the Congress as the legislature carries out
its constitutional role of approving or disapproving the executive branch’s initial
judgment. Opinions expressed and the internal procedure followed in the making of
this preliminary determination, however, would seem a much less likely candidate
for full disclosure to Congress than the facts upon which such a decision was based.
Third, the Vice President could still block materials that were requested by Congress
as they concern his preparations for succession, as opposed to inability. Congress
plays no direct role in the succession process, although the body indirectly can do so
through confirmation of a new Vice President. The author would like to thank Joel
Goldstein for posing this probing question.
755
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 198 (“As a matter of constitutional law, a
vice president acting as president under Section 3 or 4 has the same powers and
duties as the chief executive does under whom he serves.”).
756
The question of whether a former acting President should have the benefit of
executive privilege as a former President is beyond the scope of this Article.
757
See infra note 795.
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in some circumstances even need to protect this information from
the President. In reality, Cabinet officials, as opposed to the Vice
President and his staff, would likely feel more obligated to
provide such materials to the returning President.
Responsibility for deliberations, of course, is granted in large
part to the Vice President by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, not
by the President, so he would not be “defying” the President in a
legal sense by refusing to release documents to him. Nor would
he be undermining the President’s Article II authority. If the two
came into conflict over whether to release Twenty-Fifth
Amendment documents, the Vice President would be well within
his rights to refuse the President’s “instructions” to make the
material public or to give the documents to the President himself.
If not technically serving as acting President during a time
of formally recognized presidential inability or not taking direct
steps toward that end under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the
Vice President would likely be unable to enjoy privilege under
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 758 In the context of informally
filling in for the President, a Vice President could claim to be
carrying out his constitutional duties under the implied authority
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, although he could not do so
legitimately. The amendment would not be triggered and any
actions contrary to the President’s wishes in this setting would
seem to run afoul of the President’s authority under Article II.
In addition to matters involving inability under the TwentyFifth Amendment, VPP could cover certain matters involving
presidential succession. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides
that “[i]n case of the removal of the President from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become
President.” 759 Although a preparatory role for the Vice President
regarding succession is not expressly laid out in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment—as is the language involving presidential
inability—matters of presidential succession clearly reflect a
major constitutional role for the Vice President. As former Vice
President Cheney noted, the Vice President’s “basic role . . . is to
worry about presidential succession. And [the Vice President’s]

758
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See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 752, at 72.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
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job, above all other things, is to be prepared to take over if
something happens to the president.” 760
In this respect, preparations for immediate succession would
seem to be cloaked by VPP. The functional need for high
governmental officials to have the benefit of candor in their
deliberations with their aides as spelled out in Nixon I would
seem to be as present here as they would be regarding a
determination of presidential inability.
Sensitive matters
involving protocol, timing, legal mechanics, communications, and
political outreach would all need to be discussed confidentially by
vice presidential staff. Individuals close to Vice President Ford,
for example, began quietly undertaking transition plans in
advance of Nixon stepping down. 761 Official efforts in this vein
would seem to be privileged since the Vice President would be
carrying out his constitutional responsibility to prepare for the
presidency; but, at the same time, he would need to take action
without information getting out that would make the Vice
President look disloyal or presumptuous.
The heightened
sensitivity of these preparations reflects one of the fundamental
dilemmas of succession and inability—that is, the unwillingness
of Vice Presidents to take prudent steps in this direction out of
fear of being viewed as overly ambitious. 762 This reticence was a
concern that animated the framers of the Twenty-Fifth
760
Paul Kengor, Cheney and Vice Presidential Power, in Gregg II & Rozell,
supra note 549, at 168; see S. REP. No. 89-66, at 11 (1965) (“To stand by ready for the
powers and duties of the Presidential office to devolve upon him at the time of death
or inability of the President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice
President.”); S. REP. No. 89-203, at 11 (1965); Dixon Memo, supra note 434, at 36
(“The principal responsibility of the Vice President is to be ready to serve as
President or Acting President should the occasion arise, thereby avoiding any
interruption in the continuity of the office of the President. This duty ‘to stand and
wait’ is of the highest constitutional and institutional importance. Judicial
proceedings which could interfere with readiness to serve therefore require careful
scrutiny.”); TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 33 (noting that preparing for the
presidency is the Vice President’s “main constitutional role”); MARIE D. NATOLI,
AMERICAN PRINCE, AMERICAN PAUPER: THE CONTEMPORARY VICE PRESIDENCY IN
PERSPECTIVE 7 (1985) (“Most observers would suggest that the most crucial function
of the office of Vice-President is to succeed to the Presidency.”); see also
Memorandum from Vice President-elect Walter F. Mondale to President-elect Jimmy
Carter regarding the Role of the Vice President in the Carter Administration, Dec. 9,
1976, at 11 (on file with author) (The “most important constitutional obligation of
the office [of Vice President] . . . is, being prepared to take over the Presidency
should that be required.”).
761
See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 211.
762
See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 18, at 9, 14, 20.
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Amendment. 763 Acknowledgement of VPP would help somewhat
to allay these fears.
Moreover, routine documents prepared for the Vice
President’s review about potential succession or presidential
inability issues—even if a transition were not imminent—would
also seem to fall within the privilege. In this case, memoranda
about the mechanics of potential succession or related
communications or political strategy papers would be extremely
sensitive even if they were merely nonemergency contingency
They would seem to fall within the Vice
documents. 764
President’s constitutional duties and would not appear to
infringe on the President’s Article II authority. Such materials
would therefore likely be privileged.
Nonetheless, in the context of presidential succession, there
are several drawbacks to relying upon the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment for purposes of VPP. For one, it is unsupported by
practice. Vice President Ford was essentially in this position
during the last days of the Nixon administration. 765 He had
meetings with White House Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig, in
which delicate matters of succession were discussed. Far from
declaring these conversations privileged, President Ford testified
in open session about them before a House subcommittee. 766
Precedent, although limited, does not support this theory.
Furthermore, there is the practical difficulty of line drawing.
The Vice President could claim that all or most of his daily
activities are carried out with an eye toward succession. The
Vice President could assert, for example, that even routine
deliberations at the NSC are constitutionally privileged despite
the fact he is both fulfilling a statutory duty and assisting the
President. This is because, he could argue, being familiar with
national security matters is vital to the Vice President’s potential
temporary or permanent succession to the Presidency. For the
same reason, the Vice President could maintain that
communication regarding any of the functions he is delegated by
the President or by statute would also be subject to privilege.

See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 7937 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler).
Under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton, Twenty-Fifth Amendment
contingency plans were in fact drawn up. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 205.
765
See supra Part VI.G.
766
See supra notes 449–54 and accompanying text.
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Because of the potential for overly expansive privilege
claims, if an assertion of VPP stems from the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, a rule of construction wedding VPP’s invocation to
immediate or specific succession or presidential inability issues
would seem to be in order. This makes sense since it closely
follows the text of the Amendment.
At the same time, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gives no
indication that the Vice President must be intimately involved in
presidential decisionmaking. While it important as a policy
matter for him to be “plugged in” to what is going on in the
executive branch in case something happens to the President, it
is certainly not a constitutional requirement. Past practice
before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment demonstrates that Vice
Presidents often had at best episodic interaction with their
Presidents. 767 Many Vice Presidents assumed the presidency
with little knowledge of what their predecessor had been doing.
Vice President Truman’s ignorance about the construction of the
atomic bomb is well known. 768 Even following the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, few would argue that the President is required to
include the Vice President among his confidantes. For example,
Nixon ensured that Agnew was not aware of major policy
decisions. 769 At one point Nixon was queried about whether he
had informed the Vice President in advance of his diplomatic
efforts to reach out to communist China. 770 To this Nixon was
“incredulous.” 771 “Agnew? Agnew?” he replied. “Oh, of course
not.” 772 Thus, claiming that the Vice President’s presidentially or
statutorily delegated responsibilities are shielded by a
constitutional privilege held by the Vice President is dubious

767
See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, supra note 647, at 22 (noting that Vice President
Breckinridge did not meet alone with President Buchanan until three years had
elapsed into their term).
768
See, e.g., id. at 30; Goldstein, supra note 297, at 792; see also THOMAS H.
NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCIES: CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEDURES IN THE FORD AND ROCKEFELLER NOMINATIONS 5 (1998) (“Vice
President Thomas Marshall remained completely unprepared for potential
succession to the presidency throughout the period [of Wilson’s illness]” (citations
omitted)).
769
See e.g., John Robert Greene, “I’ll Continue To Speak Out”: Spiro T. Agnew as
Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 124, 127 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997).
770
See Friedman, supra note 323, at 1710 n.31.
771
Id.
772
Id.
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since there is no constitutional requirement for a Vice President
to be “in the loop” with regard to executive branch policymaking;
such decisions are the President’s alone.
Such a rule of construction is also necessary to prevent the
Vice President through exercise of VPP from undercutting the
President’s role as head of the executive branch under Article II.
The Framers rejected a plural executive. Permitting the Vice
President to invoke a privilege without the approval or even
against the wishes of the President on matters within the
President’s constitutional authority would undermine the
President’s power under Article II. 773 As such it would run
counter to the overwhelming tide of legal authority indicating
that only the President may invoke executive privilege. 774 This
narrow rule limiting VPP to immediate or specific inability or
succession issues assures that the Vice President would be
claiming privilege only over documents and communications
within his own constitutional sphere, not the President’s.
Finally, a narrow rule of construction is consistent with the
traditional legal standard that burdens placed on fact finding in
legal proceedings should be discouraged. 775
The Vice President’s responsibilities under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, much like those in the Senate, provide a path for
the Vice President to claim his own privilege. 776 This would be a
privilege he could lawfully invoke even if opposed by the
President.

See infra Part VIII.B.
See supra Part II.C–D.
775
See infra Part VIII.G.
776
The question could arise: if the Vice President enjoys a privilege under the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment when preparing for presidential succession, then would
the Speaker as the third in line to the presidency also be entitled to such
confidentiality if the President or Vice President were out of commission? See
Turley, supra note 7, at 677 n.159. The answer would appear to be yes. In a situation
in which the President dies and is succeeded by the Vice President, then prior to the
confirmation of a new Vice President the Speaker would be the next in line to the
presidency. To the extent the Speaker during this time makes preparations to
potentially assume the presidency, he or she would seem to enjoy a privilege. As a
practical matter, the Speaker’s internal deliberations on these matters with his or
her aides would likely be covered by legislative privilege. The same would be true for
the President pro tempore. It would not seem as likely for Cabinet secretaries in the
line of succession since VPP, like all constitutional privileges, is predicated on its
being invoked by a constitutional officer and Cabinet secretaries are mere creatures
of statute. Cf. id.; see also infra note 890.
773
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B. The Vice President as the President’s Vicar
It could be argued that the Vice President is the President’s
vicar in that his acts are inherently the President’s. In a passage
in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote:
By the Constitution of the United States, the president is
invested with certain political powers. . . . To aid him in the
performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain
officers, who act by his authority, and in conformity with his
orders. In such cases, their acts are his acts . . . . 777

The implication from Marbury is that the President’s actions
encompass the actions of the executive branch, at least with
respect to Cabinet secretaries. They are one and the same.
Presumably, as the only other constitutional officer who serves in
the executive branch—at least most of the time—the Vice
President would be taking steps on the President’s behalf in
fulfilling delegated executive branch duties and his actions would
enjoy the same vicarious treatment as that of a Cabinet
secretary. The language in Cheney v. U.S. District Court
combined the President and Vice President in such a manner on
several occasions. 778 The district court in Walker v. Cheney took
much the same approach, mixing the two offices. 779 The same
court in Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers followed suit, 780 as
did the courts on two other recent occasions. 781 While these
expressions are mere dicta, they remain the only judicial
pronouncements on the subject. With so little judicial reasoning
to turn to, one naturally feels drawn toward these
pronouncements. 782 Further, as the Bush administration argued
in a somewhat different context in Walker, the President and
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803) (emphasis added).
See 542 U.S. 367, 391–92 (2004) (stating that “[s]pecial considerations [are]
applicable to the President and the Vice President”); supra Part VI.L.2; see also
Amar, supra note 7; Klarevas, supra note 7; Meyers, supra note 45, at 911.
779
See 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The parties agree that no court
has ever before granted . . . an order that the President (or Vice President) must
produce information to Congress . . . .”); id. at 74–75; supra Part VI.L.1.
780
558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2008).
781
See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 532 F.3d 860, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in
Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 658 F. Supp. 2d 217, 238 (D.D.C. 2009).
782
See, e.g., United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(“ ‘[C]arefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum,
generally must be treated as authoritative.’ ” (quoting Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 322 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
777
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Vice President are treated the same in certain statutory regimes
and by the courts. 783 Such judicial and legislative opinion may,
therefore, lend support to the “vicarious” position.
But, as Professor Vikram Amar asks, “does this merging of
the two offices make sense for executive privilege purposes?” 784
The answer is no. 785 First, as will be recalled, the Vice President
does not have to do what the President commands. He may not
be removed by the President as a legal matter during his term of
office as he himself is a constitutional officer. This is unlike
Cabinet members, who can be removed by the President at any
time. In fact, Vice Presidents have not infrequently fulfilled
their constitutional duties in ways that run counter to the
President’s policy positions, 786 undercutting the concept that the
President and Vice President are one and the same for
constitutional purposes. As noted earlier, on several occasions
the Vice President has voted against the President in the
Senate. 787 Moreover, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment inability
provision actually anticipates the President and Vice President
may end up on opposite sides of such a matter. 788
Second, under the Constitution, the Vice President has
fundamentally different roles from those of the President. 789 The
See Cheney GAO Brief, supra note 551, at 16–17.
Amar, supra note 7.
785
See supra Parts II, VII.A. It could conceivably be argued that much as the
Speech or Debate Clause treats a legislative aide as an alter ego of a member of
Congress so too the Vice President is the President’s alter ego and should be entitled
to the same privileges. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972). Of
course, Gravel does not stand for the proposition that an aide may claim protection
under the Speech or Debate Clause if the member for whom he or she works opposes
such a claim. The same holds true for the President and Vice President. If the power
being exercised has been delegated by the President, then he has the ultimate
authority to determine whether the privilege may be exercised. See supra notes 546,
568. Moreover, the Vice President is not typically viewed as the President’s
doppelganger. See, e.g., COHEN & MITCHELL, supra note 482, at 269 (“The Vice
President of the United States is not the President’s partner or alter ego.”). He has
his own unique constitutional responsibilities.
786
See supra Part VII.A.1.a.
787
See supra notes 672–80 and accompanying text.
788
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 190 (“Transfer under Section 4 [of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment] comes without presidential sanction. Section 4
authorizes involuntary transfer of power to the vice president under a range of
circumstances.”); see also Friedman, supra note 323, at 1727 n.101.
789
See TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 73 (“The vice presidency is not fully
comparable to the presidency . . . . [Unlike the Vice President,] [s]ome of the
president’s most important roles, for example, are grounded in the Constitution, a
document that limits more than it empowers the vice president.”).
783
784
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Vice President presides over the Senate, breaks tie votes, and
must be prepared for succession and presidential inability. But
on the other hand, the President heads up the executive branch,
is Commander in Chief, is Chief Diplomat, nominates judges and
executive branch officials, approves or vetoes legislation among
other things. Because of these markedly different roles it is
unclear that the Vice President should be automatically treated
as interchangeable with the President.
Third, past executive branch policies demonstrate that the
President alone should invoke executive privilege. 790 This is
entirely logical since it would make no sense for the President—
as head of the executive branch under Article II—to be legally
forced to “invoke” executive privilege because his Vice President
chose on his own to exercise such a power. In this way, the Vice
President’s decision to invoke privilege would force the
President’s hand because of their supposedly vicarious
relationship.
Such a construction would turn Article II
completely on its head, permitting the Vice President, without
serving as acting President, to make executive branch decisions
without presidential approval or even contrary to the President’s
wishes, essentially creating a plural executive. This not only
runs counter to the rule that only the President may invoke
executive privilege but also does violence to Article II and the
clear intentions of the Framers. 791 Moreover, it clashes with the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which went into painstaking detail
about when the Vice President could actually exercise
presidential authority.
Presumably, the courts in Walker, Cheney, Miers, and
elsewhere merged the President and Vice President together
because the Vice President was acting as the President’s
authorized delegate.
It will be recalled that during oral
argument in Cheney, the DOJ expressly acknowledged that the
Vice President was acting on behalf of the President. 792
Nonetheless, the courts’ language left behind not a little
confusion.

See supra Part II.C.
As a practical matter, it seems unlikely a Vice President would assert VPP
unless the President were unwilling to assert executive privilege—thus again
exposing the nonvicarious nature of VPP.
792
See supra note 568 and accompanying text.
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While the vicarious argument holds some initial promise for
Vice Presidents based on judicial dicta, closer examination
reveals several fatal flaws. The courts’ language, while rightly
acknowledging the Vice President’s stature as a constitutional
officer, would seem to find a better home when limited to his
narrow constitutional functions as opposed to authority delegated
to him by the President.
C. Fulfilling Duties Delegated by Statute or by the President
The contention could be made that, to the extent the Vice
President is carrying out one of his statutory duties, such as
serving as a member of the NSC, he might have recourse to VPP.
The argument would be that service on the NSC involves
communications involving weighty military and diplomatic
matters, the type of issues about which courts have often
conceded the President may withhold information. 793 A similar
position could be advanced that the Vice President could claim a
privilege for a project that the President assigned him under the
latter’s own constitutional authority 794—for example, if the
President sent the Vice President abroad as a diplomatic envoy.
In this capacity, the Vice President would be acting as an adviser
to the President.
Again, this hypothetical would not go to the independent
powers of the Vice President. Instead, it merely illustrates the
executive privilege enjoyed by military and diplomatic advisers to
the President, which ultimately radiates from the President
himself under Article II. When it comes to questions involving
constitutional privilege regarding the Vice President exercising
authority delegated to him by the President, all roads lead back
to the delegator. The constitutional power in question is the
President’s and by definition so is the privilege; the Vice
President would not independently have such authority. The
true test is when the President and Vice President oppose each
other over whether to disclose a document. In such a scenario
the legal variable is isolated. Unless the materials in question
have a tight nexus to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or involve
the Vice President’s legislative duties in the Senate, the

793

(1974).
794

See, e.g., United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 706, 707, 710, 715
Cf. supra Part VI.E.
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President’s decision in this regard must control. Otherwise, a
plural executive could emerge.
D. Potential Applications
The previous two arguments in favor of a form of vice
presidential privilege assume an autonomous Vice President
wielding quasi-presidential power within the executive branch.
In practice, the Vice President, however, has never been a coPresident. His duties are almost exclusively delegated to him at
the discretion of the President or Congress.
A few scenarios can be readily imagined where VPP could
come into play. One context in which VPP could manifest itself
would be where a President wished to distance himself from the
Vice President for political purposes and the Vice President
would feel compelled to invoke the privilege to protect himself.
This may be particularly likely during a second term when the
threat of being removed from the ticket is no longer a political
concern to the Vice President. For this reason, a Vice President
may be less worried about breaking with the President. A
comparable situation almost played itself out with Vice President
Agnew in 1973. Nixon and Agnew had just been reelected, the
two men had divergent political interests at the time, and neither
was much concerned about upsetting relations with the other.
During the DOJ investigation of the Vice President, it will be
remembered, the White House Counsel’s office offered to secure
vice presidential documents for federal investigators.
As noted above, another scenario could involve a disgruntled
President returning to power following an inability
determination by the Vice President. 795 The returning President
could very well harbor ill-feelings toward the Vice President and
try to embarrass him politically by either revealing or
withholding materials from the public.
Yet another scenario might involve the results of an election
in which no candidate received a majority of electoral votes,
throwing the presidential race into the House of Representatives
and the vice presidential race into the Senate. The outcome
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 191 (“The prospects for an acrimonious
encounter with the president would, of course, be greatest when the proposed
transfer encounters the president’s opposition. But even when a transfer responds to
a clear presidential disability . . . the chief executive might later complain that no
pressing events mandated the transfer.”).
795
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could result in a situation where the country has a President
from one party and a Vice President from another, not unlike the
Adams-Jefferson pairing. 796 This could lead to a distrustful
combination that might pit the President and the Vice President
against one another in a contest over documents. One could well
imagine the tension that might emerge from an attempted
inability determination.
E. Conclusion
The arguments in favor of a narrow VPP are convincing to
the extent the Vice President is carrying out his constitutionally
prescribed duties. Such a position is in concert with Nixon I’s
rationale that “[c]ertain powers and privileges flow from the
nature of enumerated powers.” 797 When presiding over the
Senate, the Vice President would seem to possess a narrow
privilege relating to his legislative duties, which would stem from
the generalized legislative privilege or the Speech or Debate
Clause. He is also obligated to refuse to release information
provided in any secret session of the Senate until released by the
chamber. To the extent he takes action pursuant to immediate
or specific succession or presidential inability matters, the Vice
President’s authority in this regard is expressly tied to the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. These authorities constitute the Vice
President’s enumerated powers, and, despite their modesty and
that they straddle Articles I and II, 798 they should enjoy the same
degree of confidentiality as the those of the President, federal
lawmakers, or federal judges. This would be fully in accord with
the premium the Constitution places on encouraging effective
decisionmaking by constitutional officers.
Other arguments based on a merging of the presidency and
vice presidency seem much less defensible. While judicial dicta
have left the implication that the two offices are inseparable,
The author would like to thank Joel Goldstein for raising this possibility.
418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). It will be remembered that the Supreme Court has
reiterated the rationale from Nixon I on numerous occasions. See supra Part II.B.2.
798
The only other parallel situation under the Constitution would seem to be
when the Chief Justice serves as presiding officer during an impeachment trial of
the President before the Senate. In this capacity, the Chief Justice would likely
enjoy a legislative privilege akin to that enjoyed by the Vice President when he acts
as presiding officer. The Chief Justice also benefits from judicial privilege when
carrying out his judicial duties. In this regard, the Chief Justice—like the Vice
President—would enjoy privileges from two different branches.
796
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they are in fact distinct. The President alone is in charge of the
executive branch. On the other hand, the Vice President has
unique responsibilities that involve both legislative and executive
branch duties. To permit the Vice President to proceed beyond
the powers granted him by Article I and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment and to assert his own executive privilege
independent from the President would create a plural executive,
an approach the Framers clearly rejected. The courts’ dicta
would, therefore, seem to rest more comfortably in the context of
reinforcing the Vice President’s constitutional powers and not his
delegated duties, an approach that dovetails with VPP.
VIII.POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS AGAINST VPP
Even the prospect of a narrow VPP is likely to draw a
number of counterarguments. They include that: (1) there is no
express textual basis for VPP; (2) the Vice President should have
no constitutional privilege because all executive power inheres in
the President; (3) there is little judicial or historical precedent
supporting VPP; (4) the President enjoys no implied powers so
neither should the Vice President; (5) the Vice President’s
constitutional powers are too modest to require a privilege;
(6) the Vice President does not occupy his own branch of
government, therefore he does not have his own distinct
privilege; (7) acknowledging that the Vice President has a
privilege would be counter to the rule against creating new
privileges; and (8) VPP is anti-Originalist. While these positions
cannot be dismissed out of hand, in the end they are
unpersuasive.
A.

There Is No Explicit Textual Grant Providing Support for
VPP

It could be contended that VPP does not exist because it
cannot be traced to any express textual grant. The argument
could be advanced that, since executive privilege arguably
derives authority from Article II’s Vesting Clause, legislative
privilege arguably from the Speech or Debate Clause, and
judicial privilege arguably from Article III’s Vesting Clause, the
Vice President—by contrast—cannot point to any single
constitutional clause to support his privilege. Because the Vice
President cannot rely on any express textual grant, he, unlike all
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other constitutional officers, must lack a similar constitutional
privilege.
This position is far less convincing than it may initially
seem. After all, it is far from certain that executive and judicial
privileges draw their support from the Vesting Clauses of
Articles II and III. 799 Indeed, in the case of executive privilege,
while lower courts and academic authorities have often tied the
privilege to Article II’s Vesting Clause, 800 the Supreme Court has
never done so. In both Nixon I and Nixon II, the Court relied
instead on broader structural features of the Constitution,
rejecting an explicit textual tie. 801 The Court looked instead to
the doctrine of separation of powers and concluded that
constitutional privileges were implicitly linked to enumerated
powers. 802
An argument based on Article III’s Vesting Clause faces the
same hurdle. In the case law that has discussed judicial
privilege, Article III’s Vesting Clause has not been invoked. 803 As
with executive privilege, the courts that have discussed the
doctrine justified judicial privilege by looking to broader
structural considerations in the Constitution. 804 The courts’
reasoning in this regard has been by analogy since it is
understood that both lawmakers and Presidents enjoy such
authority. That approach—reasoning based on constitutional
structure and symmetry—is of course exactly what undergirds

See supra Parts II.A, IV.A.
See supra note 84.
801
See United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (stating that
“[n]owhere in the Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit
reference to a [presidential] privilege of confidentiality”); Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs.
(Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 448 (1977) (citing two cases involving members of Congress
to support reasoning regarding executive privilege); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice,
491 U.S. 440, 484 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[C]ontrol [of] the disposition of
Presidential materials [is] . . . vital to the President’s ability to perform his assigned
functions [but], is not given to exclusive Presidential control by any explicit
provision in the Constitution itself.”).
802
See, e.g., In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating
Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488, 1519 (11th
Cir. 1986) (“The Court [in Nixon I] discerned the constitutional foundation for the
executive privilege—notwithstanding the lack of any express provision—in the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers and in the very nature of a President’s
duties . . . . [T]he same must be true of the judiciary.”).
803
See supra Part IV.A–B.
804
See, e.g., In re Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1519.
799
800
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the argument in favor of VPP and is an approach that has been
embraced in other separation-of-powers contexts. 805
Even with regard to the Speech or Debate Clause itself, the
text says nothing about protecting papers or confidential
discussions with aides. At best, the text provides a somewhat
less ambiguous nexus with privilege than the Vesting Clauses of
Articles II and III. To the extent the Clause does lend support
for privilege, it is because the Clause has been interpreted in an
expansive fashion by the courts, not because the text of the
provision commands it. As Chief Justice Burger wrote in dissent
in Nixon II, “the Court has refused to confine that Clause
literally ‘to words spoken in debate.’ . . .
Congressional
papers . . . have [also] been held protected by the Clause . . . .”806
He reasoned further that “[d]espite the Constitution’s silence as
to the papers of the Legislative Branch, this Court ha[s] had no
difficulty holding those papers to be protected from control by
other branches.” 807 And, of course, VPP itself is in part tied to
the broad judicial construction given the Speech or Debate
Clause.
Further, the generalized legislative privilege has been used
to justify the confidentiality of individual lawmakers’
deliberations.
In this context, the courts have turned to
structural considerations to support this privilege, rather than
text.
The unanimous Court in Nixon I rejected the argument that
the lack of an explicit textual privilege for the President meant
that none existed. This reasoning merits full quotation since it
has a direct bearing on the existence of VPP. The Court stated:
The Special Prosecutor argues that there is no provision in the
Constitution for a Presidential privilege as to the President’s
communications corresponding to the privilege of Members of
Congress under the Speech or Debate Clause. But the silence of
the Constitution on this score is not dispositive.
The rule of constitutional interpretation announced in
McCulloch v. Maryland . . . that that which was reasonably
appropriate and relevant to the exercise of a granted power was

See supra note 15.
Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 511 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
807
Id. at 515 n.9.
805
806
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to be considered as accompanying the grant, has been so
universally applied that it suffices merely to state it. 808

Thus, while VPP lacks express textual support, so does
executive privilege, legislative privilege, and judicial privilege.
All constitutional officers rely on constitutional structure for
their privileges, the same basis that a Vice President would.
B. The Vice President Enjoys No Constitutional Privilege
Because All Executive Power Is Delegated to the President
At first blush, one of the major dilemmas surrounding
invocation of VPP would be that it appears to entail an implicit
assertion that the executive branch is plural. 809 As noted above,
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.” As one authority on the vice presidency
concluded, the Vice President “is constitutionally prohibited from
sharing the ‘executive Power.’ ” 810
808
United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.16 (1974) (emphasis
added) (quoting Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 537 (1917)).
809
See, e.g., David F. Forte, Vice President, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION 183, 183 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (stating that from the
constitutional text “it is clear that the Vice President was not vested with any part of
the constitutionally mandated executive power. There would be no plural
executive.”).
810
YOUNG, supra note 658, at 8; see also, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 64
(“The constitutional independence of the vice presidency, joined to the constitutional
indivisibility of executive power, limits the range of responsibilities that the vice
president can perform well in the executive branch.”); G. Homer Durham, The VicePresidency, 1 W. POL. Q. 311, 312 (1948) (“In vesting the executive power in Article
II, the Constitution bestows no grant on the Vice-President.”); see also Katzenbach
Memo, supra note 318 (“Legislation [which] might attempt to place power in the Vice
President to be wielded independently of the President . . . would run afoul of Article
II, section 1”); id. at 9 (“To the extent that legislation might attempt to place power
in the Vice President to be wielded independently of the President, it no doubt would
run afoul of Article II, section 1 of the Constitution, which provides flatly that ‘the
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.’ Furthermore,
since the Vice President is an elective officer in no way answerable or subordinate to
the President, the practical difficulties which might arise from such legislation are
as patent as the Constitutional problem.”); SILVA, supra note 297, at 170 (“[T]he
Constitution vests executive power in the President and thus by implication forbids
its exercise by anyone who is not actually a President.”); Reynolds, supra note 323,
at 1542 n.14 (“I am aware of no argument to the effect that the Vesting Clause of
Article II imbues the Vice President with any executive power, and of course such an
argument would be plainly contrary to text. Nonetheless, in modern times the
presence of some sort of ‘spillover’ executive authority in the Vice President seems
sometimes to be assumed.”); Wilmerding, supra note 670, at 34 (“The whole idea of
vesting in the office of the vice president any substantial part of the executive power
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Over the years, the DOJ has maintained that the executive
branch and the President are essentially one, 811 as reflected in
the President’s ability to remove high-ranking executive branch
officials. It is beyond cavil that the Framers of the Constitution
explicitly rejected notions of a plural executive. During the
Constitutional Convention, for example, the New Jersey Plan
provided for a multi-headed executive branch. 812 This approach
was rejected by the Convention 813 and is reflected further by an
earlier version of Article II, Section 1 which read that “the
Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single
is inconsistent with that clause of the Constitution which vests the executive power
of the United States in a single person, the president, and with that other clause
which makes the president responsible by requiring him to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. How is the president to be held responsible for the entire
execution of the laws, if some of the laws are to be executed by an officer not subject
to his direction or control?”); cf. Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(“[D]espite the Vice President’s rank, we do not believe his status as Chairman [of
the interagency group] lent the Task Force any authority independent of the
President.”); GEORGE BUSH, LOOKING FORWARD 227 (Victor Gold ed., 1987) (“It’s
fundamental that the country can only have one President at a time. On the day a
disgruntled, self-serving Vice President declares civil war on the White House by
publicly challenging a President, our system of government will be in serious
trouble.”); Cronin, supra note 652, at 335 (“You can’t have two leaders of the
Executive Branch at one time . . . .” (quoting Vice President Humphrey) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Following his tenure as Vice President, Henry Wallace addressed Harvard Law
School and stated that “[t]here should be no legislation nor any constitutional
amendment giving the office of the Vice President more power. It is vital that the
power of the Chief Executive should not be diminished in any way by law. So far as
the law is concerned, one man should run the executive branch of the Government,
not two.” See YOUNG, supra note 658, at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
811
See, e.g., Authority of Agency Officials To Prohibit Employees from Providing
Information to Congress, Op. O.L.C. (May 21, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/crsmemoresponsese.htm; Authority of the Special Counsel
of the Merit Systems Protection Board To Litigate & Submit Legislation to
Congress, 8 OP. O.L.C. 30, 31 (1984) (concluding that “Congress may not grant [a
special counsel] the authority to submit legislative proposals directly to Congress
without prior review and clearance by the President, or other appropriate authority,
without raising serious separation of powers concerns”); Constitutionality of Statute
Requiring Executive Agency To Report Directly to Congress, 6 OP. O.L.C. 632, 633
(1982) (stating that a legislative “requirement that subordinate officials within the
Executive Branch submit reports directly to Congress, without any prior review by
their superiors, would greatly impair the right of the President to exercise his
constitutionally based right to control the Executive Branch”).
812
See, e.g., CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 368 (2d ed.
1987) (quoting the New Jersey Plan, which would have “authorized [Congress] to
elect a federal Executive to consist of [blank] persons”).
813
See Rossiter, supra note 662 (observing that “a plural executive . . . [was] long
ago rejected by the framers of the Constitution”).
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person.” 814 In The Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton
defended the Constitution with its new executive. He noted that
its unitary nature was a primary feature. He stated that the
first ingredient that constitutes “energy in the executive” is
unity. 815 As this rejection of a plural executive relates to the vice
presidency, one commentator noted decades ago,
[t]he Vice President is an independent officer. He is in nowise
responsible to the President or subordinate to him. . . . But to
allow him authority for executive action—particularly should
his acts not be subject to Presidential review and veto—would
be a dangerous and doubtless unconstitutional intrusion into
the domain of the chief executive. 816

To the extent that the executive power—whatever the scope
of this authority—is placed in the President, it would seem to
follow that power over executive privilege would inhere in the
President also. If the executive power resides in the President
and therefore the power over executive privilege inheres in the
President, 817 then how would the Vice President be able to invoke
VPP?

814
2 FARRAND, supra note 323, at 171; see also Edward S. Corwin, The Steel
Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953) (“The
records of the Constitutional Convention make it clear that the purposes of this
clause were simply to settle the question whether the executive branch should be
plural or single and to give the executive a title.”).
815
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 136, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton); see
also id. at 356 (“Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise
the proceedings of one man [as in the case of the President].”).
816
WAUGH, supra note 296, at 194. A hint at the practical problems involved
with a plural executive is reflected in an incident during the vice presidency of
Charles Curtis. Although generally a nondescript Vice President, in 1932, when
confronted by hundreds of protestors on the Capitol Grounds, Curtis reportedly
called out the Marines, two companies of which arrived at the Capitol. See
HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 381. Although Curtis later denied having ordered the
Marines to the grounds, see Fleta Campbell Springer, Glassford and the Siege of
Washington, HARPER’S MONTHLY, Nov. 1932, at 641, Admiral Henry F. Butler, the
leader of the Marine units, stated that he had “sent the Marines at the request of
the Vice-President.” Id. at 650. This action led to considerable embarrassment to all
involved. See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 381.
Interestingly, Abraham Lincoln’s first Vice President, Hannibal Hamlin, partook in
military activity of a different sort during the Civil War. As Vice President, Hamlin
volunteered for and drilled with a Maine Coast Guard unit for two months. See H.
DRAPER HUNT, HANNIBAL HAMLIN OF MAINE: LINCOLN’S FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT
210–12 (1969); MARK SCROGGINS, HANNIBAL: THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S
FIRST VICE PRESIDENT 210–12 (1994).
817
See supra Part II.C–D.
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Even though the Vesting Clause precludes the Vice
President from enjoying executive power, that does not mean
that VPP cannot exist. It will be recalled that VPP is not
executive privilege or even a subset of executive privilege, it is a
privilege incidental to the Vice President’s unique constitutional
powers. The Vice President exercises Article I authority as
President of the Senate. In this capacity, he is exercising
legislative power, not executive power. Moreover, the Vice
President can take preparatory action in anticipation of
succession, preparatory action in anticipation of presidential
inability and steps to help determine presidential inability that
derive authority from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, not the
Vesting Clause or any part of Article II. 818 As with any
potentially competing constitutional clauses, Article II and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment must be read together. 819 To interpret
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment so as not to read the Vice
President out of the inability or succession processes altogether—
which would be in clear contravention of the amendment’s
purposes—it must be viewed to permit the Vice President to
carry out such functions independently from the President.
Otherwise, the President could lawfully order the Vice President
not to make an inability determination against him simply by
virtue of his heading the executive branch. This would render
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment a nullity.
A
circumscribed privilege involving the Vice President’s limited
powers would not hamper the President’s recognized authority as
the head of the executive branch and would be consistent with
the purposes of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.

818
See, e.g., Adam R.F. Gustafson, Note, Presidential Inability and Subjective
Meaning, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 476 (2009) (“The power Section 4 grants to
the Vice President and the Cabinet . . . is an exception to the Constitution’s
otherwise nearly exclusive grant of executive power to the President.”).
819
See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68–69 (1904) (“If there be any
conflict between these two [constitutional] provisions, the one found in the
Amendments must control, under the well understood rule that the last expression
of the will of the lawmaker prevails over an earlier one.”).
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C. There Is Little Judicial or Historical Precedent Supporting
VPP
It could also be argued that the position favoring VPP relies
on “arid logic” alone. 820 In this way, VPP has never been
expressly litigated 821 because it has never been expressly
invoked. Two hundred and twenty years of experience without
exercise of such authority, at least with respect to the Vice
President’s duties of presiding over the Senate, is no small
reason to doubt its existence. 822 Thus, there is no judicial
precedent directly on point, only tantalizing bits of dicta. While
there is in fact little judicial or historical precedent to support
VPP, at the same time, there is no judicial precedent to counter
such an invocation and only one such historical instance.
While the courts are the ultimate interpreters of the
Constitution, they are not the sole interpreters. Congress and
the executive branch also render constitutional exegesis. This
interpretation, known in some circles as “coordinate
construction,” 823 is of particular interest when the branches
interpret their respective powers. 824 Longstanding coordinate
820
This expression is borrowed from Frank Easterbrook. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 922 (1990).
821
See supra Part VI.L.1–2. On this basis it could be argued that VPP does not
exist because there is no case law supporting the proposition. Cf. SHANE, supra note
323, at 131 (“Prior to the Bush [2002 executive] order . . . there is not a sentence in
any statute or judicial opinion suggesting that there is any independent vice
presidential privilege to protect vice presidential records.”). But, of course, that is
the case with any legal matter that has never been litigated. By definition, there is
no judicial decision on point. The opposite proposition is of course equally true: there
is no case law that explicitly rejects VPP. And, as has been discussed above, there is
in fact much analogous case law to support VPP, particularly since 2002. See Cheney
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F.
Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008); Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002).
Finally, such an argument overlooks the compelling structural and historical
arguments in favor of VPP.
822
Of course, legislative privilege has not been definitively resolved to this day.
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the merits of issue. See United States v.
Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Neither has judicial
privilege. Admittedly, unlike VPP, lower court opinions and dicta have made explicit
reference to the existence of these other two privileges.
823
See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS
POLITICAL PROCESS 231–32 (1988).
824
See United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (“In the
performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must
initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any
branch is due great respect from the others.”); see also Immigration &
Naturalization Servs. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“When any Branch [of
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construction or constitutional custom is given great deference by
the courts, particularly the closer the practice is to the origins of
the Constitution. 825
In questions of law such as VPP, which have no express
textual link and which have never been decided judicially on the
merits, one must rely even more heavily on custom. 826 History,
however, is bereft of any formal assertions of privilege by Vice
Presidents despite there having been opportunities for them to
have done so. Vice Presidents Humphrey, Agnew, and Cheney
all made references to the possible existence of such a privilege,
and the matter was discussed during the Rockefeller vice
presidency. Vice President Quayle successfully resisted efforts to
appear before several congressional hearings although he did not
explicitly justify his position on VPP grounds. It would seem late
in the day for such a novel assertion to be made. 827

the federal government] acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the
constitution has delegated to it.”).
825
See supra note 137; see also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 412 (1928) (“This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our
government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public
affairs long acquiesced in fixes the construction to be given its provisions.”); BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884) (“The construction placed
upon the constitution . . . by the men who were contemporary with its
formation . . . is of itself entitled to very great weight . . . .”); Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 621 (1842) (concluding that “contemporaneous expositions of”
the Constitution by the Framers bolster long acquiescence in construction); Stuart v.
Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (“[I]t is sufficient to observe, that practice
and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the
organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed
fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible
nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or
controlled.”).
826
Cf. Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 233
(1971) (testimony of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, Dep’t of Justice) (with respect to the lawfulness of presidential
impoundment, stating that “I think you pretty well have to go to the history and the
congressional and executive precedents, there just being no very helpful cases”);
EDWARD S. CORWIN, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 263 (Robert G. McCloskey ed.,
1957) (“[W]hen two departments both operate upon the same subject matter . . . .
[T]he question is what does the pertinent historical record show with regard to
presidential action in the field of congressional power?”).
827
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995) (“[P]rolonged
reticence would be amazing if such [action] . . . were not understood to be
constitutionally proscribed.”).
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While the absence of explicit political precedent for VPP
would appear somewhat damning, that is not to say the doctrine
could never be judicially recognized. First, the courts have not
treated venerable political precedent as outcome determinative.
For example, in Immigration & Naturalization Services v.
Chadha, 828 the Supreme Court ruled the legislative veto
unconstitutional despite its existence in scores of statutes over
more than a half century. In Powell v. McCormack, 829 the
Supreme Court struck down the House’s decision to exclude a
lawmaker despite longstanding political precedent to the
contrary. Thus, past practice is not always dispositive.
Second, the absence of explicit precedent involving VPP is
less than meets the eye.
VPP involves very narrow
circumstances, the type of which would occur only rarely. There
is no precedent involving a court or a committee trying to compel
a Vice President to appear to discuss his official duties. There
seems never to have been a situation in which a Vice President’s
legislative materials were demanded by an outside body. There
is only one occasion in which the Vice President’s Twenty-Fifth
Amendment actions regarding succession have been examined
directly—Ford’s appearance before a House subcommittee. And
there has been no inability determination made in U.S. history,
let alone an opportunity for assertion of privilege thereto. Thus,
the parameters for such a precedent are so narrow that its
absence is far less relevant than it otherwise might be. 830 As the
D.C. Circuit noted in In re Sealed Case regarding claims of
privilege, the “lack of such precedent is hardly surprising,
however, in view of the novelty of the [current] demand for
testimony: . . . [W]e do not regard the absence of precedent as
weighing heavily against recognition of the privilege.” 831
And, of course, such an invocation, while never expressly
made, would not be wholly lacking in pedigree. As alluded to
above, references to a possible vice presidential privilege have
occurred during four vice presidencies: Humphrey, Agnew,
See 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
395 U.S. 486 (1969).
830
For more on the application of political precedent in the context of separation
of powers, see Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom In Resolving Separation of
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984).
831
148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998); cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727
n.5 (1986) (“The Impeachment Clause of the Constitution can hardly be thought to
be undermined because of nonuse.”).
828
829
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Rockefeller, and Cheney. Vice Presidents have also declined to
testify at congressional hearings. These Vice Presidents could be
seen as having reserved the right for a successor to invoke such a
privilege. It will be remembered that, despite agreeing to provide
personal records to federal investigators, Agnew announced that
I do not acknowledge that you or the grand jury have any right
to records of the Vice President. Nor do I acknowledge the
propriety of any grand jury investigation of possible wrongdoing
on the part of the Vice President so long as he occupies that
office. These are difficult constitutional questions which need
not at this moment be confronted. 832

Finally, the applicability of political precedent, or lack
thereof, ought to reflect the constitutional and historical
development of the vice presidential office itself. The TwentyFifth Amendment has only been in force for just over four
decades, not two-hundred twenty years like the original text of
the Constitution. 833 In this regard, a major pillar of VPP is
actually comparatively youthful in constitutional terms. In
addition, the references to a potential constitutional privilege
being invoked by a Vice President all occurred during the past
forty-five years and illustrate the heightened status of the office
that has taken place in the past several decades. The increased
activity of, and attention focused on, the Vice President only
heighten the likelihood of a VPP scenario presenting itself. Some
commentators readily expect that Vice Presidents will invoke
Because of these
their own privilege in the future. 834
Agnew Reply, supra note 428.
Vice Presidents perhaps could or should have played a role in determining
presidential inability before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. That was never borne
out in practice, however. See HANSEN, supra note 741, at 123–24 (“In the three
major instances of temporary inability, Vice Presidents Arthur, Marshall, and Nixon
made no attempt to determine disability, although at least Nixon had reason to
believe the legal right was his.”). This failure was one reason why Section 4 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment was added.
834
See WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 242 (“[F]uture vice presidents will most likely
seek the same protections for their conversations, asserting that they too have
executive privilege. . . . The assertion of executive privilege for the vice
president . . . may be one of the changes in the office that remains in future
administrations.”); see also MONTGOMERY, supra note 143, at 112–13 (concluding
that the Cheney v. U.S. District Court “opinion was notable for . . . laying the
groundwork for future vice presidents to assert a distinct vice presidential immunity
from legal proceedings under the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine”);
Klarevas, supra note 7, at 865 (“[T]he opinion implies that the vice president should
enjoy the right to invoke presidential privileges and immunities (at least in civil
832
833
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considerations, the scope for evaluating the lack of explicit
political precedent ought to be narrowed accordingly.
For these reasons, this potential counterargument is much
less than it first appears.
D. The President Has No Implied Powers, Therefore, Neither
Should the Vice President
A fourth counterargument against VPP could also be made.
It would proceed as follows: if the President does not enjoy
implied powers, 835 then a fortiori the Vice President should not
have such authority either. This argument would be based on
the principle that the Constitution established a federal
government of limited powers 836 and that this principle was
underscored by the Tenth Amendment. 837 It could be bolstered
by past debate involving whether the Vice President possesses
implied powers. During the Calhoun vice presidency, a question
arose over whether the Vice President qua President of the
suits). . . . Should vice presidents seize on this language in the future, it is likely that
they will argue that they are shielded from a variety of legal proceedings because of
the unique rights and responsibilities conferred to them by the Constitution. The
fact that the Supreme Court did not expressly distinguish the vice president from
the president in its ruling bodes well for vice presidents.”); cf. Myers, supra note 45,
at 909 (“Cheney . . . essentially extended the protection of executive privilege to the
Vice President.”).
835
See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 225 (1821) (“[T]he genius and spirit
of our institutions are hostile to the exercise of implied powers.”); see also 2 ELLIOT,
supra note 28, at 540 (quoting Pennsylvania Chief Justice Thomas McKean at the
state ratifying convention: “executive officers have no manner of authority, any of
them, beyond what is by positive grant . . . delegated to them”); 3 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
464 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (“[Its powers] are enumerated. Is it not, then, fairly
deducible that it has no power but what is expressly given to it?—for if its powers
were to be general, an enumeration would be needless.” (statement of Edmund
Randolph at the Virginia Ratification Convention about the nature of the federal
government)); cf. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 483 (1789) (quoting Representative
Thomas Hartley, who stated the President’s “powers, taken together, are not very
numerous”).
836
See United States v. Lopez, 518 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“We start with first
principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 236 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) (“The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few
and defined. . . . [They] will be exercised principally on external objects, as war,
peace, negociation, and foreign commerce . . . .”).
837
See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
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Senate had the implied constitutional authority to call Senators
to order. Calhoun argued that the Vice President “has no
inherent power whatever.” 838
There is a fundamental flaw with this position, however.
Each of the three branches undeniably does exercise implied
powers, that is to say, powers not expressly delineated in the
Constitution. 839 It has been long recognized that Congress has
the implied authority to conduct investigations, 840 subpoena
information, 841 and hold individuals in contempt. 842 The Senate
has the authority to condition its approval of treaties. 843 The

838
Onslow, supra note 652, at 327. Several members of the Senate disagreed
with Calhoun, however. See 4 CONG. DEB. 278–341 (1828). In an abundance of
caution, the Senate ultimately decided to clarify matters and expressly granted the
Vice President this authority subject to overrule by the Senate as a whole. See id. at
340–41; HATCH & SHOUP, supra note 652, at 418.
839
See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406–07 (1819).
[In the Constitution,] there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the
Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers and which
requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely
described. Even the 10th Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of
quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word
“expressly,” and declares only that the powers “not delegated to the United
States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the
people,” thus leaving the question whether the particular power which may
become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one Government, or
prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole
instrument.
Id.
840
See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
841
See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Serviceman’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 505 (1975) (“The
issuance of a subpoena pursuant to an authorized investigation is . . . an
indispensable ingredient of lawmaking . . . .”).
842
See, e.g., Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542 (1917). The Court stated that
Congress’s implied power to issue contempt citations
rests only upon the right of self-preservation; that is, the right to prevent
acts which, in and of themselves, inherently obstruct or prevent the
discharge of legislative duty or the refusal to do that which there is
inherent legislative power to compel in order that legislative function may
be performed.
Id.
843
See, e.g., Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32, 35 (1869) (“In this country, a treaty is
something more than a contract, for the Federal Constitution declares it to be the
law of the land. If so, before it can become a law, the Senate, in whom rests the
authority to ratify it, must agree to it. But the Senate are not required to adopt or
reject it as a whole, but may modify or amend it, as was done with the treaty under
consideration.”); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 182 (1901)
(Brown, J., concurring) (“The Senate has no right to ratify the treaty and introduce
new terms into it, which shall be obligatory upon the other power, although it may
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President has the authority to establish diplomatic relations with
foreign governments, 844 settle international claims, 845 and enter
into certain executive agreements without the approval of both
houses of Congress or the Senate. 846 The judiciary can strike
down laws it deems unconstitutional, 847 hold individuals in
contempt, 848 and issue stays. 849
More importantly for this inquiry, each of the three branches
not only exercises some measure of implied power but also the
specific implied power to control the confidentiality of its internal
As will be
deliberations subject to judicial review. 850
remembered, the Court in Nixon I stated,
[T]he valid need for protection of communications between high
Government officials and those who advise and assist them in
the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this
confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. . . .
Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of
enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of
Presidential communications has similar constitutional
underpinnings. 851

Chief Justice Burger was even more explicit in dissent three
years earlier:
No statute gives this Court express power to establish and
enforce the utmost security measures for the secrecy of our
deliberations and records. Yet I have little doubt as to the
inherent power of the Court to protect the confidentiality of its
refuse its ratification, or make such ratification conditional upon the adoption of
amendments to the treaty.”).
844
See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 43 (2d ed. 1996).
845
See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
846
See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654; Pink, 315 U.S. at 203; Belmont,
301 U.S. at 324.
847
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
848
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1874) (“The power to punish for
contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and
writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The
moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with
jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power.”).
849
See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay
proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket . . . .”).
850
See supra Parts II–IV.
851
418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974).
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internal operations by whatever judicial measures may be
required. 852

Why would the Vice President, when exercising his own—
admittedly narrow—enumerated powers, not benefit from the
same privilege as all other constitutional officers? Why would his
decisionmaking be deemed less important and less in need of
confidential discussion? Indeed, the only way to read the
Constitution in a consistent fashion is to recognize the Vice
President’s authority in this context.
Therefore, an argument against VPP based on the supposed
lack of implied powers in the federal government is not
compelling.
E. Since the Vice President Does Not Occupy His Own Branch of
Government, He Does Not Have His Own Distinct Privilege
A fifth counterargument could be made that confidential
deliberations are required to ensure candor within discreet
branches of government. The Vice President is not a member
solely of any one of the three branches, therefore, it could be
contended he does not enjoy the protection of any of the three
constitutional privileges: executive, legislative, or judicial. Put
another way, the Vice President is already a constitutional
anomaly; his lack of a constitutional privilege would merely
reflect his unique status. 853 By extension, any vice presidential
privilege, such as it exists, must be exercised subject to the
approval of the head of the executive or legislative branch,
depending on what functions the Vice President is carrying out at
the time. Although this counterargument also has initial appeal,
a closer examination reveals its flaws.
First, the Vice President has unique duties that are
delegated to him by the Constitution, and they should not be
N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
853
This argument could be supported by other constitutional anomalies
involving the Vice President. For example, while the Constitution provides an oath
of office for the President, there is no vice presidential equivalent in the charter. See
Medina, supra note 654, at 80. While the Chief Justice, as opposed to the Vice
President, presides over the President’s impeachment trial, no special provision
exists regarding which officer would preside over a vice presidential impeachment
trial. See, e.g., id. While Congress may not reduce the President’s salary, see U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, there is no prohibition against its doing so to the Vice
President. See also supra note 789 and accompanying text.
852

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010)

2010]

VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY

619

confused with duties delegated to him by either Congress or the
President. His constitutional duties are not subject to the
ultimate means of executive branch or legislative branch control:
removal. Congress or the Senate by itself cannot prevent the
Vice President from chairing the upper chamber unless he is
impeached by the House and removed through Senate conviction,
and even then a new Vice President would eventually take his
place. 854 The Senate can, and has, changed its rules to limit the
discretion the Vice President has as President of the Senate but
again it cannot keep him from presiding altogether. Similarly,
the President cannot lawfully prevent the Vice President from
playing a role in making a determination as to presidential
inability or prevent him from succeeding to the presidency. 855
Nor can the President remove him from office. Thus, in carrying
out his constitutional duties, the Vice President is not
subordinated to the head of either the executive or legislative
branch; neither should his privilege. 856
Second, constitutional officers, not the branches writ large,
hold constitutional privileges. As the Supreme Court in Nixon I
stated and has been reaffirmed repeatedly, 857 constitutional
privileges stem from “the valid need for protection of
communication between high Government officials and those who
advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold
duties.” 858 Notably, the Court has also recognized that “high
854
See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew,
14 CONST. COMMENT. 245, 245 (1997).
855
As a practical matter, since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Vice Presidents
have been excluded from making at least initial, informal determinations of
presidential inability. For example, Vice President Bush did not make an initial
determination as to President Reagan’s fitness following his surgeries; this was
carried out by White House staff. See FEERICK, supra note 18, at xiii–xiv. As a
constitutional matter, however, any formal determination as to the President’s
ability to perform his duties must include the Vice President.
856
It will be recalled that lawmakers’ invocation of privilege is not subject to
approval of the parent chamber. See supra note 180.
857
See supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text.
858
United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (emphasis added).
The question could be raised whether “high Government officials” are in fact
“constitutional officers.” It is difficult, however, to see how they could be anything
but one and the same. The Court in Nixon I stated that “[c]ertain powers and
privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers . . . . The valid need for
protection of communications between high Government officials and those who
advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties . . . is too plain to
require further discussion.” Id. Nixon I and its progeny therefore reason that
constitutional privileges protect the enumerated powers of “high Government
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Government officials,” not branches, enjoy these privileges.859
While executive privilege may only be claimed by the President
as head of the executive branch, the same is not true of
legislative and judicial privileges. These privileges reflect the
dispersed power delegated by Articles I and III. These privileges,
therefore, may be asserted by individual lawmakers and judges.
That is to say a federal judge may invoke judicial privilege
without first seeking the approval of the Chief Justice of the
United States; although, if the matter were litigated, the
Supreme Court could wind up reviewing the assertion. 860 A
House member may do the same without seeking the approval of
the Speaker. 861 Not only is the privilege to be exercised by high
officials, but it is identified with enumerated powers under the
Constitution. 862 The Vice President’s enumerated powers just
happen to include powers involving both the legislative and
executive branches.
Thus, simply because the Vice President straddles two
branches does not mean he lacks a constitutional privilege. Were
such a rule to govern it could lead to absurd results. For
instance, under this scenario, the Chief Justice would not be
permitted to claim a judicial privilege because he straddles the
judicial and legislative branches through his role as presiding
officer during impeachment trials of the President. Yet all other
federal judges would maintain such authority. 863
officials.” At the same time, case law and past practice clearly indicate that only
constitutional officers may invoke constitutional privileges. This is further reflected
in the case law regarding executive privilege, which concludes that the doctrine can
only be invoked by a current or former President. See supra Part II.C–D. Similarly,
legislative privilege can only be asserted by current or former members of Congress
or staff at the member’s direction. See supra Part III. The same is likely true for
judges and law clerks. See supra Part IV. Since only constitutional officers can make
the decision to invoke constitutional privileges, the only way to reconcile the
rationale in Nixon I with the case law and past practice that restrict who can assert
constitutional privileges is to conclude that “constitutional officers” are in fact “high
Government officials.”
859
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978) (“Judges have absolute
immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because
of the special nature of their responsibilities.” (emphasis added)).
860
See supra Part IV.
861
See supra note 180.
862
See Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705–06 (“Certain powers and privileges flow from the
nature of enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential
communications has similar constitutional underpinnings.” (emphasis added)).
863
In a similar context, the President still enjoys executive privilege over
communication related to whether to veto legislation even though his responsibility
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As has been often observed, the branches of the federal
government are not hermetically sealed off from one another. 864
By design, constitutional duties transcend specific branches and
articles.
Accordingly, constitutional privileges flow from
“enumerated powers,” not from concerns over which branch or
article the constitutional officer happens to occupy.
F.

The Vice President’s Powers Are Too Modest To Require a
Privilege

The counterargument could be advanced that the Vice
President’s powers are too unimportant to require a
constitutional privilege. 865 It could be contended that since he
only presides over the Senate and casts tie breaking votes—
which as a practical matter he does infrequently and which
involve only modest authority—and since succession and
presidential inability matters take up little time, there is no need
for the Vice President to have a privilege. To build on Vice
President Rockefeller’s complaint, the “Vice-President has no
responsibility and no power.” 866 Such an argument against VPP
would be a variant of the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex,

in this regard stems from Article I, not Article II. This is no different from members
of the Senate who enjoy a legislative privilege when sitting in executive session
considering treaties and nominations. See also supra note 655.
864
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The actual art of governing under our
Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any
of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity.” (emphasis added)); Springer v. Gov’t of the Phil. Islands,
277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.”).
865
The office of Vice President has been denigrated from the beginning. Vice
President Adams famously lamented, “[m]y country has in its wisdom contrived for
me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or in his
imagination conceived.” 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 230. In declining nomination
to be Vice President, Daniel Webster stated, “I do not propose to be buried until I am
dead.” MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 652, at 428. Woodrow Wilson observed that
“the chief embarrassment in discussing this [vice presidential] office is that in
explaining how little there is to be said about it one has evidently said all there is to
say.” See id. at 431. Their comments and others like them generally predate the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the beginning of the modern vice presidency. See, e.g.,
Goldstein, supra note 298, at 508.
866
Cronin, supra note 652, at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the law does not concern itself with trifles. For two reasons such
a counterargument is misplaced.
First, it is difficult to argue that issues of presidential
inability and succession are unimportant. To the contrary, there
are few more weighty governmental matters than ensuring the
executive branch is led by an individual who is not laboring
under an inability. Ensuring an orderly succession is equally
important. Both of these concerns are especially vital in an age
involving nuclear weaponry, terrorists with global reach and a
host of other potential issues requiring instantaneous
presidential attention. The importance of presidential inability
and succession is reflected by the fact that a constitutional
amendment was adopted expressly to resolve such matters. 867
Moreover, three times Congress has taken action by statute to
attempt to improve the presidential succession process. 868
Simply because the Vice President may spend disproportionately
little of his time on matters of presidential succession and
inability does not mean that these are not vital governmental
functions; it means only that the nation has had the good fortune
to have been spared excessive experience with such matters since
the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Second, while the Vice President’s role in the Senate is
usually a modest one, at times it can be of supreme importance.
During the first Congress, Vice President Adams’s tiebreaking
vote ensured that the President’s authority to remove executive
officers from their posts without Senate approval was
recognized, 869 a constitutional interpretation later upheld in
Myers v. United States. This congressional interpretation of the
Constitution is credited with ensuring that Presidents have
sufficient authority to control the executive branch. 870 Another
vote cast by Adams may have averted war with Great Britain.871

See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 205 (“[O]bviously, the new
constitutional vision of the vice presidency that is embodied in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment gives the office an enhanced constitutional status. The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment articulates an appreciation of the office as an essential institution,
integral to the executive branch and crucial to solving problems of presidential
succession and inability.”).
868
The Succession Acts were passed in 1792, 1886, and 1947.
869
See 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 237.
870
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive
During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1492 (1997).
871
See 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 237.
867
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Vice President Arthur’s deciding vote aided his party in gaining
control of the Senate in 1881. 872 Similarly, Vice President
Cheney’s vote ensured Republican control of the Senate during
the first part of the 107th Congress. 873 A Vice President has also
participated in the constitutional amendment process through
his voting power, an authority not even the President
exercises. 874 At the same time, the authority to preside can be an
influential position from the standpoint of Senate procedure. For
instance, Vice Presidents have played a role in modifying or
attempting to modify interpretations of Senate rules such as the
filibuster. 875
More broadly, an argument based on the premise that the
vice presidency is an unimportant position overlooks the
enhanced profile of the institution over the past several decades.
There is no gainsaying that the office has risen immeasurably in
stature to the point where it is among the most prized in the U.S.
government. 876 For instance, there is little doubt that Vice
Presidents Cheney, Gore, and Mondale all wielded significant
authority during their tenure.
The high esteem in which the modern vice presidential office
is held is reflected by its treatment in the courts. It will be
remembered that in Cheney v. U.S. District Court the Supreme
Court itself noted that “[w]ere the Vice President not a party in
this case, the argument that the Court of Appeals
[erred] . . . might present different considerations.” 877 Further,
the Court implicitly equated the Vice President with the
President: “[S]eparation-of-powers considerations should inform
a court of appeals’ evaluation of a mandamus petition involving
the President or the Vice President.” 878 Elsewhere, the Court
observed that

See id. at 236.
See, e.g., Congress A to Z, in CQ ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
(D.R. Tarr & A. O’Connor eds., 2003), republished at CQPress.com, Historic
Milestones in Congress (2005), http://www.cqpress.com/incontext/constitution/docs/
hist_milestones.html.
874
See, e.g., 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 238.
875
See, e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 427–28, 442–43, 510–11, 523.
876
See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, supra note 647; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 10–
13; Albert, supra note 315.
877
542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004).
878
Id. at 382.
872
873
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[t]he discovery requests are directed to the Vice President . . . .
The Executive Branch, at its highest level, is seeking the aid of
the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives . . . .
[S]pecial considerations control when the Executive Branch’s
interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and
safeguarding the confidentiality of its communication are
implicated. 879

The Court also noted in the decision that “constitutional
responsibilities and status [are] factors counseling judicial
In this regard, the Court’s
deference and restraint.” 880
appreciation for the Vice President’s prominence in the
government played a role in its reaching the result it did. While
the judicial equation of the office with the presidency is
conceptually problematic, it certainly conveys the perceived
importance of the modern day vice presidency.
Finally, there is no indication that the Constitution
prioritizes one set of enumerated duties over another. Simply
because certain clauses are not often triggered does not mean
they are not important. The example of the impeachment power
comes to mind. Certainly this power is not a small one even
though it is infrequently invoked. 881
Ultimately, the argument that the Vice President’s duties
are ostensibly modest should not be a compelling rationale for
denying the office its own constitutional privilege.
G. The Rule Against Creating New Privileges
Another counterargument against the existence of VPP is
the legal principle that new privileges should not be fashioned
unnecessarily. This view has been acknowledged by the courts
on numerous occasions, including by the Supreme Court in Nixon
I. There, the Court stated that “exceptions to the demand for
every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” 882
The D.C. Circuit elaborated on this principle in In re Sealed
Case, in which it noted the importance of transparency in

Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
881
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 n.5 (1986).
882
United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see also Kaye,
supra note 181, at 546 n.98 (listing further authorities).
879
880
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government:
“The argument for a narrow construction is
particularly strong in cases like this one where the public’s
ability to know how its government is being conducted is at
stake.” 883
During the Clinton administration, the courts showed little
enthusiasm for embracing a novel form of executive branch
privilege, the protective function privilege. As noted earlier, the
Clinton administration asserted that this doctrine prevented
secret service agents from testifying about the President and that
the privilege was controlled by the Secretary of the Treasury—a
position that was rejected by the D.C. Circuit. In this regard, the
rule of construction has limited the efforts of Cabinet officers to
invoke novel privileges.
Certainly, interpreting the Constitution to recognize that the
Vice President has his own privilege would be counter to the
legal doctrine against creating new privileges and against the
democratic ideal of openness and governmental accountability.
That said, this rule of construction has not been applied so
strictly that it has prevented other constitutional officers from
exercising their own privileges.
Courts have held that
884
885
Presidents and federal lawmakers enjoy their own authority
in this regard. Federal judges would appear to as well. 886
Cabinet members, however, do not. 887 The distinction between
constitutional officers on one hand—the President, Vice
President, federal lawmakers, and federal judges—and
nonconstitutional officers—Cabinet members—on the other
would seem to be the path between these competing lines of
judicial precedent that acknowledge constitutional privileges in
some cases 888 but not others. 889 It also dovetails with Nixon I’s
admonition that privileges be related to “enumerated
constitutional powers,” which Cabinet officers do not exercise on

121 F.3d 729, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
See supra Part II.
885
See supra Part III.
886
See supra Part IV.
887
See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
888
See United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974); United States
v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re Certain
Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council
of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986). But cf. Turley, supra note 7,
at 677 n.159.
889
See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1077.
883
884
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their own. 890 Thus, this approach would seem to permit Vice
Presidents to exercise such a constitutional authority.
It also bears repeating that the argument in favor of VPP
entails only a narrow privilege, encompassing as it does merely
his authority to preside over the Senate and break ties, to
prepare for and help make a determination about presidential
inability, and to prepare for succession. As the rapporteur for the
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Vice Presidency,
Professor Michael Nelson, has written, “[c]onstitutionally, the
vice-presidency . . . [has] clear boundaries defining both the
range of activities it can perform and the extent of influence in
These “clear boundaries”
government it can achieve.” 891
accordingly limit the scope of the privilege. In this respect, VPP
would only reflect a minor “derogation of the search for truth”
890
The argument could be made that, since Cabinet members are given an
explicit role in determining presidential inability by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
they too should be granted a constitutional privilege akin to that discussed in this
Article. See Turley, supra note 7, at 677 n.159. The Vice President’s status under the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment is, of course, different from that of the Cabinet. First and
foremost, despite the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Cabinet secretaries remain
creatures of statute, not the Constitution. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon
II), 433 U.S. 425, 508 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[E]xecutive power was
vested in the president; no other offices in the Executive Branch, other than the
Presidency and Vice Presidency, were mandated by the Constitution. Only two
Executive Branch offices, therefore, are creatures of the constitution; all other
departments and agencies . . . are creatures of the congress . . . .”). The vice
presidency is a position established by the Constitution.
Second, aside from being a constitutional officer under Articles I and II, the Vice
President is the indispensable man in the inability determination process. See 111
CONG. REC. S15,383 (1965) (“The Vice President must be a party to the decision.”
(quoting amendment sponsor, Senator Bayh)); THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY: AN OVERVIEW 5 (1999) (“[T]he Vice President is
the indispensable actor in section 4: it cannot be invoked without his agreement.”).
The Cabinet is empowered to participate in the inability determination process with
the Vice President, but it may be replaced by another entity established by
Congress. See 111 CONG. REC. S15,385 (“[I]f Congress specifies another body . . . it
will do so because it wants another body to replace the Cabinet, which would have
the primary responsibility until Congress precribed [sic] another body.” (quoting
amendment sponsor, Senator Bayh)). The Vice President, therefore, is distinct from
the Cabinet in that he cannot be removed from the decisionmaking process. Id. at
S15,379 (contending that the amendment makes it “crystal clear that the Vice
President must be a party to any action declaring the President unable to perform
his powers and duties” (quoting amendment sponsor, Senator Bayh)); id. at S15,383
(“The Vice President would have to act with either body.” (quoting Senator
McCarthy)); id. (“The Vice President must make a separate determination with
either the Cabinet or another body.” (quoting Senator Bayh)). For these reasons,
Cabinet secretaries cannot be equated with the Vice President.
891
TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 62.
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and would seem to properly balance the competing concerns of
promoting intra-governmental candor with dissemination of
information about the functioning of the vice presidency.
H. VPP Represents an Anti-Originalist Position
Finally, it could be posited that VPP represents a position
that contradicts the views of the Framers. 892 Earlier discussion
reflects that neither Adams nor Jefferson made any reference to
the Vice President enjoying his own privilege. 893 In fact, both
took positions that would seem inconsistent with VPP. While
there may be some initial appeal to this counterargument to
supporters of Originalism, this view suffers from two significant
shortcomings.
First, the views of the original Framers carry much less
weight with respect to the vice presidency than the presidency
because the original clauses governing the Vice President have
been amended on several occasions. As noted above, in 1804, the
Twelfth Amendment changed the election process for the Vice
President, making him politically subordinate to the President.
In 1933, the Twentieth Amendment clarified the incoming Vice
President’s authority to become President should misfortunate
befall the incoming President. Finally, in 1967 through the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment the Vice President’s status was
elevated by his explicit inclusion in the process for determining
presidential inability. The amendment also clarified his standing
following the death or resignation of the President or the
occurrence of a presidential vacancy. Further, it acknowledged
the increasing executive branch role the Vice President had come
to play during the previous few decades and at the same time
raised his constitutional stature. 894 Since the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment is a major part of VPP, this aspect of the Vice
President’s privilege would not be governed by the Founding

See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 338, at 13 (stating that Cheney’s
“privilege argument is so novel that its antecedents won’t be found in
any . . . foundational texts,” such as The Federalist Papers); Turley, supra note 7.
This counterargument, of course, presupposes that Originalism should govern
separation of powers disputes, a view not all would share.
893
See supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text.
894
See, e.g., supra note 315.
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Generation. 895 Thus, since the authority of the Vice President
and his relationship to the President have been modified several
times through the amendment process, 896 the views of the
original Framers have less bearing than in other contexts.
Second, it merits noting that none of the early Vice
Presidents appears to have been engaged in a contest for
information while presiding over the Senate. In this regard, it is
hard to say definitively that the other half of VPP would have
been beyond the pale to the Framers. The views of the Founding
Generation are therefore far from clear on this score. In sum, the
argument that VPP is an anti-Originalist conception is
unpersuasive.
CONCLUSION: WEIGHING THE MERITS OF VPP
Whether the Vice President holds his own constitutional
privilege is a novel question; one that sheds light on both the
growing power of the office and on the unique role the Vice
President plays in American government. While constitutional
text is silent on the explicit question, broader structural
considerations counsel in favor of such an authority to the extent
the Vice President is carrying out his own constitutionally
assigned responsibilities to preside over the Senate and break
ties, to prepare for and help make a determination about
presidential inability, and to prepare for succession. Since the
President, members of Congress, and federal judges each enjoy a
constitutional privilege to shield their internal deliberations from
outside scrutiny, logically so should the Vice President. This is
because the Constitution has been interpreted to protect the
quality of internal decisionmaking by constitutional officers.
This includes ensuring that Presidents, national lawmakers, and
federal judges can gather the information they need to make
decisions properly; they can make decisions without fear they
will incur civil liability for their official duties; and they can have
candid discussions with their subordinates and among their
peers.
Although the Vice President’s constitutional
decisionmaking is limited to two narrow spheres, there is no
reason it should not receive the same protection from outside
895
See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 167 (“[The Twenty-Fifth Amendment]
articulates a new constitutional vision of the vice-presidential office, a far grander,
more optimistic conception than the founders dared advance.” (citations omitted)).
896
See Albert, supra note 315.
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interference as that of any other constitutional officer. This is
particularly so when compared to federal judges. Members of the
judiciary would seem less in need of a privilege than the Vice
President since they have life tenure.
VPP is, in effect, a composite of two separate constitutional
privileges: (1) an Article I privilege, stemming from the Speech or
Debate Clause and from structural and historical considerations;
and (2) a Twenty-Fifth Amendment privilege. 897 The former part
of VPP could only be invoked pursuant to the Vice President’s
presiding over the Senate and breaking ties and the latter only
when matters involve immediate or specific questions of
presidential succession or inability. Although obviously not a
Senator, the Vice President under the Constitution is President
“of” the Senate: a part of that body while chairing proceedings in
the upper chamber. Thus, it would seem that in this capacity he
could exercise the privileges that may attach to the legislative
branch, especially since congressional staff enjoy such protection.
In this respect, he may claim the benefit of some measure of
absolute privilege radiating from the Speech or Debate Clause, or
something akin to it, under the generalized legislative privilege.
In addition, he would have to comply with Senate rules regarding
nondisclosure of information revealed in secret sessions over
which he presided, although enforcement of such confidentiality
would be governed by the Senate as a whole and not by the Vice
President.
With respect to the Vice President’s preparation for
succession or involuntary replacement of the President, a
persuasive argument in favor of a qualified VPP could be made
based upon the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. The President’s
authority under Article II cannot be read in isolation from the
rest of the Constitution. It must be interpreted in light of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 898 To the extent the Vice President is
preparing to immediately take the reins of power—either
897
These potential privileges, taken together, could also overlap. Conceivably,
the Vice President could preside over the Senate while the body considers inability
matters pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Both aspects of VPP, therefore,
could involve the Vice President resisting civil discovery and a nonimpeachment
House investigation.
898
See, e.g., Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68–69 (1904) (“If there be any
conflict between these two [constitutional] provisions, the one found in the
Amendments must control, under the well understood rule that the last expression
of the will of the lawmaker prevails over an earlier one.”).
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permanently or temporarily—it would seem his relevant internal
communications would be privileged based on his own
constitutional authority, with his deliberations after assuming
the presidency being governed by traditional executive privilege.
Further, routine discussions among vice presidential aides
specifically regarding presidential inability and succession would
appear to be privileged as well. Invocation of such a privilege,
like that of executive privilege, would of course be suspect in the
context of a criminal investigation.
Past investigations involving the vice presidency reflect that
occupants of the office have been presented with numerous
opportunities to assert a constitutional privilege of some sort but
have never formally done so. However, none of the past inquiries
involved the Vice President’s role in presiding over the Senate,
only one entailed the Vice President’s preparation for the
presidency,
and
none
involved
presidential
inability
determinations. These episodes involved either allegations of
malfeasance or maladministration unrelated to vice presidential
duties (Tompkins, Calhoun, Colfax, Agnew, Rockefeller—as
Governor—and Gore) or the exercise of authority delegated by
the President (Wallace, Humphrey, Rockefeller, Bush, Quayle,
and Cheney). On the other hand, generalized allusions to a vice
presidential privilege were made during the tenures of
Humphrey, Agnew, Rockefeller, and Cheney, all of which imply
that such a power exists. In addition, no Vice President has ever
been compelled to appear against his will before a congressional
committee and Vice Presidents have successfully resisted such
oversight efforts in the past (Humphrey, Quayle, and Gore).
Thus, to some extent, these historical precedents can be read to
support a vice presidential privilege.
Furthermore, dicta from the Supreme Court in Cheney v.
U.S. District Court and from a lower court in Walker v. Cheney
also buttress the position that the Vice President should be
treated with some deference in contests over the release of
information. The facts underlying the two former decisions are
not completely on “all fours” as to vice presidential privilege but,
by definition, unprecedented legal questions have no exact legal
precedent. Dicta from these opinions therefore constitute the
only judicial pronouncements closely related to VPP. While the
two decisions tend to combine the President and Vice President
together in an unsatisfying manner and do not involve an actual
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assertion of constitutional privilege, the overall tenor of the
opinions and of the dicta are unmistakable. The courts have
therefore shown a healthy respect for the asserted needs of the
Vice President to carry out his duties with a fair measure of
confidentiality, even if he is only exercising presidentially
delegated duties. There is little reason to think that the Vice
President would receive any less deference from the courts if he
were exercising his own constitutional powers and if he actually
made a formal claim of constitutional privilege. The judicial
equation of the President and Vice President also reflects the
latter’s constitutional status and further underscores the
likelihood that a court would ultimately recognize a vice
presidential privilege since the President obviously enjoys his
own authority in this realm. Dicta from Nixon I and a host of
other judicial opinions tying privilege to enumerated
constitutional responsibilities provide further reinforcement for
the notion of VPP. To varying degrees, structural arguments,
case law, and history are all therefore supportive of such a
doctrine.
The argument in favor of VPP, while persuasive, is not
wholly unassailable, however. There are arguments against its
existence that are not without some merit. Still, the better view
is that the Vice President may withhold communications from
outside parties if such materials relate to his narrow authority in
the Senate and as potential successor to, or temporary
replacement for, the President.
In sum, should the issue arise as to whether the Vice
President may withhold materials, even if the President opposes
his efforts, it would appear that the Vice President would indeed
enjoy such a constitutional privilege, provided the matter in
question falls within the latter’s own areas of constitutional
responsibility. This would seem to be the most acceptable
outcome for a governmental structure premised in part on
encouraging all its constitutional officers to have the benefit of an
effective decisionmaking process. It would also be very much in
keeping with the rising stature of the vice presidency in
American government that has taken place over the past several
decades.

